On the last day of May, 1862, heavy gunfire rumbles and thunders in the distance beyond
the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. Gloomy clouds overhead reinforce the darkness
that shadows the Union Army. Only the day before, Major General George B. McClellan’s Army of the
Potomac had seemed poised to move decisively against Richmond, but a torrential rainstorm
that night had turned the roads into deep quagmires. McClellan, as usual, decides to wait.
By late May, weeks of successful campaigning have brought the Federal enemy nearly to the
gates of Richmond. So close to the Rebel capital are the lead elements of McClellan’s Army of the
Potomac that they can hear the clanging of church bells in Richmond, and they can spot the distant
church steeples dotting Richmond’s cityscape. Both Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston and Union
Major General George B. McClellan are thoughtful, cautious commanders. McClellan, in particular,
constantly pleads for reinforcements. President Lincoln, wanting more aggressive action,
grumbles that the general had a bad case of “the slows.” McClellan believes he is facing
a Confederate army much larger than his own; in reality, he outnumbers the enemy by 40,000 men.
For his part, Johnston knows he is outnumbered and seeks to keep his army out of harm’s way
while he waits for a chance to strike a decisive blow against the enemy.
As the Union Army edges ever closer to Richmond, the James River offers a tempting
avenue for the Navy to aid the campaign with heavy artillery and ironclad vessels.
On May 15th, a Union Navy flotilla is battered by stubborn Confederate guns
atop the high ground along the river at Drewry’s Bluff. The armor of the ironclads USS Monitor
and USS Galena could not withstand the advantageously placed land batteries
and had to turn back. It becomes plain that the James will not lead Northern forces into Richmond.
The Union Navy’s failure does not assuage worries in Richmond about the advancing enemy,
and Johnston’s next move only increases the alarm. Although Confederate batteries block the James,
Johnston worries that Union forces might still approach the capital from the river below Drewry’s
Bluff. Accordingly, he withdraws all his troops south of the Chickahominy River. The troops settle
into positions three miles east of Richmond, behind a line of earthworks dug the year before.
Even more alarming to Confederate prospects are reports about Union Major General Irvin
McDowell’s I Corps. Numbering more than 30,000 men, McDowell’s corps has kept well north of
Richmond to guard Washington. Now it is reported to be marching toward Fredericksburg on its way
south to join McClellan. Uniting I Corps with McClellan’s men would create an overwhelming
army of 135,000 troops - the largest military force yet seen in North America.
Although the potential junction with McDowell would create a vast and unstoppable Union force,
it also gives Johnston an opening. To speed the union with McDowell
while maintaining pressure on Richmond, McClellan has dangerously split his vast army in two.
Keeping most of his men north to be nearer to McDowell, McClellan shifts two corps south of
the Chickahominy. If Johnston swiftly strikes and crushes the detachment below the river,
the remaining Union forces would be vulnerable to a quick attack.
The Chickahominy River is an insignificant squiggly line on a map, only 15 yards wide in dry
weather. Before the war, several bridges provided easy crossing points, but the shallow river is
easily fordable in many places. Occasionally splitting into multiple streams to flow around
swampy islands, the river twists through a belt of wooded wetlands 300 to 400 yards wide.
Beyond the swamps, the terrain rises slightly into stretches of woods or cleared and cultivated
bottom land cut with drainage ditches. Despite its shallowness, the Chickahominy
is a formidable barrier. The month of May is notorious for relentless and heavy rain,
and the river overflows its banks and keeps on rising over wide stretches of swamps and
bottom lands. Farther back from the stream, the ground is so saturated with water that it has
become a mushy quagmire in which artillery, wagons, and horses are virtually useless.
General Johnston orders all the Chickahominy bridges destroyed after he withdraws south
of the river on May 16th. Union troops set to work building new bridges. They quickly erect
Bottom’s Bridge, a span crossing the stream at the Williamsburg Road on the direct route to Richmond.
A short distance upstream, they also repair the Richmond & York River Railroad bridge.
Union forces begin crossing the river on May 20th. Eventually, two Union corps,
commanded by Brigadier Generals Erasmus D. Keyes and Samuel P. Heintzelman, assume positions on
the south bank of the river. McClellan’s other three corps, under Brigadier Generals Edwin V.
Sumner, William B. Franklin, and Fitz John Porter, remain on the north bank.
Brigadier General Keyes moves his IV Corps along the Williamsburg Road. The night of May
26th brings more rain to soak the troops despite their rubber blankets. Pickets posted in thick
brush find the night so dark that “had a battle line of the enemy been within bayonet’s thrust,
it would have been invisible.” Occasionally skirmishing with the Confederates, troops from
Brigadier General Silas Casey’s Third Division in the IV Corps settle into a crossroads community
called Seven Pines, which is distinguished by two curious-looking twin farmhouses.
Originally, the houses were intended to be the opposite ends of a much larger mansion.
The owners planned to live in the houses while construction went on for the palatial main
building, but the intervening rooms were never built. Near the houses is a tremendous woodpile,
10 to 12 feet high and more than 100 feet long. Three-fourths of a mile west of Seven Pines,
Casey’s troops of the Third Division cut down trees to build a line of abatis in front of
their earthwork. Half a mile to the east of the front line of works, a longer and heavier line
of abatis shields the Williamsburg Road and Seven Pines. Between the two lines is the Union camp,
situated behind a line of defenses anchored by a five-sided earthwork fort called Casey’s Redoubt.
Behind Casey’s men is Brigadier General Darius N. Couch’s First Division; in their rear is
Heintzelman’s III Corps. Farther back along the Williamsburg Road toward Bottom’s Bridge are the
Second and Third Divisions of Brigadier Generals Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny, respectively.
