You may have heard about the battle of Arnhem, or you may have seen the film a Bridge Too
Far. You may think you know what happened and what went wrong. Think again. In this
series, we’re going to look at as much of the Market Garden Operation as we can, even
the bits other documentaries leave out. We will dispel the myths that surround this Operation
and find out who exactly was to blame for its failure. In the coming videos, we’ll
be covering the entire Operation, which was not only the biggest airborne assault of all
time, but was also the last major defeat for the British military. It remains a controversial
operation. Somehow an all-but defeated German army clawed their way to victory, stopping
the Allies from crossing the Rhine and winning the war by Christmas. Today, we’re going
to focus on the plan, since it’s a plan which has since been deemed “rotten” and
badly executed. But was it really that bad a plan?
The situation by late 1944 for the Germans was desperate. Nazi Germany had conquered
most of Europe in the early days of World War II, but by 1944, was on the backfoot.
The Wehrmacht (or German Army) was decisively beaten in the East by the Soviets at battles
like Stalingrad and Kursk and annihilated during Operation Bagration. In the South,
the Allies had defeated the Germans in the Desert and were slowly working their way up
the Italian peninsular. And in the West, the Allies had landed in Normandy, had crushed
the Germans in the Falaise pocket, liberated Paris and were now on their way towards Germany.
It seemed to most Allied commanders that the German Army was thoroughly beaten. The Third
Reich was about to fall. It was all just a question of time.
Since Normandy, Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force - Eisenhower
- had been in charge. Knowing that the Germans were thinned out after Falaise, Eisenhower
prefered a broad front strategy. That is, by marching his Armies forward on all fronts,
so the Germans would have to spread out their weakened forces and would be overwhelmed by
sheer weight of numbers. But supply and logistical issues soon became a problem. Armies require
supplies and fuel if they are to keep on advancing, and Allied logistics couldn’t keep up with
the demand of supplying all the Armies at the same time. The result? Allied Armies stopped
dead in their tracks in late August and early September 1944.
This gave British Field Marshal Montgomery the chance he’d been waiting for. Monty,
experienced in the African Desert and commander of the Allied forces in the initial stages
of the Normandy landings, believed that he had a plan that could knock out the Germans
with a decisive blow if he was given logistical priority. In his mind, the British could bypass
the German Siegfried Line, cross the Rhine river in September, then race into Germany’s
industrial heartland, the Ruhr. He believed he could win the war by Christmas.
Facing logistical problems and knowing that fighting through the Siegfried Line would
be challenging, Eisenhower gave the green light, and Operation Market Garden was born.
Monty’s plan was to drive XXX Corps (a British Tank and Mobile infantry force) over the bridges
of the lower Rhine river and thrust deep into Germany. That was the Garden part of the plan.
But of course Bridges would be no use if the Germans had a chance to destroy them, so the
Bridges had to be secured for the tanks in advance. And there were several bridges in
the area to capture intact if this operation was to have any chance of success.
Therefore, three and a half Airborne Divisions (a total of 33,971 men) would land on Day
1 behind enemy lines to secure both the bridges and the road to Arnhem. The American 101st
Airborne division would land at Eindhoven, the American 82nd would land at Nijmegen,
and the British 1st Airborne Division, supported by the Polish 1st Independent Airborne Brigade,
would land at Arnhem. This was the Market part of the plan. With a carpet of Airborne
troops to secure the route, XXX Corps would simply cross the secured bridges and ride
off to victory! But the bridges had to be secure - without them, the plan would fail
- they were the priority of this Operation. So this was two operations in one. Operation
Market, and Operation Garden. And together they make Operation Market Garden. Sounds
simple. It is until you realise there was another element to the plan not often
mentioned. Once the British tanks were over the Rhine at Arnhem, another Division - the
52nd Lowland Infantry Division would be flown in by air on the fifth day, after Deeland
Airfield had been captured. Yes, this wasn’t an Operation aimed at capturing Arnhem bridge,
it went on beyond that. The tanks were meant to get to Zuiderzee, which is the shallow
bay that juts into the Netherlands. Now, the reason you don’t hear about this part of
the Operation much, is because (spoiler alert) it didn’t happen. But that was the true
goal of Market Garden. In charge of the Airborne part of the plan
was Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Montague Boy Frederick Browning. This was the father
of the British airborne forces, and was the one who said I think we might be going a bridge
too far… well, he may have said that. Nobody really knows, but he had the task of making
Operation Market a success, and that wasn’t going to be easy.
Landing troops behind enemy lines sounds great, until you consider two things:
Paratroopers rely on the element of surprise to disorientate and confuse the enemy so that
they can secure their objective before the enemy knows what’s happening. So if surprise
is lost or they fail to act quickly enough, they lose their biggest asset.
