Late summer, 1757. The initial campaigning of the Seven Years' War was over.
It did not look good for Prussia's King, Frederick the Great.
Despite a promising start, the Prussian army and its Hanoverian ally lost multiple battles.
Optimism crumbled as enemies encroached on Prussian territory from the north, south,
east and west. All the while, the Prussian army suffered enormous losses. The King knew all too
well what was at stake. The entire existence of his Kingdom was hanging by a thread. In a final,
desperate manoeuvre, Frederick took part of his army, outnumbered two-to-one, against a combined
French-Imperial army. If he lost, it would all be over. The subsequent events culminated in
what Christopher Clark describes as "Frederick the Great's single most impressive victory."
[Towards Rossbach]
The late summer months of 1757 held nothing but bad news for the Prussians. In early September,
Frederick learned of Field Marshal Hans von Lehwaldt's defeat at Gross-Jagersdorf.
The subsequent defeat at the Battle of Moys and the death of his cherished friend General von
Winterfeldt crushed the King. Bevern retreated to Breslau, where the Silesian front stagnated
until November. Three days after Moys, Hanover and France concluded the convention of Klosterzeven.
It led to Hanover's withdrawal from the war. It opened Prussia's western
flank to a combined French-Imperial army commanded by Prince de Soubise and Prince
Joseph Friedrich of Saxen-Hildenburghausen. To the north, the Swedes, led by Baron Mattias
von Ungern Sternberg, finally landed in Stralsund on September 13 (although the Baron was delayed by
four weeks). Their navy blockaded Stettin. Not an ideal position for Prussia, but intelligence
taught Frederick the Swedes weren't eager to conduct an invasion of Prussia's heartland.
Instead, they conducted sieges against Pomerania's strongholds, and that was it.
The Reichsarmee, the Imperial Army, wasn't the leading cause for worry either.
Comprised of soldiers from many Imperial states (231 political bodies!),
every House sent its commanders. Challenging to work together and
heavily decentralised, with Field Marshal von Sachsen-Hildenhausen maintaining feeble control,
the army's efficiency is still debated. On August 30, Frederick arrived at Dresden.
Here, Keith maintained a force of some 25.000 soldiers who retreated from Bohemia.
These were in poor shape, battered by the constant harassment by irregulars and the
elements wearing them down. Frankly, Prussia's army was so weakened that Frederick resorted
to deceptive measures to prevent an all-out invasion. For example, the names of Prussian
regiments were changed when they moved quarters to confuse enemy spies and inflate their numbers.
The next few weeks saw Frederick move around in Saxony, attempting to force a battle against
roaming Prince de Soubise and Hildburghausen. During this, Frederick learned of Winterfeldt's
death. He wrote to his sister that he was "so oppressed with grief that [I] would rather keep
my sadness to myself." He was looking forward to dying sword in hand rather than suffering defeat
followed by the tyrannical rule of his enemies: "Sorrow is a century, death an instant."
Already after Kolin, Frederick considered suicide. He now proposed a mutual suicide
pact to his sister. Fortunately for him, she reminded him that "a great genius like yours
finds resources even when all is lost, and it is impossible for this frenzy to continue."
His subordinates did not notice Frederick's depression and suicidal tendencies. Aside from the
outpouring of letters to his sister, he resolutely conducted his campaign with steadfastness and
calm. And fortune sometimes works in mysterious ways. Around this time, Frederick learned of
Apraxin's withdrawal from the Duchy of Prussia, despite the Russian victory at Gross-Jagersdorf.
He immediately ordered Lehwaldt to return to Pomerania and defend it against the Swedes.
To a contemporary observer, this would not be enough to reinvigorate Prussia. To illustrate the
thread the Kingdom's existence hung by: on October 16, a 3400-strong Austrian flying corps under
General Hadik managed to raid Berlin. They faced barely any opposition. Clearly unable to hold the
city, they demanded a hefty ransom before leaving the next day. This news was met by Frederick
splitting up his army, despatching Moritz to relieve the capital, before moving in that
direction. Keith maintained the western frontier. But due to the slow communication at the time,
Frederick learned of Hadik's departure three days too late. So he turned his army around,
returning to Torgau. Moving like this did not exactly improve the army's morale:
`(Mitchell, September 6, PRO SP 90/70). "
Frederick still assessed Prussia's survival depended on him preventing the French-Imperial
and Austrian armies from linking up. From Leipzig, Keith reported the French-Imperial army linked up
nearby them (at Mucheln, unbeknownst to Keith). This was his chance. He rallied
his army at Leipzig. Conducting any campaign with the army would be tough, even for the
greatest of commanders. To illustrate: Moritz's army had just five days to march from Berlin,
and Ferdinand's army just three from Magdeburg. However, sources reveal:
"'(...) What is the most surprising and pleasing at the same time is the spirit the soldiers
showed on this occasion; they had marched upwards of twenty-five English miles a day
for three or five days successively, and at the moment they arrived they desired to be led again
against the enemy' (Mitchell, October 27, PRO SP 90/70)."
