Where and when will the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive come, and what expectations should we have
for it?
Will it be a decisive battle that ends the war or do we need to be far more cautious
about its prospects of success?
One retired American brigadier general and the moves the Ukrainians have made in June
in what appears to be the initial stage of the broader counteroffensive can give us clues
about what we should expect for the coming months.
Let’s take a look.
After Russian gains in Donbas in the early summer of 2022, Ukraine launched counter offensives
in Kharkhiv and Kherson which stunned the world.
These two campaigns were far more successful than anyone had imagined they would be.
Then the fighting stalled as first the muddy season and then the winter set in.
Russia once again made slow, grinding gains in Donbas, finally capturing the city of Bakhmut
at the end of May 2023 after nine months of fighting.
During that time, international observers and military experts anticipated a Ukrainian
counteroffensive, especially as the Ukrainians requested, and were granted, hundreds of advanced
Western battle tanks like the American Abrams, British Challenger, and German Leopard II.
However, the expected offensive did not materialize in the early spring, as many hoped it would.
Ukraine was probably waiting for the delivery of those advanced tanks and other munitions
in order to launch the counteroffensive from the strongest possible position.
According to a report in The Wall Street Journal report from May 17th, Ukraine carried out
drone attacks behind the Russian lines during that month.
The purpose of these attacks was twofold.
First, these strikes weaken Russian positions.
Second, they are also surveillance operations, as the Ukrainians seek out points of vulnerability
in the Russian lines which would prove the most promising places to attack for the broader
counteroffensive.
The current front line in Ukraine as of about June 15th, 2023 stretches over 900 miles,
from the area around Kherson in the south, through Zaporizhzhia and Donbas, and up to
the Russian border in the north.
Trying to pinpoint the exact location of a counteroffensive along such an extended front
is always a difficult challenge, but there are certain areas that would make sense from
a strategic or political perspective for Ukraine to try and attack.
What are these areas?
What value would come from attacking them and what would the prospects for success be
along each of these potential offensive axes?
What are the respective strengths and weaknesses of each potential route?
What are the risks involved in each strategy?
In a May interview for The Wall Street Journal, retired American Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt
pointed out what he believed would be the four most likely scenarios for the 2023 Ukrainian
counteroffensive.
The first option would be a direct attack from Kherson across the Dnieper River to the
Sea of Azov.
The rewards involved in such a strategy would be obvious.
If successful, a counteroffensive along this axis would cut the land bridge from Crimea
to the other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, and cut it almost in its entirety.
As we have often mentioned on this channel, Crimea is of vital importance not only for
the Russian war effort, but to Russia’s entire geopolitical strategy and to Putin’s
political image.
It is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet and one of its few warm water ports.
Crimea is also a supply hub for the Russian forces in Ukraine.
This is the reason why the southern offensive from Crimea was by far Russia’s most successful
campaign in the earliest days of the war.
Cutting the supply line to and from Crimea would not only threaten Russian forces in
Ukraine, but Russian control over the peninsula itself.
The explosion on the Kerch Bridge last fall showed how vulnerable Crimea is.
If the land bridge connecting it with the Russian border goes, Crimea would be limited
to being supplied by sea or over that same bridge, a piece of infrastructure that has
already proven vulnerable to attack.
The route from Kherson to the Sea of Azov would be the shortest possible path to cutting
the land bridge to Crimea.
If the Ukrainians were to successfully carry out such an operation, Crimea would essentially
be put under siege.
Meanwhile, the other Russian forces in Ukraine would lose one of their most important supply
lines.
On the Russian home front, Vladimir Putin’s image among the high-ups in the Kremlin and
with the Russian general public would be seriously damaged if control over Crimea is substantially
threatened by such battlefield developments.
His image has already come under stress thanks to military failures, economic hardship, and
the botched wave of mobilization he announced last fall.
The last thing he needs would be to see Crimea threatened.
The consequences of this possibility on the Russian home front would add even more momentum
to the Ukrainian war effort in the field.
There are daunting problems that would come with this option, however.
Attacking directly from Kherson would involve crossing the broad Dnieper River straight
into the teeth of the Russian fortifications on the other side.
