In 1945 the United States initiated Operation Paperclip, a secret program in which some sixteen
hundred Nazi German scientists, engineers, and technicians were taken into the employment
of the United States government. The ostensible purpose was to help develop technologies to win
the ongoing war in the Pacific, but it was clear that the real focus was on the
competition with the Soviet Union which even then was clear was going to be the defining conflict
of the post-war world. But of course the Soviets were not going to be left out.
Their project was called Osoaivakhim but it operated much differently than
Operation Paperclip. It is history that deserves to be remembered.
The end of the war brought on a flurry of efforts from all sides to acquire German scientists
for the future. Germany had significant technical experience, and while ultimately
their nuclear program came to little, their scientists represented a significant resource
in the army and technology race that both the West and the Soviet Union were already preparing for.
Probably the most significant scientific development of the war was the Manhattan Project's
atomic bomb which immediately, and instantly, set the stage for the years to come. It was Germany
who initially set off the arms race for the nuclear weapon when in 1938, Otto Hahn discovered
nuclear fission. His discovery that an atom could be split, and that the splitting required far less
energy than was released was recognized by scientists around the world as proving
that a nuclear bomb was feasible, although many thought its creation was far off into the future.
A French team of scientists discovered soon after that Germany had offered to buy a large supply of
heavy water, which the French scientists had determined would be vital in developing sustained
nuclear chain reactions, hinting that the Germans were well on their way to developing a bomb.
In the US, two Hungarian-born physicists warned FDR that extremely powerful bombs of a new type
could be developed based on the German research; that letter eventually led to the creation
of the Manhattan Project. Soviet scientists had been considering nuclear physics for some time
by 1940, however there was little interest from the government which had spent decades dealing
with purges, revolutions and other kinds of unrest which demanded precedence over physics research.
The German invasion in 1941 further delayed research until an official group was established
in 1943, however even that effort failed to accomplish much due to a lack of uranium.
Thanks to espionage the Soviets were however well informed about Allied efforts, including
accomplishments of the Manhattan Project. The Allies feared throughout the war that Germany
was on the cusp of developing nuclear weapons which would have the potential to alter the
war's balance. The Soviets seemed as interested and uncertain about the state of the German
program as the other Allies since Germany fell. In fact, by 1942 the Germans had decided that
nuclear fission would not prove to be effective in the war effort and research into nuclear fission
was generally neglected for other wartime goals. August 1945 proved that the Soviets were behind
in the technology game and likely materially affected Soviet goals and aims in the East.
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were world altering, and Stalin is reported to have said that
“Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The balance has been destroyed.” The nuclear bomb itself was
the most important part of that balance, but it would not be the only vital piece of
arms and technology race to come. Stalin did finally turn his attention fully to his own
nuclear program and put it under his whip. NKVD Chief Lavrentiy Beria, cruel and ruthless manager
who nonetheless proved, according to a scientist beneath him, a first-class administrator.
Russia demanded significant recompense for Germany's invasion. Hundreds of cities had
been destroyed and the country's industrial base severely damaged, not to mention the death of
more than 20 million people. Just as important was the race for intellectual reparations. The United
States was as hard at work at it as the Soviets, seeking to secure German technical experts for a
variety of projects. Soviet Trophy Commissions which sought to capture all manner of valuable
goods, as well as cultural objects, also sought to abduct or hire German experts in fields such as
nuclear weapons, rocketry and turbojet engines. Initially the Soviets opened up several design
offices such as the Nordhausen Institute and the Berlin Institute which aimed to reconstruct V2
missiles. On April 17th a degree was issued that ordered 1,400 German engineers and their families
to be deported to Russia. Among the first scientists to be taken to Russia were nuclear
scientists. Manfred von Arden arrived on May 22nd in 1945, just weeks after Germany's surrender,
he was soon followed by a number of other nuclear scientists. for Ardenne's contribution
to the Soviet atomic project he was awarded the Stalin Prize. By the end of 1945, the Germans
were hard at work assisting Soviet scientists in building a bomb. Possibly more important,
Soviet forces were able to seize a significant amount of uranium from captured German territory.
The largest program the Soviets enacted to acquire scientists was Operation Osoaviakhim to capture
and transport over 2,500 German scientists for work and related industries in Russia. On May 13th
1946, a resolution by the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union was decreed which ordered
the transfer of the construction bureaus, as well as 2,000 German specialists till the end of 1946.
Ivan Serov, head of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany was put in charge
of preparations. On July 9th Stalin had another resolution decreed which set the date for the
effort to October 22nd 1946. The goal of the operation was twofold, first to acquire as many
German scientists in specific fields as possible and two, to transport scientific machinery and
equipment to new bases in Russia. Initially Soviet scientists were sent to Germany to learn from
German experts about various Nazi technologies, especially rocketry, which the Soviets knew little
about. It was clear however that the research couldn't continue in Germany, Germans were gaining
knowledge and learning important information the Soviets would rather keep classified and building
the infrastructure in Germany contributed to the industrial potential of the country,
which the Soviets didn't want to do. Removing the scientists and their work became a priority.
The operation was enormous, the United States Operation Paperclip took place over several years,
the Russian operation was kept completely secret and its “recruitment” took place over a single
night. By doing it suddenly the Soviets hoped to prevent any of their targets from fleeing to
the West. The effort required requisitioning 92 railway cars, fuel and food for the internees,
as well as guards and soldiers to round up the scientists. A few weeks after the operation
commenced Serov received a list of his targets. It included 2,200 scientists, experts in nuclear
technology, rocketry, electronics, chemistry and radar technology, as well as their families.
