President Moon Jae-in has a bunch of issues to address-- during his upcoming visit to
China,... but his diplomatic priority is clearly North Korea.
Our Moon Connyoung had the chance to sit down with Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of
Australia, and a longtime China expert... for his take on ways to win support from President
Xi Jinping.
Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and currently President of Asia Society.
Thank you for agreeing to speak to us today.
Great to be back in the ROK.
I want to start by asking for your assessment of the current situation on the Korean peninsula.
You've said the possibility of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula is up from
a 5% from your previous estimate to maybe 25%.
Historically, it's always been around 5%.
That is, something could happen.
I think what's changed materially is the rapid nature of the progress of the North Korean
nuclear program.
And secondly, because you begin to cross American red lines about what they can tolerate in
terms of the ICBM risks to themselves.
There is a form of unilateral U.S. military action against the North.
I don't think we can rule that possibility out.
In fact I think it's a growing possibility, but not a probability.
You've looked at this issue from many angles for many, many years, in many different positions.
In the interest of the great clich?, 'Never waste a great crisis', what are some dynamics
that need to change here?
I think one of the key challenges in dealing with North Korean nuclear weapons program
is, how do you make it clear to our Chinese friends that there are real opportunities,
which proceed from this current difficulty?
Can you turn the armistice into a peace treaty?
Can you also look at credible, external security guarantees, by the Chinese, by the Russians,
by the Americans, for the future of the North Korean regime?
Can you even long term with all these things, look at a beginning of a reduction in the
U.S. military presences on the peninsula?
I regard all those things as opportunities for China.
Speaking of China, South Korean President Moon Jae-in will be sitting down with his
Chinese counterpart in Beijing.
The U.S. and South Korea have been pressing China to more to rein in North Korea.
But some have begun casting doubt on how much leverage China actually has over North Korea,
or more importantly, how much are they willing to use that leverage?
Well of course, those are two different questions.
On the actual leverage the Chinese have, it begins with the letter 'O', ends with the
letter 'L', and the middle letter is 'I' and it's called Oil.
90% of its oil imports come from China.
And we also know that the importance of oil in keeping the wheels of the North Korean
military machine literally turning.
So China has considerable leverage.
If you spend time in Beijing in talking to our Chinese friends, they will ask a series
of questions.
They'll say one, why should we do this?
You want us to effectively assist in the toppling of a regime in North Korea, and not know what
would replace it.
Well, does that point in the direction of Korean reunification, but on South Korean
terms?
Or American terms?
Thereby presenting us and China with a difficult geopolitical neighbor.
So I think it's very important to deal with the substance of each of those concerns.
President Moon looks at this also as an opportunity to understand the full breadth of China's
own national priorities, including its domestic priorities.
Where is its economy going?
What about the problem of the deleveraging of its financial institutions and its state
owned enterprises?
The reason I suggest those things is it has always been helpful in dealing with Chinese
leaders, to understand the broader world they're coming from.
Each of us has got priorities.
China has been calling for a freeze-for-freeze or dual suspension.
South Korea is considering it, however it has said that it's not something that is on
its table for now.
The U.S., on the other hand, is not for that idea at all.
What is your view?
I understand the logic about freeze.
Let's face it- the dynamic factor here is North Korea.
They're requiring a weapons capability that didn't exist before, which is inherently,
definitionally destabilizing.
I think because the North Koreans have actually themselves changed the status quo,...it's
a reasonable principle for them to adopt that they must take the first step, in freezing
what they do.
Which means, freezing the nuclear weapons program and freezing the ballistic missile
program.
It's also important that these are done in a way where what's on the agenda for a freeze
affects both the United States and the ROK equally.
I'm always a little skeptical about a freeze only in an ICBM program, because that affects
the Americans--but not the ROK or Japan.
So I'd be looking at a freeze on both ballistic missile testing and acquisition of nuclear
material.
Two theories I first step forward, which is...let's call it a 'double freeze' by the DPRK.
Then it's really important that other countries in the six party talks sign under that as
well.
So that if there's a breach by the North--and they've breached these things before--everyone
is locked in.
Not just the ROK and the North.
Mr. Rudd, always a pleasure to speak to you.
We appreciate your insights.