One
might think that the life of a conqueror as well known as Mongol imperial founder Chinggis Khan
would be meticulously detailed. While Chinggis Khan certainly is a well-attested figure,
before he was the great conqueror and merely Temüjin Khan, outside sources did not take
account of his life. Thus, most of the histories of his early life could be written after the fact,
and suit the needs of Mongol imperial historiography. This episode looks at
the sources on the life of Temüjin, and the mysterious ten-year gap that the official
Mongol imperial source created— a gap he may have spent, in Jin Dynasty China.
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One of the most interesting of all surviving inscriptions of the Jurchen-ruled Jin Dynasty
(1115-1234) is the Servan Khaalga Inscription, located in Bayankhutag, Khentii Aimag, Mongolia.
Discovered in the 1980s and carved into a granite mountainside, the inscription is weathered and
difficult to read. It consists of several lines of Jurchen text, accompanied by a translation
into Chinese. They glorify a successful campaign in May/June 1196 by the Jin commander Wanyan
Xiang against the Tatars of eastern Mongolia (here called Zubu, 阻䪁). It’s a brief victory marker over
“barbarian tribesmen,” which is hardly uncommon in the history of Chinese dynastic monuments. It also
happens to be the earliest record of an event in the life of Chinggis Khan, then known as Temüjin.
Though Chinggis is not named on the monument, we know of his participation in the campaign
from a number of Mongol imperial sources, such as the Jāmi’ al-Tawārīkh by the Ilkhanid historian
and vizier Rashīd al-Dīn (c.1305), the Chinese translation of the Veritable Records of Chinggis
Khan 實錄 (c.1287), the Shengwu Qinzheng lu 聖武親征錄 (c.1320), the Yuan Shi 元史 (1370),
and of course, the famous Secret History of the Mongols (c.1252). The campaign is
also referred to in the Jin Dynasty’s own dynastic history, the Jin Shi 金史 (1343),
though from the point of view of the commander, Wanyan Xiang. Again, Chinggis Khan is unnamed.
Collectively, these sources allow us to firmly date Wanyan Xiang’s campaign against the Tatars
to summer 1196, with Xiang returning to the Jin capital of Zhongdu 中都 by the autumn. This makes it
the earliest concrete date we have for an event in the life of Temüjin Khan. Dating the early life of
Chinggis Khan is notoriously difficult. For events before 1196, the main sources (the Secret History
of the Mongols, Rashīd al-Dīn, the Veritable Records, Yuan Shi) generally agree in the general
flow, but often differ in the actual year or order of events. The most famous of these, and the
earliest surviving Mongolian history, the Secret History of the Mongols, plays particularly loose
with dating, often condensing years for dramatic purposes or simply offering no dating at all.
Scholarship of the last decades has come to a rough guideline for Temüjin’s life. 1162 is
the most widely given year for his birth (though supporters remain for 1155 and1167). Around 1180
(give or take a year or two) saw the capture of Temüjin’s wife Börte by the Merkit, and soon-after
birth of their first son, Jochi (they already had a daughter: Qojin Beki). The only date of
birth given for any of his sons in a medieval source is 1186 for Ögedei, Temüjin’s third son.
A few years after the rescue of Börte and birth of Jochi (c.1180-1182), Temüjin and his
sworn ally Jamuqa fell out and came to blows. The ensuing battle at Dalan Baljut (seventy marshes)
was not only the first time where the future Chinggis Khan held his own independent command,
but was also a major defeat for him, despite efforts of later writers like Rashīd al-Dīn to
gloss over this. Jamuqa was victorious and in the Secret History of the Mongols boiled
seventy captive princes alive after the battle, while Temüjin slinked away to lick his wounds.
The most usual dating for the battle of Dalan Baljut falls between 1186-1190. While a minority
of researchers like Carl Sverdrup propose a date as late as early 1194, most scholarship prefers a
date in the mid-1180s, which seems to align better with the chronology within the sources. 1186-7 is
perhaps the most popular suggestion. By assigning Temüjin’s defeat at Dalan Baljut to 1186,
a new issue emerges, for the next recorded event in Temüjin’s life comes with the aforementioned
Tatar campaign of 1196 with the Jin. Paul Ratchnevsky shed light on this in his Genghis
Khan: His Life and Times (1991), identifying this as the “ten-year gap” in Temüjin’s life.
Assuming, first of all, this chronologic reconstruction is accurate, and that there
is indeed a ten-year gap from 1186-1196, a number of suggestions have been proposed to account for
the silence. A simple explanation is that Temüjin underwent a rather uncharacteristic quiet period,
slowly rebuilding his support or fighting minor skirmishes with his rivals while raising
his new family. More or less, nothing interesting happened from 1186-1196.