The Russian positions there would also be some of the best-supplied, thanks to their
proximity to Crimea.
Unless the Ukrainians manage to achieve surprise, casualties would be very high.
Even if the Ukrainians do manage to accomplish their initial objectives on the opposite side
of the river, they would need to rapidly expand their bridgehead or get pushed back into the
water by well-supplied Russian reinforcements.
This option therefore is the highest-risk, highest-reward one.
Most observers do not expect the Ukrainians to take such a risk, though that may work
to their favor if they try to pull it off.
Taking a risk that your enemy does not believe you will take is one of the oldest ways of
creating surprise on the battlefield, a tradition which stretches all the way back to ancient
Egypt.
It was perhaps for this reason that a strange incident occurred recently.
The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in early June further complicated the prospect
of the Kherson line of attack.
Both sides blamed each other for the dam’s destruction.
Since the destruction of this dam could affect the water supply for an otherwise arid Crimea,
some war watchers find it unlikely that Russia would deliberately destroy it.
However, the dam’s destruction has now turned vast swathes of land on the opposite bank
from Kherson into a flooded area that Ukrainian vehicles cannot penetrate.
Russian forces also controlled the dam prior to its destruction, making them the likeliest
culprits.
It has therefore made the Kherson to the Sea of Azov route an all but impossible one for
Ukraine to attempt at this time, allowing Russia to more fully concentrate its forces
on other, more likely axes of advance for the Ukrainian armed forces.
As expected, there is no significant movement along this sector as of about June 15th, 2023.
According to General Kimmitt, the second possible option for the counteroffensive would also
cut the land bridge to Crimea if it succeeds, but the route would be longer.
It would lance down from Zaporizhzhia to the city of Berdiansk on the Sea of Azov.
There are many advantages to this route.
It does not involve a risky amphibious operation.
The route has a robust road network that would make transit and supply easier.
The roads would be able to support the tanks and armored vehicles that would lead the attack
on the ground.
Many observers have considered the Zaporizhzhia strategy as the likeliest one.
Previous Russian attacks in the area have not been successful, as the intensity of the
invaders’ resources has been directed toward Bakhmut and other targets in the Donbas region.
The downside to this strategy is that there are major Russian fortifications in the area.
Russia has long anticipated that the Zaporizhzhia strategy is in Ukraine’s sweet spot of doable
and rewarding.
It has therefore taken pains to fortify the area and make a counteroffensive there costly.
Even so, the Zaporizhzhia strategy is likely the most promising option for the counteroffensive,
especially given that most Russian forces are still concentrated in Donbas.
Recent activity suggests that the Ukrainians are probably attempting this route, but we
will get into those details later.
If either of these two strategies were to succeed, all Russian forces east of the Ukrainian
line to the Sea of Azov would be cut from Crimea.
Any supply disruptions from the peninsula would severely threaten their continued existence.
Meanwhile the Russian troops west of the line would be trapped in a giant pocket, and as
the Ukrainians get closer to Crimea, more and more of its vital infrastructure, including
the Kerch Bridge, would come into range of HIMARS and other weapons systems.
Understandably, Russia will try to prevent these scenarios from unfolding at all costs.
Kimmitt says that a third route for the Ukrainian counteroffensive could come further north
and east by way of Donbas, the region which has seen the heaviest fighting in the war.
The route would start in Donetsk and move to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.
Like the other two routes, it would cut the land bridge to Crimea, but only partially.
The land bridge would no longer connect to the Russian border, but there would still
be a large area connecting Crimea to a big percentage of the Russian forces in Ukraine.
As such, the supply routes from and to Crimea would not be as well disrupted and the Russian
forces within the cut-off area not nearly as imperiled as they would be via the Kherson
or Zaporizhzhia routes.
For these reasons, Kimmitt is less enthusiastic about this option.
He believes it would not significantly alter the military balance of power in Ukraine even
if it succeeds, meaning that casualties would probably come at a high price for little gain.
However, the Donetsk to Mariupol strategy would have one significant plus.
It would be a major propaganda and morale win for the Ukrainians.
