- [Instructor] A safe effective form
of reproductive healthcare
or an inhumane, life-ending procedure?
This was the debate over a controversial abortion procedure
in Gonzalez v. Carhart.
Although the vast majority of abortions
occur in the first trimester,
the most common method of abortion in the second trimester
was called dilation and evacuation.
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the United States Supreme Court
held that a Nebraska law outlawing dilation and evacuation
was unconstitutional.
In response, Congress passed
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.
The act prohibited intact dilation and evacuation,
a variation of the standard procedure
by which the fetus's body was kept mostly intact
until the abortion was completed.
The procedure was also known as partial-birth abortion
among pro-life advocates.
LeRoy Carhart and other doctors
who performed second trimester abortions
brought a constitutional challenge.
The doctors argued that the act was facially invalid
for two primary reasons.
First, the act was void for vagueness.
And second, the act imposed an undue burden
on the right to an abortion due to its over-breadth
and lack of an exception to protect the woman's health.
The federal district court agreed
and held the act unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court granted cert.
The question was whether a law
banning intact dilation and evacuation
without an exception for the health of the mother
unconstitutionally burdened constitutional abortion rights.
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
the court held that the act was constitutional.
It wasn't unconstitutionally vague
and didn't constitute an undue burden
on a woman's right to an abortion.
On the vagueness argument the court reasoned
that the statute described the prohibited procedure
with adequate specificity.
In defining partial-birth abortion,
the act provided anatomical landmarks for partial delivery.
These guidelines were sufficiently clear
to inform physicians of what was
and wasn't legal under the act.
Next, the court held that the act didn't impose
an undue burden on the right to an abortion.
The court noted that under Planned Parenthood v. Casey
the state has a legitimate interest
in protecting fetal life.
Under Casey, this interest must be balanced
against the constitutional right to abortion
so that a law regulating abortion is unconstitutional
only if its purpose or effect creates
a substantial obstacle to seeking an abortion.
Kennedy reasoned that because the act only prohibited
intact dilation and evacuation
and not other second trimester abortion procedures,
the act didn't impose a substantial obstacle.
Further, the act's purposes were legitimate under Casey:
to express respect for the dignity of human life,
to safeguard the integrity and reputation
of the medical profession, and to protect women
who may regret their decisions to have late term abortions.
Finally, the court addressed the act's lack of an exception
where necessary for the mother's health.
In the court's view, a health exception
would be constitutionally necessary
only if medical evidence demonstrated
that intact dilation and evacuation
was the safer choice for some women
compared to other forms of abortion.
The court found that the evidence
on that question was inconclusive.
Because of that medical uncertainty,
the court deferred to Congress's judgment
that no health exception was necessary.
The court reversed the Court of Appeals
and upheld the act as constitutional.
Justice Thomas concurred, joined by Justice Scalia.
He agreed with the court's application
of the court's abortion jurisprudence,
but wrote separately to emphasize his belief
that there is no constitutional right to abortion.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by four justices, dissented.
According to Justice Ginsburg,
the majority opinion misapplied the court's
abortion precedence, particularly Casey.
Contrary to the majority's determination
that the evidence was inconclusive,
she pointed to ample, reputable medical evidence
supporting the conclusion that intact dilation
and evacuation was actually much safer for many women.
Justice Ginsburg was also critical of Justice Kennedy's
theory that the state should protect women
who regret their decision to have abortions.
In Justice Ginsburg's view, this theory
was unsupported by evidence and reflected
antiquated notions about women's role in society.
Gonzalez v. Carhart represented the first time
since Roe v. Wade that the court upheld
the constitutionality of an abortion restriction
with no exception for the mother's health.