However, as Ratchnevsky noted, there is evidence that Temüjin spent his “dark years” in China.
It was not uncommon for defeated steppe leaders to seek shelter with neighbouring sedentary powers,
such as the Jin Dynasty, Tangut Kingdom, Uighurs or Qara-Khitai. Temüjin’s ally,
To’oril of the Kereyit, did so several times. Shortly after Dalan Baljut, To’oril was chased out
of power by a relative named Erke-Qara. To’oril fled to Qara-Khitai, then made his way through
Uighur and Tangut lands before rejoining Temüjin for the 1196 campaign. After To’oril’s death his
son Ilqa-Senggüm fled through the Tangut lands, while the Naiman prince Küchülüg, upon being
defeated by Temüjin, fled with his retainers to Qara-Khitai, where he eventually usurped power.
The neighbouring powers were often happy to receive these nomadic lords, for they could
be useful auxiliaries for their own campaigns, while installing a friendly khan back on his
throne could be protection against future raids. Furthermore, several historical sources actually
directly state that Temüjin spent years in China as a captive. A Franciscan friar who travelled
through the Mongol Empire in the 1250s, William of Rubruck, recorded Temüjin being held captive by
the Tangut Kingdom, while a Song Dynasty emissary in 1221, Zhao Gong, stated that Temüjin spent 10
years as a slave of the Jin. Zhao Gong states that Temüjin was young when this occurred, but the time
there gave him great knowledge of Jin affairs, which he later put to use in his war against them.
Based on the surviving evidence, that Temüjin spent some or all of these years in the Jin state
seems likely— while also embarrassing enough that official Mongol imperial historiography felt it
too shameful to comment upon, but Song envoys like Zhao Gong would have no taboos over mentioning.
As Temüjin’s defeat at Dalan Baljut occurred in northeastern Mongolia, a flight across the entire
steppe to Qara-Khitai or the Tangut Kingdom seems a difficult venture; the Jin were considerably
closer. While Temüjin had reasons to dislike the Jin, namely their role in the murder of his
relation Ambaghai, such feeling could have been put aside in the face of the immediate material
and political need for shelter from his rivals in Mongolia. This juxtaposition of taking shelter,
or vassalage, with a hated enemy would certainly explain why official Mongol
histories glossed over it. Contemporary sources outside of the Mongol historical tradition,
such as the Song border official Li Xinchuan and the envoy Zhao Gong, both indicate that Temüjin
had been a vassal of the Jin, paying them yearly tribute until the very eve of the Mongol invasion.
Such a relationship was also well-within Jin Dynastic border policy. Unlike their predecessors,
the Khitan Liao Dynasty, the Jin Dynasty did not rule over the Mongolian plateau directly.
Aside from sending a few armies into the steppe, by and large the Jin’s preferred policy was to
operate through jüyin peoples. That is, nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples along the frontier
between the steppe and the Jin Dynasty, who paid tribute to the Jin and patrolled the border.
The most well-known of these were the Önggut, who also manned the Jin’s border fortifications
in Inner Mongolia. The Tatars themselves were the Jin’s regular allies in the steppes from
the 1160s until the 1190s. In exchange for this allegiance, these nomadic polities received gifts,
trade privileges and official titles that enhanced the prestige of their leaders in the steppe.
And when one of these groups grew too powerful or rambunctious, the Jin would back a different
group and overthrow it to maintain the balance of power, as they did when they
supported Temüjin against the Tatars in 1196. A few sporadic mentions within Mongol imperial
sources support Temüjin spending time in the Jin Empire. In Rashīd al-Dīn’s account,
Temüjin recalls bringing To’oril Khan’s uncle, Ja’a Gambu, back from the Jin Dynasty with him.
Numerous official Mongolian sources refer to the 1196 campaign, and are very open about Temüjin and
To’oril’s cooperation with the Jin commander Wanyan Xiang. In the Secret History of the
Mongols, Wanyan Xiang sent messages to Temüjin requesting his aid, and Temüjin and To’oril
both met him in person. For their services in the battle, To’oril was given the Chinese
title of Wang 汪, “king, prince” which became in Mongolian Ong, and hence the epithet by which
he is better known, Ong Khan. Temüjin meanwhile was granted the title of ja’ut quri, of uncertain
etymological origin but the general meaning is thought to be akin to centurion. The granting
of both titles is recorded even in the Secret History of the Mongols. This was no minor thing;
the prestige of such titles was important to the reputation of steppe leaders. The name of To’oril
own son, Ilqa-Senggüm is a Mongolized form of a Chinese title, xianggong 相公 meaning Lord Minister
or Chancellor. It was no coincidence that To’oril is better known by the title of Ong Khan than his
own name. The Secret History of the Mongols even includes the detail that Wanyan Xiang was going
to ask the Jin Emperor about granting an even more prestigious title on Temüjin, in an episode meant
to enhance Temüjins’ importance to the reader, indicating a connection beyond momentary allies.