It might be surprising that both Paperclip and Osoaviakhim primarily targeted aeronautic
scientists and not nuclear ones. The USSR had done little research on jet engines, cruise missiles
and rockets, and gained significant technological benefit from the deported scientists.
At least one German scientist did notice something in the lead-up to the operation as numerous
freight and passenger trains were pre-positioned all throughout the Soviet zone of control. At
least one specialist managed to escape but he couldn't warn his colleagues as the phone system,
and public transportation were forcibly shut down by Soviet authorities. In the early morning of
October 22nd, thousands of internal police and Soviet soldiers began arriving at German homes
with orders that the specialists were to prepare immediately for a trip to the Soviet Union. Wives
could choose to stay in Germany if their husband approved, but most families chose
to remain together, as did unmarried couples. One of the most important scientists taken
in the operation was Helmut Grottrup who worked under Wernher von Braun. Grottrup's wife Irmgard
was shocked at their treatment. “Could these be the same officers who not so long ago, had tried
with a courteous smile to make the reconstruction of our experimental station palpable to us?
The same officers who assured us that we should never be sent to Russia.
The authorities, guns in hands, promised they would have a larger flat, and life without any
restrictions. The only thing they couldn't promise,” Irmgard wrote, “was when we should
see our own country again.” A soviet official remembered Serov's orders, “No action is required
of you except a farewell banquet. Get them good and drunk, it'll be easier to endure the trauma.”
Another engineer described the operation between midnight and 3 am, when everybody was asleep.
“They knew exactly where I lived. First of all, a few days before I was captured a fellow came,
they had a key. There was one interpreter who told me get up, you're being mobilized to work
in Russia, and there were about a half dozen soldiers with machine guns. When I wanted to
get to the toilet they checked first to make sure there was no escape hatch.”
The specialists were allowed to bring some furniture and personal belongings, but within
a day or two most if not all of the targeted specialists were on their way to the USSR.
Russian records say that 90 percent of the Germans resisted the order. The name of the operation,
Osoaviakhim is a western invention, based on an acronym of the Soviet Organization, the
Society for the Promotion of Defense Aviation and Chemistry which recruited civilian workers for the
Red Army. The term was first used to describe the operation the day after it took place by a German
broadcaster of the US occupying power and adopted by the Central Intelligence Group and the OSS.
While the operation mostly went off without a hitch it had its problems. Different institutions
were in charge, and the various groups and institutions fought over the experts for their
own operations and objectives. Grottrup was surprised to find that many of his colleagues
didn't show up with him. “They haggle over every single ordinary measuring instrument, recorder,
ciliograph etc." he said, “and apparently over specialists.” Grottrup called it “A cattle
market.” As the operation was still going on, the Soviet Democratic Party of Germany issued
a protest against the kidnappings. Two days later the British complained that numerous specialists
were taken from Berlin, including some who lived in the British sector of the city. Newspapers
reported that employees and workers have been requested to allegedly immigrate voluntarily,
and an Austrian newspaper reported that Russian authorities assured them that, “No Germans had
been forcibly deported. A number of special workers traveled to Russia with their families
in order to work in Russian industry for two or three years after voluntarily signing a contract.”
Whole factories with their equipment were also taken, although without adequate storage space,
some of that equipment rusted at train stations. Though taken against their will,
conditions in Russia were reasonably good for the scientists, certainly better than for
their Russian counterparts. In general they were paid more and given more decent accommodations.
They were dispersed to various institutions and projects such as
NII-88, and were kept throughout the USSR. The German experts assisted the Soviets in producing
rockets such as copies of the V-2 rockets, as well as developing and organizing production plants.
In general however, the German projects were limited to consulting and practical training,
Soviets had no desire to let the specialists know what Russia was working on. As historian
Daniel Bose describes that, “Soviets were only interested in skimming off the special knowledge
of the technicians and engineers in order to be able to develop their own missile program.”
However the germans were essentially prisoners, almost never allowed to visit Moscow or see Soviet
civilians. They were kept entirely separate from their Soviet counterparts, and many of the Soviet
commanders avoided them simply because they hated Germans for Nazi actions during the war.
They were increasingly made to feel useless as they were given little support. In 1950,
Irmgard Grottrup complained that, “It is futile to keep on wondering what lies in store for us.
Exactly nothing.” A Soviet report said that by 1951,
owing to their isolation from modern science and technology, the Germans were becoming useless.
The Germans were held in the Soviet Union for between 5 and 12 years, but all had been returned
to Germany by 1958 and the Soviets had developed their own professionals who continued their work.
Their work was important however, analysis afterwards determined that the Germans were
at least critical in helping the Soviets to reconstruct the German rocket designs.
One of the reasons that the Soviets were so anxious to sideline the Germans is that they
wanted any scientific development to be Soviet, they wanted the world to attribute scientific
prowess to the Soviet method. And that was consistent with their internal propaganda
where the Soviets insisted that Russians had invented everything from the light bulb, to
the steam engine, to baseball. But it contrasted highly with the United States where for example,
German scientist Wernher von Braun was a central part of the US space program. Still both sides
were anxious to augment both their technology and their reputations, and both benefited
greatly from the intellectual reparations that they extracted from a defeated Germany.
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