The T-14 Armata is a worthy weapon system since it may give us many
clues about what is going wrong in Ukraine for the Russian Army.
This tank has also ignited the initiation of new projects in the West. As the Weapon Detective,
we are now investigating the Armata, the tank that tells a story about the changing world.
The Armata offers a chance to understand how the Russian Army has changed since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. Also, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this tank was one of the
most significant signs of the dawn of a new era, which we define as the Second Cold War.
We can track the roots of the Armata to the early 1980s when the Western armies began to
operate new and highly advanced Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams. They made the Soviet tanks outdated.
The armoured warfare doctrine of the U.S.S.R. had been based on quickly produced, easily maintained,
and expendable tanks since the Second World War. The design criteria of the T-34, regarded by many
experts as the most successful tank of the Second World War,
were replicated in the successor T series tanks. Yet, after the West introduced the superior
Leopard 2, M1 and Challenger, the Soviet Army began considering new approaches.
It was not enough for the Soviet engineers to develop a tank with similar capabilities
to its Western counterparts. They aimed more. During the
1980s, the U.S.S.R. examined many innovative technologies and concepts.
But, the Soviet Union lost the First Cold War and collapsed.
The newly-established Russian Federation did not have enough money to continue the work.
Besides, there was no longer a risk of a third World War.
So, the new tank, called T-95, could not go beyond being a technology demonstrator.
The T-95 was quite different from conventionally designed tanks.
It had a remotely controlled unmanned turret, which separated the crew from ammunition.
The T-95 was also fitted with advanced electronics.
Relying on electronics had not been something the Soviet Army believed in.
According to the Soviet military planners, in the Third World War,
the electromagnetic pulse effect of nuclear weapons would make electronics useless.
Or in large-scale conventional war without nuclear strikes, millions of fighting soldiers would use
radios and radars. So, the frequency interference would disable any healthy
result in terms of communication and detection. Also, the jammers would multiply the nightmare.
Besides, each side would destroy the satellite network of the other within a week.
According to the Soviet military planners, the network-centric warfare concept was unrealistic.
The T-95 symbolized a breaking point in Russian military thought.
The Armata was the continuation of this change. It relies on the unmanned turret, advanced
electronics, electro-optics and situational awareness systems. Furthermore, the Armata
has network-centric warfare capability. The three-person crew seats side-by-side in
a special armoured capsule in front, separated by an armoured bulkhead from the turret.
The main body is built with the new and lightweight 44S-SV-SH steel,
which is highly durable and can withstand extreme temperature environments. The ballistic
protection is also enhanced with new ceramic plates and explosive reactive armour blocks.
Also, the Armata has the Afganit active protection system with
both hard-kill and soft-kill capabilities. The 125mm 2A82-1M main gun can fire the Vacuum-1
armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot round. According to Russian sources,
it can penetrate 1,000 millimetres of rolled homogeneous armour at 2 kilometres.
The gun can also fire guided anti-tank missiles, such as the 9M119M1 Invar-M
with a 5 kilometres range and the 3UBK21 Sprinter with a 12 kilometres range.
They are also effective against low-flying air targets.
The tank carries 45 125mm rounds, 32 of which are on the autoloader.
The Russians are also considering changing the
125mm main armament of the Armata with a new 152mm one.
The 12.7mm machine gun on the remotely-controlled weapon station can be replaced with 30mm cannon.
The three-person crew of the Armata consists of the driver, commander and gunner.
It has a length of 10.8 metres, a width of 3.9 metres, and a height of 3.3 metres.
Its combat weight is 55 tons. The 1,500-horsepower A-85-3A turbocharged diesel engine provides 75
kilometres per hour on the road. Its range is 500 kilometres. In addition to the 125mm
2A82-1M smoothbore gun, the Armata has one 12.7mm Kord and one 7.62mm PKTM machine gun.
The Armata and its programme have many handicaps, even though it is an excellent tank on paper.
The current Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed that the Russian Army and
Russian military industries are struggling with many problems.
Even before the so-called special military operation in Ukraine began, Moscow had already
lost its enthusiasm to equip its armoured units with the Armata as soon as possible.
The programme had continuously been delayed or suspended.
The Russian officials publicly expressed that the reason for the setback was mainly economic.
Besides, the modernized T-72s, T-80s and T-90s could not deal with any potential threats.
So, acquiring the advanced Armata was not a priority. On the other hand, there were some
other problems that were unmentioned openly. First, the question of how rapidly the Russian
Army could adapt to these radical approaches to the tank concept stood as an enigma.
The new design criteria of the Armata were unsuitable for the old doctrine. Yes, the Russian
Army was changing, but like all transformations, it required time and brought many problems.