He could not pinpoint their exact location, but prepared his army for an inevitable battle.
On November 3, Frederick arrived at Weissenfels. A letter he wrote reveals:
"The enemy is assembling opposite me. From my window I can see all his cavalry!"
The enemy saw him as well.
"Frederick in person was at the river bank, watching with some
frustration as the French burned the covered wooden bridge behind
them. (...) Two enemy officers were watching the royal party from a con-
cealed position on an island which lay within close musket shot. One
of the Frenchman hastened back (...) to report that it
would be possible for a marksman to shoot down a Prussian senior
officer, and that this dignitary was probably the King, from the
respect that was being shown to him. 'Crillon handed his loyal Brunet
a glass of wine, and sent him back to his post, remarking that he an
his comrades had been put there to observe whether the bridge was
burning properly, and not to kill a general who was making a
connaissance, let alone the sacred person of a king, which must
always be held in reverence' (Crillon, 1791, 166). Duffy, 139-140.
False intelligence-led Frederick to believe his enemy numbered 60.000,
outnumbering his force nearly three-to-one. This was exaggerated, but the fact Frederick
continued to pry for battle just shows how desperate, or confident, he was.
In reality, the Prussians found themselves outnumbered around two to one by the
combined French-Imperial force. The numbers of soldiers participating
in the battle are well-documented. The Prussians commanded 16.600 infantry in 2? battalions and
5400 cavalry in 32 (or 45?) squadrons. 22.000 men in total, with 79 pieces of artillery.
The French-imperial army commanded 33.770 infantry in 49 battalions and 7340 cavalry in 40 squadrons
for a total of 41.110 men. They fielded 114 artillery pieces. Of those, 10.900
troops and 45 guns were from the Imperial Army. Frederick positioned his army between the villages
of Bedra and Rossbach, some four miles removed from where he assumed the French were stationed.
The musicians in the French camp revealed their location. "'All their complements of musicians,
trumpeters, drummers and fifers now gave sound, as if they had won some great
victory' (Oeuvres, IV, 151). "Frederick set up headquarters at Rossbach. His brother in law,
the Duke of Brunswick, commanded the right-wing. General von Seydlitz commanded the cavalry.
Preceding the battle, a crucial miscalculation in the French camp occurred. Their scouts relayed
the Prussians were outnumbered and likely to flee. Whereas Prince de Soubise still wanted to
proceed with caution, Prince Joseph Friedrich persuaded him to attack the following day.
Meanwhile, in the Prussian camp, Frederick miscalculated as well.
But in a more favourable way than his opponents. He figured his enemies were about to retreat
and viewed their movements accordingly. The following morning, the French-imperial
army moved to the south in three columns. They hoped to outflank the numerically inferior
army on their left. The columns moved slow and sluggish, with the French cavalry far in advance.
The Count of St. Germain and Ernst Gideon von Loudon protected the rear,
positioned on the hills south of Mucheln. But this movement only strengthened
Frederick's belief they were attempting to retreat. Only when the French turned
to the east did he reconsider his assessment: perhaps they were trying to flank his army?
[Battle sequence]
He rapidly switched gears, understanding the gravity of the situation if he allowed his
enemies to complete their manoeuvre. Frederick redeployed his army with incredible speed.
First, he despatched his cavalry under General von Seydlitz. Then, he ordered Prince Henry
and Ferdinand to lead all his infantry from their positions to the southeast,
and take up position in front of Reichardtswerben and Tagewerben.
The cavalry moved to the east past the Janusberg before bending south.
The long ridge masked their movements. During this move, the Prussian artillery
hastened to deploy on top of the Janusberg. Seydlidtz appeared in front of the Imperial
cavalry, charging them head-on. Both parties clashed, and savage combat ensued. During this
charge, the Prussians didn't enjoy much momentum, and the French cavalry soon
moved to aid their Imperial comrades. Then, the artillery lit up the valley.
A deafening bombardment followed, mauling several infantry units.
With the arrival of the French cavalry, Seydlitz called in his reserves. These charged head-on
against the body of cavalry. Savage close-quarter combat followed. This time, the Prussians
enjoyed more success. Their enemy's cavalry began crumbling. They were pushed past Reichardtswerben.
Around this time, the Prussian infantry vanguard arrived at their destination.