They’re weak. They’re dropped behind enemy lines, are lightly armed and supplied by the
air, so if they’re not relieved in a matter of days there’s a good chance they’ll
be overwhelmed. Speed is therefore, imperative. The paratroopers
have to take their objectives quickly, and the tanks have to relieve them quickly. It’s
worth bearing this in mind as we consider that cracks began to appear in the plan right
from the beginning. For starters, Operation Garden wasn’t going to be easy. Commanded
by Sir Brian Horrocks, XXX Corps would have one road to drive up. One road. An entire
corps, one road. That’s a logistical nightmare. But considering the enemy could easily counterattack
from the sides and cut the road at any point, plus they had to drive 60 miles just to reach
Arnhem… I hope you can see the problem here. Even if all things went smoothly, it would
take at least two to three days for XXX Corps to get to the British at Arnhem. That’s
assuming all the bridges would be taken intact. If the Germans managed to hold or destroy
a bridge or two, it could take even longer. The issue of delay is compounded when you
realise there weren’t enough transport planes to deliver all three and a bit airborne divisions
at the same time. This would mean they would have to be dropped over a period of three
days, because the RAF also refused to fly in more than one lift per day for fear of
exhausting their pilots. Apart from the fact that this would weaken the strength of the
initial landings and compromise the paratrooper’s element of surprise, it also meant that … potentially
... not all the bridges could be secured on the first day. If some of the bridges aren’t
taken, and if XXX Corps is delayed, the Operation fails and the British at Arhem are doomed.
General Gavin of the American 82nd Airborne Division who was dropping in at Nijmegen decided
that he simply didn’t have enough troops on the first day to take all his objectives.
He wanted to take the bridges from both ends at once, but without enough troops on the
ground this wasn’t possible. He also feared an attack from the Reichswald… a forest
that was within the borders of Germany, and he believed there were a lot of Germans in
there ready to counter attack. In his mind, he would have to pull forces away to capture
the heights at Groesbeek, in order to secure his position against the Reichswald rather
than send troops to take the Nijmegen Bridge. This meant they wouldn’t be able to start
their attack on the Nijmegen Bridge until later in the day, or until reinforcements
arrived on the second day. The element of surprise would be lost, and it was likely
that the Germans would have time to react, dig in and prepare their defenses at the Nijmegen
Bridge. Not good. To make matters worse, the 101st Airborne
had to take five bridges on the first day. 5. Lead by Maxwell D. Taylor, the 101st would
drop as close to the bridges as they could to take them as quickly as possible. This
would give them the best chance of taking the bridges, but with 5 to take… chances
are, they wouldn’t take them all. This, and the problems at Nijmegen and the lack
of transports meant that, there was a big chance that there was going to be a delay
in reaching Arnhem. At first glance however, the British at Arnhem
seemed to have the least amount of trouble - they only had one bridge to take (well two,
but one main one). Yet it wasn’t as simple as that. The RAF refused to drop the paratroopers
near to the bridge because of that heavy Anti Air cover over Arnhem, and because the ground
south of the bridge was believed to be too marshy for a landing (although good enough
for the Polish airborne coming a few days later).
Major General Roy Urquhart was commander of the British 1st Airborne Division. Urquhart
had never commanded paratroopers before, and believed that once he was on the ground it
was basically going to be the same as any other infantry battle. No. Paratroopers need
to get to their objectives quickly and sit tight for relief. Essentially, once you take
your objective, you’re not attacking, you’re defending. So perhaps Urquhart was the wrong
man for the job? Either way, due to pressure from the RAF and the US Airforce, Urquhart
was forced to land 8 miles to 13 miles away from the bridge. Yes, 8 to 13 miles away.
Not only was there a real chance that the vital element of surprise be lost, but also
the British paras landing on day one would need to hold the Landing Zones for subsequent
waves of paratroopers, meaning that only a portion of the British paras landing on day
one would actually strike towards Arnhem Bridge. And the British would also need to hold onto
a huge area, which realistically they’d struggle to hold with the entire division.
To be fair to Urquhart, he did request for his troops to be landed nearer to the bridge,
such as south of Arnhem (which was again, good enough for the Polish Brigade coming
later but not for anyone on Day 1). Unknown to Urquhart during the early planning stage,
when briefed a few days before the battle, officers of 1st Parachute Battalion actually
volunteered to land on the town of Arnhem itself rather than land miles away from the
bridge, but in the end Air Vice-Marshal Hollinghurst refused Urquhart’s request and the landing
zones remained many miles from Arnhem. It was purely about the anti-air fire.
The RAF and the US Airforce thought they’d take excessive losses if they landed
near the city. Urquhart has taken the blame over the years for the fact that the landing
zones were far from the bridge. In reality, that decision wasn’t his. It’s often been
argued that Urquhart should have insisted on closer landing zones, but the fact remains
that it didn’t happen. The British would land 8 to 13 miles away from the bridge.