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine displays that the Russians could
not handle the re-organization progress well. The old Soviet doctrine was based on a massive
human-machine flood with devastating firepower. However, the Russian Army operated battalion-sized
tactical groups in Ukraine. Russian attackers never had overwhelmingly numerical superiority
as expected by those who know Russian military history, against the Ukrainian defenders.
It was an indicator of the changed Russian doctrines.
But also, Russia could not execute modern network-centric warfare properly.
The Russian Air Force could not gain air dominance over Ukraine as the Westerns did
in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. The Russian Ground Forces buzzed
in Ukraine like in old times, but they had not organized as before.
Tens of thousands of T-34s crushed Nazi Germany in the Second World War.
The T-55, T-62, T-64, and T-72 were developed based on the same principles as the T-34.
Tens of thousands of them might crush the NATO forces in a third World War.
But, a couple of thousands of tanks could win a
big war only if they are high-tech and are supported by other modern
weapon systems and a mighty air force in a network-centric warfare doctrine.
Also, the war showed that the Russian military industry did not have a massive
production capability, especially for high-tech systems, as before.
The fact that Russia was stuck between the past and the future and could not
solve the handicaps in the transition to modern Western tactics caused it to fail in Ukraine.
The same problems hit the Armata programme. This tank, designed according to new concepts,
could easily not be fitted to the outdated Russian Army.
Russia initially expressed it planned to produce 2,300 Armatas. It represented a dramatic change
in the structure of the Russian Army, which had 13,000 tanks at that time.
Replacing the old T-72s and T-80s with the Armatas would not be enough.
All other military vehicles in the inventory were designed to fight alongside T-72s and T-80s.
So, the effectiveness of the Armata is directly related to reorganizing
and re-equipping motorized infantry, artillery, military engineering, and even air support units.
Besides, all operation plans to date, the education system, mobilization documents and
logistic structure have to undergo a revision. So, the Russian Army, struggling to adopt
new doctrines, as seen in Ukraine, can not use the Armata efficiently.
So, why has Russia sent the Armata to fight in Ukraine?
First, many Western experts do not believe this claim. According to them, it is just propaganda.
Indeed, even if Russia operates the Armata in Ukraine, it is still a propaganda effort.
Due to shortcomings caused by war and economic problems, neither the tank nor its crew could
probably reach combat-readiness level. But, while Western countries are
supporting the Ukraine Army with Leopard 2s and Challenger 2s, Moscow had to do something.
According to our analysis, Moscow hopes that Western countries will take a step back because
they will not risk that the Armata may destroy and humiliate their best tanks.
Or maybe, the Russians trust their new tank against the Leopard 2 and Challenger 2.
Let's hypothetically accept that the Armata is much superior to its Western counterparts.
We still think that the Russian Army, which is struggling to adopt new doctrines,
will not be capable of using its new steel beast against them effectively.
The design of the Armata is innovative. However, we cannot say that all innovations are better.
For example, when a tank is hit by an armour piercing or even a high explosive round, although
the armour remains intact, the crew has to endure a massive noise, harsh vibration, heat, and blast
effect. Of course, there are some measures to reduce them, but they can not eliminate them all.
Due to the design of the Armata, all crew members feel these effects together,
and the driver, gunner and commander might faint or be dazed at the same time.
In conventional tank design, the driver is separated from the commander and the gunner,
who are located in the turret. So, while the driver faints or is dazed,
the turret crew could still be operational or at least they could escape. If the round would hit
the turret, the driver could be safe. The unmanned turret design offers many advantages.
But, it may cause some other handicaps. Although the Syrian T-62s had better night
vision and firing systems than the modernized Israeli Centurions, called Sho't, in 1973 at
the Golan Heights, the Israel Defense Forces stopped 1,400 Syrian tanks with only 170 tanks.
The real heroes of this victory were the Israeli tank commanders, who observed the battlefield
with binoculars while their hatch opened. Naturally, they suffered the most casualties.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Western countries accelerate their efforts to
invest in electro-optic technologies for tanks to save tank commanders.
However, many combat analyses have shown that electro-optics are less
efficient than the Mark1 eyeball. Also, after each fire, the blast
and recoil effects of the main gun decrease the efficiency of electro-optic devices bit by bit.
Even the vibration of the track negatively affects the life and calibration of electro-optics.
Therefore, the open hatch of the commander is still vital for the combat efficiency of a tank.
The highest point is the best spot for observation.
Looking over from the hull is simply ineffective. Looking over from the hull is simply ineffective.
Avigdor Ben-Gal, who commanded the Israeli
7th Armoured Brigade at the Golan Heights, also agrees.
In a military conference in 2007, he claimed it was the human factor that matters the most at war.
Also, Ben-Gal argued that the technological revolution did not bring Israel to a better point.
Time will tell whether the Armata will be one of the symbols of the new era. We accept that all our
analyses are inherently doomed to be speculations. It is wiser to wait to see if the Armata will face
the Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 in Ukraine and if it can win the fight when the time comes.
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