Mariupol was the first big city that the Russians captured in the war.
Most of us remember the headlines of the Mariupol pocket and the weeks of fighting that ended
with a last stand in the city’s steel plant.
A scenario that ends with Ukraine retaking Mariupol would be a big blow to Russian morale
and Putin’s prestige.
It would also be a signal to the West, which has begun to show some signs that its commitment
to Ukraine is not open-ended.
The recapture of Mariupol would demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to make further gains,
which is critical for its ability to maintain Western support at a high level.
Such a symbolic target falling back into Ukrainian hands would be a symbolic image that Western
leaders and the general public would find difficult to ignore.
Kimmitt’s fourth scenario would be an eastern offensive from Kharkhiv through Luhansk.
This axis is a short route that would, if completely successful, reach the Russian border.
This route would avoid the Sea of Azov and thus leave the land bridge from the Russian
border to Crimea fully intact.
However, like the Donetsk to Mariupol offensive, it would have a significant propaganda value
if it succeeds.
It would retake land that the Ukrainians lost in 2014, when Russia threw its support behind
the self-declared breakaway republics in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.
The loss of these territories, which contained the seeds of the full-scale war, would be
another blow to Russian morale and a signal to the Ukrainian people and the Western powers.
It would be a successful offensive that demonstrates Ukraine’s continued ability to make gains,
even into long-held pro-Russian areas.
The offensive would send the message that Ukraine’s war effort is therefore worthy
of continued Western support.
A successful offensive to the Russian border in Luhansk would also open up more Russian
territory to long range precision strikes from HIMARS or to raids like that seen in
Belgorod in May.
Given how disruptive the Belgorod raid was while using relatively few assets, the advantages
of keeping the Kremlin guessing about where new raids or strikes into additional stretches
of Russian territory might come from should not be underestimated.
On the downside, this strategy, too, would not significantly alter the military balance
of power in Ukraine, since Crimea would remain free to supply most of the Russian forces
along the front.
Indeed the front line itself would change relatively little from where it is now, with
Russian forces controlling a vast swathe of Ukrainian territory and able to resupply and
reinforce one another all along that war zone.
Casualties would therefore be dearly bought for relatively little gained on the battlefield.
Recent Ukrainian activities, however, suggest that this axis may be an item on their agenda.
General Kimmitt warned to not place expectations for the counteroffensive too high.
He does not believe that the Ukrainians will be in position to rout the Russians and drive
them from all of the territories they have occupied in Ukraine’s borders since 2014.
He does not even expect the war to end in 2023.
Rather, he is paying attention to how deep the Ukrainians can drive into Russian-occupied
territory, which would preferably be “as far as the water,” the Sea of Azov.
“They’ve got to decisively defeat the Russians for this to be a successful counterattack
and it’s got to be successful enough that it will continue to inspire the West to provide
material and equipment for the next counterattack, and the next counterattack after that because
this will certainly not end the war,” he said.
To sum it all up, General Kimmitt believes that the Ukrainians can launch a successful
counteroffensive that would alter the military situation in the war and stagger the Russians,
but he does not believe that the Russian war effort will collapse as a result.
Instead, this offensive will be one of many in a war that lasts at least into 2024.
After some shaping operations that involved HIMARS and other artillery and drone strikes
on important Russian assets in May, the first phase of the proper Ukrainian counteroffensive
finally seemed to begin in the second week of June.
On June 9th, Vladimir Putin declared in a video interview published to Telegram: “We
can definitely state that this Ukrainian offensive has begun.”
Putin also claimed that attempted Ukrainian attacks on Russian positions had failed with
heavy casualties.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also seemed to confirm that the counteroffensive
had finally begun, saying on June 11th: “Counter-offensive and defensive actions are taking place.”
He refused to go into any further detail on the nature of the operations.
Zelensky called Putin’s claims of high Ukrainian casualties “interesting.”
The scale of the operations has so far been limited.
The Ukrainians are attacking along three axes.
The first is around Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast.
The second is the Velkya Novosilka axis, also in Donetsk.