The acute angle they positioned themselves in formed the perfect trap for the advancing
enemy infantry. Already suffering heavy bombardments, they ran into an awful sight.
Their cavalry was mauled to their south. In front of them, the Prussians trapped
them. Upon their arrival, the Prussians launched an obliterating volley. Heavily demoralised,
part of the infantry barely resisted. The volleys shredded the frontlines.
Some of the imperial infantry dropped their weapons and ran. The French infantry launched
a few scattered volleys, but the Prussians did not stop. Because of their formation in columns,
the returned fire was wildly ineffective. As the Prussians advanced, the infantry
vanguards engaged in ferocious, close combat while large parts of the column deteriorated
in an uncontrollable frenzy. It has to be said that Hildenburghausen, despite being wounded,
personally led a bayonet charge. A futile attempt, but it evoked even Soubise's admiration.
As the first fights erupted between infantry, Seydlitz completed the rout of the French-imperial
cavalry. His horsemen were ideally positioned to the south of the infantry skirmish. Then,
Seydlitz ordered to launch the devastating charge into the right flank of the French infantry.
The French were massacred, and a total collapse soon followed.
Within minutes, they cracked and retreated from the battlefield towards Pettstadt.
A French soldier participating in the battle later described the retreat:
"Everybody sank into a mob. It was not possible to prevent the flight.
The Prussian infantry followed on our heels and fired without checking its advance
or having a man drop out of rank or file. The artillery bombarded us without pause."
It was only thanks to darkness arriving at 5 PM that the
slaughter wasn't worse than it already was. In total, the Prussians lost no more than 550
men, of whom 170 were killed. One colonel, and seven officers were among the dead.
Twenty-three officers and 356 men were wounded. In contrast, the French-imperial army lost over
10.000. Most of them prisoners. The French lost some 6600 men, whereas the Reicharmee lost 3552.
Among the prisoners were eight-to-eleven French generals (depending on the source),
260 officers and 6000 soldiers. Among the spoils were 22 standards and colours. The
majority of the casualties were French, although the Imperials certainly received a battering.
In total, they lost 72 guns, 21 standards and the bulk of their baggage. The victory was quick
to the degree that most Prussian infantry never discharged their weapons.
Christopher Clark remarks the Battle of Rossbach as Frederick the Great's "single most impressive
victory". It tasted only 90 minutes but decided the future of the Kingdom of Prussia.
That night Frederick wanted to lodge in the nearby castle of Burgwerben, only to find it
filled with injured French officers. So instead, he lodged in a servant's room in the village.
Clark writes: "In France, the alliance with Austria, and especially the abject defeat
at Rossbach, played disastrously with the home public, raising doubts about the competence of
the Bourbon regime that would persevere until the revolutionary crisis of the 1780s." A letter by
the French foreign minister, Cardinal de Bernis, observes: 'More than ever before, our nation is
outraged against the war. Our enemy, the King of Prussia, is loved to the point of distraction...
but the court of Vienna is hated because it is seen as the bloodsucker of the state.'
One day after the battle, Frederick wrote to his sister. "That was a tame battle!
I can go to my grave in peace because the reputation and honour of [my] people have
been saved. We may still be overtaken by misfortune, but we will never be disgraced."
Perhaps the battle was tame, but it changed the fortune of his Kingdom. Whereas
everything had gone wrong for Frederick at Kolin, everything went right at Rossbach.
The Prussian army, and Frederick the Great's reputation, were vindicated.
There is an important caveat when considering this comparison. Blanning writes:
"A major difference, of course, lay in the relative caliber of Frederick's opponents.
At Kolin he had faced battle-hardened Austrians, supported by Saxons seeking revenge for the
humiliations inflicted on them by the Prussians during the Second Silesian War. (...) At Rossbach,
the French were exhausted after a long march across Germany and disorganised
by the persistent looting for which they had become notorious."
Even the French commanders were demoralised.
A surviving letter by the Count of Saint Germain does not leave much unsaid:
"No doubt you, like me, were able to predict the Rossbach
disaster five months ago. Never has there been such a
defective army, and the first cannon-shot determined our
route and humiliation. I am leading a gang of robbers, of
murderers fit only for the gallows, who run away at the
sound of the first gunshot and who are always ready to
mutiny. The King has the worst infantry under the sun,
and the worst-disciplined—there
is just nothing to be done with troops such as these."
Rossbach meant Frederick, and the Kingdom of Prussia, would live to see another day.
But to the east, trouble was brewing. And Frederick soon ordered his victorious,
but tired army on a gruelling march to the east. There, exactly one month after Rossbach,
he would meet the Austrian army at Leuthen. Again, he would be heavily outnumbered. And again,
it would be a battle determining the future of Prussia.
Thank you for watching this video.