Barcelona is a fan-owned club. Along with Real Madrid,
Athletic Club, and Osasuna, the club is one of four such entities in Spain’s top tier.
From the beginning of the 1992-93 season,
a Spanish law passed in 1990 made it mandatory for clubs to become privately owned, as a way
of staving off serious financial issues across the sport. But some exemptions were allowed.
If a club could show a profit for five consecutive years from 1985 onwards,
then they were allowed to remain fan owned.
At Barcelona, there are around 144,000 such members,
called socios, each paying membership dues of around 185 euros a year.
To become a socio, a person needs to have a family member or spouse who is an existing
member. If that isn’t the case, they can buy a ‘commitment card’ for 144 euros a year.
If someone holds a commitment card for three years, they can then apply to be a member.
Fans hold voting rights for several key decisions, not least of which is the election of the
president. For important, immediate matters that affect the club as a whole, the president can call
for an Asamblea de Socios Compromisarios. Here, almost 4,500 socios meet to debate
and vote upon things that the club president feels merit wider approval. A recent example was held in
October when the ASC voted on Joan Laporta’s plan to save the club from its huge financial issues.
These gatherings comprise the club’s longest-serving members, known as ‘senators’,
surviving former club presidents, committee members, representatives of supporters’ groups,
and a small number of ordinary socios selected at random. This smaller group wields significant
power and in October, there was anger that a full vote among all 144,000 members was not called.
Here, though, the president has the choice and this is the same with many other matters. Indeed,
once elected, the president largely occupies the role of an owner, making day-to-day decisions
of importance, and so such a vote is key. At Barcelona, presidential candidates must themselves
be socios, and are required to provide financial guarantees before taking the role. Once elected,
candidates can determine transfer policy, as well as run or oversee all other aspects of the club,
and so many make promises about signings or new contracts for star players.
Presidents have a lot of power, and there’s no doubt that some of Barcelona’s financial issues,
detailed in a recent Tifo video, have been caused by bad decisions made at the top.
But, given the issues surrounding the acquisition of football clubs by owners
with little or no connection to the club, in some instances not even the country of the club,
there is generally a positive feeling towards the concept of fan or member-owned clubs.
As with everything, though, there are pros and cons to this ownership model.
The biggest benefit is that the club cannot be taken into private ownership without a
significant majority of members in favour, and that is extremely unlikely. This means the club
cannot be sold off again, asset-stripped, or laden with debt to finance a purchase.
In addition, because the club is not beholden to shareholders,
there is no need to pay dividends and that means that commercial and matchday revenue
can largely be reinvested in the playing squad, either as transfer funds or wages.
There is also money for training facilities and stadium upgrades, although sometimes
private financing in the form of loans might be taken on for significant projects like these.
The downside is that, should revenue fall,
then finding external sources of financing that are not simply loans is very hard.
This means that bodies lending money to a club like Barcelona know they are one of the few
avenues for raising money. This leads to higher interest rates and worries about collateral,
as the club cannot raise their own equity and must rely instead on revenue or more loans.
That is why the pandemic hit Barcelona particularly hard: with no private ownership
and the potential to raise an equity investment by selling off stock, the club had to rely on loans
and revenue, which plummeted in the absence of crowds. In addition, poor squad-building
decisions, high wages, and failed transfers were collectively damaging. La Liga’s financial
requirements hit the club hard, which is why they couldn’t secure Lionel Messi’s continued
presence at the club and why they courted the European Super League concept so vigorously.
The upside is that, assuming Barcelona can weather the storm, which they have done
in part through taken on debt, then once they return to profitability the old benefits apply.
But the football landscape has changed. Previously, a huge club like Barcelona,
which has benefitted from some golden periods in terms of coaching and youth development,
translating to massive success on and off the pitch, could rely on this to generate sufficient
revenue to stay ahead of the chasing pack. Now, in terms of Barcelona’s Champions League competitors
especially, this just is not the case. Private investment funds, state-backed or otherwise, or
super-rich individual owners can bankroll clubs to levels previously unimaginable. Revenue no longer
needs to be the main driver of a club’s financial success when investment can surpass that.
The danger for Barcelona is that this change, and the legacy of bad decisions
made in the club’s boardroom, have left them off the pace to an irrevocable degree.
They will always contest trophies in Spain, but in European competition they simply cannot match the
financial firepower of other clubs. Joan Laporta, the current club president, has brought back Xavi
and pledged to reinvigorate La Masia youth academy to reinstil Barcelona’s values and
hopefully renergise the club’s abillity to produce talent in the Barcelona mould,
not least because it’s less expensive. But that will take time and, meanwhile,
clubs such as Manchester City and PSG are pulling away on and off the pitch.
Barcelona’s ownership model safeguards them from many issues and protects certain aspects
of their identity, but it could also, ultimately, be what is holding them back.