[MUSIC PLAYING]
ALEX BYRNE: Welcome to "Minds and Machines," an introduction
to a branch of philosophy called "The Philosophy of Mind,
the philosophical study of the mind and its relation to the rest of the world."
Can computers think?
And what does the answer tell us about our own minds?
Here at MIT, smart computers control pretty much everything.
It certainly seems like they're thinking.
Ninth floor, please, HAL.
Sometimes appearances are deceiving.
Maybe HAL here is faking it and isn't really thinking.
Open the elevator doors, HAL.
HAL: I'm sorry.
I'm afraid I can't do that.
ALEX BYRNE: Suppose HAL does have a mental life?
We generally suppose the mind is software
running on the hardware of the brain.
What happens when we die?
Death, on time as usual.
Come in.
[PIANO MUSIC PLAYING]
This computer is not running any programs anymore.
If the mind is software running on the hardware of the brain, when we die
that's the end of our mental lives.
In this view there is no hope for a meaningful afterlife.
But there is an alternative.
Perhaps the mind is more like a ghost in a machine, an immaterial soul that
can survive when the brain shuts down.
As we'll see in this course, there's a surprisingly powerful argument
for the view that we are immaterial souls.
I need lemons and limes for cocktails, and my faculty of vision
is going to help me out.
Perception is a crucial part of being a creature with a mind.
It's where mind meets world.
Using my eyes, I can see these lemons and limes, and I can see their colors.
Amazing, if you think about it.
But wait.
Do I really see this lemon?
Doesn't the brain create an image of a lemon?
And isn't this the thing I really see?
And even if somehow I do see this lemon, is it really yellow?
Physics tells us the lemon is just a bunch of colorless particles.
And where's the yellowness in that?
Isn't the yellowness in my mind and not in the lemon?
We're going to try to turn these tantalizing
thoughts into proper arguments.
We're going to discuss an argument that we don't see,
physical objects like lemons.
And we're going to discuss an argument that physical objects like lemons
have no colors.
That this riot of color is a false imaginary glare.
Excuse me, but this lemon isn't yellow.
How's your PhD thesis coming along, Jeeves?
JEEVES: I endeavor to give satisfaction, sir.
ALEX BYRNE: Thank you.
Nothing like a mind-altering zombie cocktail
after a hard day at the office.
In the last part of the course, which brings together many of the earlier
topics, we'll talk about consciousness.
Some scientists and philosophers think of it like a movie playing in the head.
To be the subject of conscious experience
is to witness this amazing movie in glorious 3D
Technicolor surround sound smell-o, taste-o, touch-o vision.
But where in the brain is this movie to be found?
The brain isn't sweet or yellow or loud.
[SCREAMING]
Science tells us the brain must be the basis of consciousness.
But our own experience tells us it can't be.
How can some sparks in your brain result in conscious experience?
Some scientists and philosophers say that this
is the most profound and deepest intellectual mystery of all.
We'll find out why and think about whether they're right.
Hope to see you in lecture.
[MUSIC PLAYING]