Of course the British could rely on the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade as reinforcements
who would hopefully arrive on Day 3. Yes, it was no surprise that General Sosabowski,
commander of the Polish Brigade, had had misgivings about this AND the previous proposed operation,
operation comet (which was basically similar to this one, but with less troops). You see,
the airborne units had been told to prepare for battle time and time again over the last
few months, only to have plans cancelled last minute. This not only affected morale, but
gave their commanders an eagerness to get into battle that may have clouded their judgement
during the planning of the Market Operation. General Sosabowski was more accepting of the
Market Garden plan because it was better than the previous one, although it clearly wasn’t
perfect. His Polish Brigade would land south of Arnhem on Day 3, when the element of surprise
was lost days before. It was bad enough for the brigades landing
on Day 2. But the eagerness to get into battle felt by all the Officers and troops is perhaps
why the Operation went ahead anyway. And is also why vital intelligence reports about
the existence of German tanks in the area were ignored. Now tanks could overwhelm the
lightly armed paratroopers and threaten the whole operation. Although a lot of the German
units in the Arnhem area were of doubtful combat quality, they did have two rather depleted
SS Panzer Divisions in the area. The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to be exact.
Why were these intelligence reports dismissed? I guess we should ask
Lieutenant General Frederick Browning - the man in charge of the whole airborne operation
- because he didn’t want to cancel the mission with only two days remaining before it began.
Browning also believed that the Germans were already defeated so these tanks were probably
few in number and would be slow to react. So he didn’t warn Urquhart or any of the
British paratroopers of the possibility of their being two SS Panzer Divisions in the
area, which meant the paras didn’t take as many anti-tank weapons and ammunition as
they could have. Oh, and Browning decided that his corps headquarters would be airlifted
into the Nijmegen sector on day one using a staggering 38 aircraft and extra gliders
on top of that, all of which were taken from the British allocation of transport aircraft
- who were already starved of transport aircraft as priority had been given to the Americans.
Oh, and the decision was taken not to support the air transports or the paratroopers on
the ground with ground attack aircraft. This meant that the Germans would be able to move
freely in day-light without fear of being attacked from the air - something they hadn’t
been able to do in Normandy. The Germans could reinforce their troops as and when they liked,
a fact that would prove disastrous as the battle progressed.
Despite having two understrength SS Panzer divisions in the area, overall the Germans
facing the Market Garden Operation were weak and were forced to fill the front with rag
tag units. Including units like the ‘eyes and ears battalions’ who consisted of men
who had disabilities that had prevented them from fighting, until now. By this point in
the war, Germany was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, however,
they were well led. Field Marshal Model, Commander in Chief of Army Group B, coincidently had
his headquarters in the Hartenstein Hotel near to the British Landing zones. He was
an experienced leader, having earned nicknames such as “Master of Defence”, “Lion of
Defence”, the “Saviour of the Eastern Front”, and the “Fuhrer’s Fireman”
(because he’s constantly putting out fires, or plugging holes in the front). In the defensive
battle that followed, Model was the right man for the job.
As was Kurt Student, Commander of the 1st Fallschirmjaeger Army. Fallshirmjaeger were
German Paratroopers and in the days prior to the Allied airborne assault, Student had
been ordered to ‘Collect all available units together and build a new front’. This he
had done (and these units weren’t all elite paratroopers) but it’s important to note
that Student was an experienced leader and had directed some of the first opposed paratrooper
landings in history. You have to remember that paratrooper operations had only begun
in 1940 so it remained a new concept even by 1944. Lessons were still needed to be learnt
about how to properly use paratroopers in combat, but it was the Germans who had pioneered
their early use.
In charge of ii ss panzer corps was Wilhelm bittrich. Harmel was in command of 10th ss
panzer division and harzer was in command of the ninth. All of them experienced commanders
who'd proven themselves in previous campaigns, including at Normandy in Operations like Epsom
and Goodwood. Good commanders commanding ad hoc forces is
what the British and Americans were facing. However, it’s worth noting that although
the two SS Panzer Divisions together totalled maybe 7000 men at most (about 30% of what
they should have been) the entire II SS Panzer Corps had spent a good 15 months performing
anti-paratroop landing training.
And these training exercises were fresh in their minds. Essentially,
the paratroopers were landing against an enemy who knew how to deal with them.
So this is where we stand on the eve of battle. Three landing zones, one road, and an underestimated
enemy. The plan has the potential to end the war by Christmas, but it isn’t flawless.
I’ll leave you with a question - how rotten was this plan? And do you think it was doomed
to fail from the start? Comment below and let me know. Next time, we’ll see what happens
on Day One, so don’t forget to like and subscribe if you haven’t done already. Thanks
for watching, thanks for subscribing, bye for now.