When policymakers want to respond to foreign challenges or influence a desired outcome,
there is a favorite non–lethal tool in their bag of tricks: Economic sanctions.
From the U.S. embargo on Cuba to international sanctions on Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait,
the effectiveness of sanctions, as a whole, has been widely debated.
Myanmar is the latest target of sanctions after a military coup at the start of 2021.
So how effective are they?
Sanctions come in different forms depending on the desired outcomes, similar to a carrot
and stick approach used in negotiations.
Besides economic and trade sanctions, these measures include targeted actions such as
arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and commodity restrictions.
These sanctions can be imposed by a single country or multilaterally,
by like-minded nations or international bodies such as the UN and the EU.
To date, the UN Security Council has imposed 30 sanctions regimes, with the shortest lasting
nearly a year involving an arms embargo on Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2001
while the longest sanctions regime currently in force dates back to 1992 on Somalia.
Sanctions can be wide-ranging or targeted.
Wide-ranging sanctions, also known as comprehensive sanctions, ban all transactions with a specific country
while targeted ones affect specific individuals or entities
minimizing the negative effects on the general population.
Myanmar is no stranger to sanctions.
Since 1988, broad sanctions programs were employed against the country’s military regime
by the U.S., while the EU adopted an arms embargo in 1996.
Straddled between India and China
Myanmar was one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast Asia at the start of the 20th century.
After the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized power in 1962
Myanmar was isolated from the international community for nearly half a century.
Efforts to create a socialist state crippled the economy,
and in 1987, Myanmar was included in the UN’s Least Developed Country list,
just when the rest of Southeast Asia was experiencing strong economic growth.
In the years since, the U.S., EU and other countries tried to
to force the military junta into political rapprochement
with the opposition National League for Democracy, led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi,
by tightening the sanction screws, without much success.
Towards the end of 2010, the junta embarked on a series of reforms,
including holding the country’s first election in 20 years,
which was won by a military-backed civilian party,
and releasing Suu Kyi after seven years of house arrest.
Shortly after her release in 2011, Suu Kyi called for Western sanctions to continue,
prompting the military rulers to demand an apology.
After winning a parliamentary seat in a by-election in 2012,
Suu Kyi's NLD clinched a landslide victory in the 2015 general election and formed the next government.
By then, the U.S. and EU had eased several of their sanctions on the country.
Even as the democratic reforms continued, tensions were building between the military
and Suu Kyi’s government.
In 2021, the military, citing voter fraud in the November 2020 elections,
launched a coup and arrested Suu Kyi, along with senior members of her party.
A one-year state of emergency was declared, with the Tatmadaw promising to hold a "free
and fair general election" thereafter.
Amid rising casualties in Myanmar as protesters clash with the military, some countries have
reimposed targeted financial sanctions against leaders of the military coup,
their family members and business interests.
The punitive measures are on top of existing sanctions on some generals over the persecution
of the Rohingya Muslim minority.
While some critics argue that these sanctions are largely symbolic and the Tatmadaw leaders
have been impervious to past measures, the UN rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar,
Tom Andrews, said that it's worth a shot.
We just have to have the political will to exercise those options
and they’re certainly worth trying.
I’m not saying they are necessarily going to be a panacea, but they’re worth trying.
The U.N. Security Council says that “sanctions do not operate, succeed or fail in a vacuum”
and that they are the most effective when applied as part of a comprehensive strategy
encompassing “peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking.”
Experts say that there are a few pillars of an effective sanctions policy.
Firstly, sanctions policies should be well-rounded with both punitive measures and incentives
to sweeten the deal, as was the case with Libya in 2003, when the country agreed to
dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program.
Sanctions should also be attainable and realistic.
For example, trying to induce regime change through sanctions would be an unrealistic goal,
which was what happened with the U.S. embargo on Cuba under Fidel Castro.
Another key pillar is multilateral support, especially in cases where the target is economically diversified.
In March 2021, the U.S., Canada, EU and the United Kingdom coordinated to impose sanctions
on Chinese officials for alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
Last but not least, sanctions must be credible and flexible for the targets to feel the pinch
while recognizing the benefits of good behavior.
Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing the unintended consequences of wide-ranging
sanctions and are opting for targeted measures instead.
According to the UN, the U.S.’s embargo on Cuba has cost the country $130 billion
over nearly six decades.
After the U.S. imposed comprehensive trade sanctions on Myanmar in 2003,
a report released by the U.S. State Department a year later
noted that at least 50,000 jobs in the garment industry were lost.
In 1995, the UN Security Council recognized that its wide-ranging sanctions created
“adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries.”
Since 2004, all sanctions by the UN security council have been targeted at specific individuals
or businesses affiliated to or operating in a target country.
Before the coup, the World Bank projected that the poverty rate in Myanmar could increase
from 22.4% to 27% because of the pandemic.
Any comprehensive sanctions of the past will likely strain a population already battling
the economic fallout of Covid-19.
While the sanctions imposed by the West so far have been targeted, entities with links
to the Tatmadaw are active in many parts of Myanmar’s economy,
which will have a spillover effect on the general population.
The inaction by Myanmar’s neighbors also blunts the impact of any sanctions.
As Western businesses withdraw from the country, the void would be filled by regional backers
such as Thailand and China.
There are also fears that sanctions could push Myanmar closer to China —
a situation that does not play well for other regional powers such as India and Japan.
If history is any indication, it is unlikely that the generals will buckle under the threat
of sanctions, even though the measures this time are more surgical than the previous ones.
However, after emerging from half a century of isolation in 2011,
Myanmar today is different after a decade of change.
Despite promises by the military junta that it will hold a "free and fair general election"
once the year-long state of emergency ends,
it is likely that opposition will continue to mount, not just internationally, but domestically too.