To their left, the Federals are shielded by White Oak Swamp, but to the front and right
the Union works are unprotected by any natural barriers. Keyes recognizes the peril and tells
staff officers on May 29th that “our position is certain to tempt the enemy to attack us.”
Seeking to guarantee quick access to reinforcements from across the Chickahominy,
Keyes puts his soldiers to work building several new bridges. Bridging the river is only part
of the effort needed for the crossings. Each bridge requires hundreds of yards
of corduroy roads to provide access across the saturated bottom lands. One of the new bridges
is built by the 1st Minnesota Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Company officers supervise the work,
with no help from Army engineers - their hardened lifestyles as lumberjacks and woodworkers in the
forested woodlands of Minnesota suits them in this new and improvised line of work.
Without regulation bridge materials, soldiers chop down trees in the surrounding woods to hew beams
and planks. To support the bridge, they build timber cribs. Each crib sinks deep into the mud,
surrounded with stones to weigh them down. Once the pilings are firmly set, log stringers are
laid across them to hold the roadway, which is then floored with split logs.
Holding the bridge together are withes, flexible branches that firmly lashed planks and beams
together. Wild grapevines used for the withes provide the name for the span: Grapevine Bridge.
By May 25th, General Johnston has set his plans in motion to attack the divided Union Army, calling
in troops from Petersburg, Gordonsville, and Fredericksburg. When assembled, the Confederates
would number nearly 75,000. Each of Johnston’s three top commanders have graduated from West
Point in the Class of 1842. Major General James Longstreet of South Carolina had served in the
Indian Wars and the Mexican War. Also from South Carolina, Major General Daniel Harvey Hill, often
shortened to D. H. Hill, had left the Army after the Mexican War to become a college professor
and administrator in North Carolina. As Colonel of the 1st North Carolina Infantry Regiment,
he won an early Confederate victory at the Battle of Big Bethel on June 10th, 1861.
Kentucky-born Major General Gustavus W. Smith had also left the Army in the 1850s. His training as
a military engineer had helped secure him the post of street commissioner of New York City.
Johnston originally plans to move against the Union forces on both sides of the Chickahominy
on May 29th and shatter McClellan’s army before it becomes even larger
with the addition of McDowell’s men. But late on the evening of May 28th,
Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart sends word that McDowell has been diverted to
deal with Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s army in the Shenandoah Valley.
For the time being, at least, Johnston could focus on smashing the smaller wing
of the Union army. If the attack succeeds, the odds would be less daunting for an attack on the
rest of the Federals north of the stream. The Confederate move is set for Sunday, May 31st.
Johnston divides his army in two for the attack. Two of Smith’s divisions,
under Major Generals Ambrose Powell Hill and “Prince John” Magruder, would shield the
Confederates from enemy troops on the other side of the Chickahominy. For the main attack against
the 31,500 troops of Keyes and Heintzelman, Johnston allots Longstreet 40,000 troops.
They would advance along three different roads and strike from three directions at once. D. H.
Hill has orders to take the Williamsburg Stage Road, which runs directly east from Richmond to
Seven Pines, and move against the enemy center and right. Major General Benjamin Huger would
cross the Williamsburg Stage Road and take the Charles City Road, which runs to the southeast.
From there, a rural road runs north to a position menacing the Federals’ left flank.
Longstreet, in turn, would take the Nine Mile Road. For several miles,
the Nine Mile Road runs parallel and to the north of the Williamsburg Stage Road. But, it takes a
southeastern turn to cut across the Richmond & York River Railroad at Fair Oaks before meeting
the Williamsburg Stage Road at Seven Pines. Coming down from the northwest against Seven Pines,
Longstreet would hit the Union right, prevent the escape of the enemy to Fair Oaks,
or block any Union reinforcements coming from the upper Chickahominy. For reinforcements,
Brigadier General William H. C. Whiting’s Division is to follow Longstreet’s force.
The timing of the attack depends on Huger. Once his troops are in place on the Confederate right,
he is to send a message to Hill, who would then open the attack on the enemy center. The sound of
Hill’s firing would be the signal for Longstreet to move in against the Union right. Huger could
then move against the left. Johnston’s plan promises great results, but he evidently does not
clearly explain it to any of his commanders. To Longstreet, who is placed in charge of the attack,
Johnston gives only verbal orders. The two generals speak at length on May 30th,
but by the next day it is clear that Longstreet has misunderstood his orders.
Huger is not told that he is the key to the Confederate offensive. There is only a vague order
advising him to “be ready, if an action should begin on your left, to fall upon the enemy’s left
flank.” It will prove to be a costly oversight. Heavy rain pounds both armies on the night before
the attack, and the Chickahominy quickly surges to new heights. At about 11:00 PM on May 30th,
a detail of pickets from the 33rd New York go to guard one of the half-built Chickahominy bridges.
Within a short time, they are cut off from their main camp by the swiftly rising water.
When another shift comes to relieve them at 2:00 AM, they find the pickets “standing nearly up to
their arm-pits in the now new channel, and others, having lost their footing,
were clinging to trees, for dear life.” The relief detail sends for boats to rescue their comrades.
As the rain drifts on throughout the night, the stage is set for battle in the early morning
hours of May 31st. General Johnston prepares his troops for his long-awaited counterattack
against McClellan. With the enemy at the gates, time is running short for Johnston’s Department
of Northern Virginia to repulse the Federals before they can begin a siege against the capital.
Unbeknownst to both sides at that moment is the knowledge
that the ensuing Battle of Seven Pines, or Battle of Fair Oaks,
will become the largest and bloodiest battle of the war’s Eastern Theater to date.