The third is around Russian-occupied Tokmak in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
The Ukrainians seem to be trying to draw the Russians into committing their reserves along
these three axes.
Once this is done and Russian assets are stretched thin, they can try to affect a breakthrough
in their desired sector.
The Ukrainians have not yet made the type of progress they made in the counteroffensives
of last year, but have advanced about 10 kilometers on all three fronts, targeting critical enemy
assets like artillery and air defense batteries, communications hubs, and supply depots.
Reports indicate that Russian helicopters have been unusually aggressive in striking
against the attacking Ukrainians, slowing the attacks down and causing heavier casualties.
The Ukrainians have also lost some of the Western tanks and armored fighting vehicles
they have recently been supplied with.
Russian drone attacks have also been more effective than last year, as the Ukrainians
do not seem to be doing a great job of moving their air defense equipment forward along
with the front line.
The Ukrainians also appear to be moving slowly because of a lack of their own air support
thanks to a dearth of fighter jets which the Western powers are still reluctant to supply
them with.
Images of captured Russian self-propelled artillery systems which are swirling around
some Ukrainian social media accounts have led some observers to believe that the Ukrainian
advance has been more than the reported 10 kilometers.
This speculation comes because the Russians would probably deploy these assets further
back from the front lines.
As always with an ongoing military operation, we will need to wait and see how true this
assertion is.
It is too early in the operation to say for sure which of the three axes is the main objective
in Ukraine’s strategy, although the Tokmak axis may be the most promising.
An offensive along this route would be in line with General Kimmitt’s second scenario,
with Berdiansk and the Sea of Azov as the main objective.
In comparison, the other two axes are relatively lacking in strategic promise.
The Tokmak area has heavy Russian fortifications along the front line which Ukraine would need
to break through, so diverting Russian reserves to Bakhmut and Velkya-Novosilka would be important
for the viability of the counteroffensive.
These two other axes therefore may be feints for the real offensive around Tokmak.
The stakes for Ukraine are high.
If they can indeed reach Berdiansk, break the Russians’ control of the Sea of Azov,
and cut the land bridge to Crimea as General Kimmitt hopes, they will not only significantly
alter the military balance of power, but it is likely they will also continue to secure
strong Western support going into 2024.
On the other hand, if the rest of the year goes by with only partial success or none
at all, it is far likelier that political pressure in Western countries will ramp up
on forcing a negotiated settlement to the war on much more unfavorable terms for Ukraine.
With recession looming over the United Kingdom and other countries, it will become a lot
harder for Western leaders to justify large expenditures on a cause that appears to be
stagnant or fading.
The Ukrainians do not have long to achieve their objectives for this year.
By November or so, the fall rainy season will arrive and turn the open ground into perilous
muddy terrain, making the movement of supply vehicles, artillery, and tanks or other heavy
fighting vehicles difficult or impossible.
The front will therefore stall just as it did last year.
All wars are first and foremost political and launched with political objectives.
For Ukraine, securing Western support for the long term is its most important such objective,
which means that for the counteroffensive, demonstrating the continued ability to win
on a large scale is the first item on the agenda.
Although cutting the Russians’ land bridge to Crimea would make the most sense from a
purely military standpoint, the political objective of securing long-term Western support
is even more important.
If the Ukrainian counteroffensive makes enough gains to ensure that support into the next
year, Kyiv will likely consider it a success.
The last thing the Ukrainian government wants is to be forced to the negotiating table at
this point in the war, with Russia still occupying an extent of Ukrainian territory that matches
the size of Iceland.
To reclaim all of its pre-2014 territory, or as much of it as possible, the Ukrainians
will need to repeatedly demonstrate that they can not only withstand Russian assaults, but
win and continue to drive them back.
If the Tokmak axis is indeed the main attempted counteroffensive the question will be: “how
close can Ukraine get to the Sea of Azov before the rains come?”
The answer to that question will be a big determining factor in the conduct of the war
heading into 2024.
But what do you think?
Which one of these counteroffensive scenarios would most likely ensure Ukraine’s success
in the Russo-Ukraine war?
Let us know in the comments and don’t forget to subscribe for more military analysis from
military experts.