Other indirect support comes from how effective Chinggis’ actual invasion of the Jin was.
Chinggis showed a marked familiarity with individuals of the Jin state, such as the Emperor
Wei Shao Wang, and before the invasion there were dissidents against Jurchen rule, especially
Khitans, defecting to Temüjin, demonstrating he was a known figure within the Jin realm.
As Zhao Gong stated, when Temüjin attacked the Jin, he was no stranger to them, but had
familiarized himself with their strengths and weaknesses, particularly of their military. Some
of this can be accounted for by Mongol spies, such as the Muslim merchant Ja’far Khoja, who travelled
through Jin lands and brought back valuable intel. But it seems Temüjin had his own eye-witness
knowledge which he incorporated into his planning, and allowed him to overwhelm the Jin defenses.
Other evidence may come from Börte continuing to bear children continually over the 1180s and 90s.
There is no indication of miscarriage, and all of Temüjin and Börte’s nine known children lived to
adulthood. Whatever Temüjin was doing, Börte was still at his side, and in a safe enough position
to bear and raise their children. No matter what, Temüjin was not reduced to nothing after Dalan
Baljut. He was able to keep his family secure in a way he’d never been able to beforehand;
something unlikely if his power was broken and he was hunted by his rivals in the steppes.
Assuming Temüjin did indeed flee to the Jin Dynasty after 1186, then his life probably looked
something like this. With his retinue, perhaps even a small army, he came to the Jin border,
meeting with the jüyin border guards and sending messages to seek permission to enter the Jin
Dynasty. During this time he may have waited at the court of the Önggud rulers and, with his
natural charisma, made a good impression; it would explain why the Önggud were later so willing to
side with Temüjin against his rivals and betray the Jin. Presumably Temüjin was brought to the
capital of Zhongdu to make an official show of submission, a humiliating but valuable necessity.
We cannot track his movements over the intervening years, but it seems he likely
received military training or accompanied the Jin army on campaign. Up to Dalan Baljut in 1186,
Temüjin’s military performance was mediocre, having lost the only major battle he led himself.
By 1196, Temüjin appears a much more confident and capable commander, able to coordinate effectively
with the Jurchen army. His military actions during his stay may have ranged from bandit suppression,
to joining Jin armies in punitive raids in Mongolia, as the Jin did in 1195 against the
Onggirat. At the same time, he made connections and spoke of uprising with disaffected members
of the military, particularly Khitans. Likely, Temüjin spent these years hungry
for news from the steppe, looking for an opportunity to rush back and claim his title.
Perhaps other former allies of his steadily flocked to him when they learned he was in the
Jin lands. When the Tatars rose in revolt in 1195, Temüjin jumped at the chance,
if the Jin court didn’t already have him in mind as their new “man-on-the-ground.” Once victory
was achieved and the Tatars humbled, the Jin hoped to keep Temüjin playing nice, delivering tribute
and stopping any other nomadic power from growing too strong. Hence, the Song sources' description
of Temüjin paying tribute and recognizing the Jin Emperor as overlord until his invasion.
But as Mongol sources recognized no legitimate power on Earth other than the one established
by Chinggis Khan, it was simply inappropriate to suggest any tributary relations whatsoever.
The Jin’s plan might have worked too, but the ailing emperor Zhangzong failed to pay proper
heed to steppe affairs in his final years, despite the cries of concerned members of the court,
like that of his uncle Wanyan Yungji. In 1206, a massive war broke out with the Song Dynasty
which demanded the Jin court’s full attention; the very same year that Temüjin established the Mongol
Empire and took the title of Chinggis Khan. A large uprising of Khitans in the Jin Dynasty,
continued ecological and financial crises greatly diminished the political will of the Jin state. In
late 1208 Zhangzong of Jin died, and was succeeded by Wanyan Yungji (Weishao Wang, r. 1208-1213).
Chinggis had little respect for the man, but initially continued tribute payments.
According to Li Xinchuan, when a Mongol party (perhaps including Chinggis himself) came to
bring their yearly tribute to the border, Wanyan Yungji, concerned over the Mongol
unification (as well as Chinggis’ attacks on the Tangut Kingdom to the west), attempted to ambush
Chinggis. Unfortunately for the Jin, the plan was discovered, leading Chinggis to officially
cut off the tribute in 1210, and invade the Jin Empire in 1211. Inadvertently, the Jin Dynasty
may have sheltered, and given power, to the force which ultimately wiped them from the map.
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