As we last saw in our previous episode, with the arrival of General Savige’s
3rd Australian Division, the drive to Salamaua was finally about to begin.
Though the Allies had won two key victories at the battles of Wau and the Bismarck Sea,
they had wasted a perfect chance to attack the lightly-defended Japanese bases of Lae and
Salamaua, and now they have much fighting ahead of them before they can have the opportunity to
expel the enemy from New Guinea in order to at last secure their homeland. In front of
the brave and skilled Australian soldiers are the ferocious troops of the Japanese Empire,
who hold two critical strongholds in the path of the Allies to victory: Mubo and the Bobdubi Ridge.
Thus, we are about to witness the beginning of another bloody campaign in the Pacific War,
so join us as we delve into the start of the battles of Mubo and Bobdubi.
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When General Savige with the headquarters of the 3rd Division took command of the Wau-Bulolo area,
he inherited dispositions and the tactical situation from Brigadier Moten, who had been
commanding the troops in this area since January. Moten had then decided not to drive the retreating
Japanese forces out of Mubo, but to control the area by offensive patrolling forward from
a line running between Guadagasal and Waipali, thus maintaining a threat to Salamaua without
prejudicing his main role of protecting the approaches to Wau from Mubo. An interesting
fact is that back in January, General Blamey had actually given Moten a forecast that he would have
to threaten the approaches to Salamaua to draw the enemy away from Lae. Blamey’s forecast would
eventually become the basis of Operation Postern, the planned invasions of Lae and Nadzab ; and
although Moten was aware of these plans, Savige would be kept in the dark until June or later.
In that regard, during the early stages of the campaign, Moten would continue to plan
his next offensive steps while Savige still studied his best defensive possibilities.
Savige’s first operation instruction on April 25 therefore instructed the 17th Brigade to prevent
the Japanese from entering the Bulolo Valley from the Mubo area, secure the Mubo-Guadagasal-Waipali
area, and gain control of the coastal area immediately south of the Bitoi River while
the 2/3rd Independent Company was to prevent the Japanese from entering the Bulolo Valley
through the Missim area, and secure the Missim-Pilimung area as a base for raids
towards Komiatum and Salamaua. Additionally, the 2/6th and 24th Battalions were to prevent
the Japanese from entering the Bulolo Valley through the Markham area, establish a close
defense of the Bulolo and Bulwa airfields, and patrol forward to the Markham River.
We’ve already covered the movement of Major Warfe’s 2/3rd Independent Company into the Missim
area, from where they were to conduct a number of raids and ambushes over the key Japanese positions
around Komiatum Hill and the Bobdubi Ridge; but in the meantime, the 2/7th Battalion of
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Guinn had been ordered to make and maintain contact with the enemy in
the Bitoi-Duali-Nassau Bay area, patrolling to the coast if necessary. By the end of April,
however, the 2/7th had a new mission: to clear the Japanese from the vicinity of Mubo . After much
consideration, Moten finally approved a plan to attack Green Hill and the Pimple on April
22, also ordering Warfe to harass enemy supplies or troop movements down Mubo Track as a diversion.
On the morning of April 24, after 20 minutes of air attacks by Boston aircraft, the limited
offensive would commence with a two-pronged attack by a company of the 2/7th against the
steep and precipitous Pimple, which was a natural fortress that could be held by a few good troops.
As such, within 100 yards of the Pimple, the two columns would soon be pinned down
by the enemy's machine-guns in front; and despite launching an all-out assault
late in the afternoon, the Australians would be unable to gain much ground.
The following morning, as Savige and his headquarters arrived at Wau,
three Bostons again strafed and bombed Green Hill while a mountain battery fired on the Pimple.
Yet the troops would still be unable to dislodge the enemy with their next attacks, and with the
defenders reinforcing these positions, the offensive would finally be put to an end.
Meanwhile, Major Warfe had sent a strong patrol from Namling to follow the old graded Bench Cut
Track and ambush the enemy at the junction between the Francisco River and the Buirali Creek. As
the ambush was successful, reporting 18 Japanese killed, another party was sent on April 28 towards
the south; yet the commandos would this time get ambushed by the Japanese at the Goodview Junction,
suffering many losses as a result. A vital consequence of this operation was that the
Australians learnt that the Bobdubi Ridge area was held very lightly by the enemy,
something that eventually convinced Warfe to send a second platoon to capture the northern
part of the ridge on April 27 . By the end of April, Warfe thus had two platoons spread over
the Bobdubi Ridge area, with his third platoon in reserve at Missim. But the most important result
of these two limited attacks was that Brigadier Moten now came to the understanding that it was
too costly to assault positions like the Pimple, which should be bypassed instead. But alas, the
decision to continue to launch attacks against the Pimple now rested in the hands of General Savige.
Furthermore, a patrol would find the Pimple unoccupied on April 28, successfully observing
the location of enemy weapon-pits and machine-gun positions before the Japanese returned in force.
Colonel Guinn deduced from this episode that the Japanese must have anticipated an airstrike at
the usual time and withdrawn, returning when they realized that no strike was to be made.
He therefore brought forward another company, under Captain Leslie Tatterson, for a renewed
assault, planning to bomb the Pimple every day until May 2 when, instead of bombing the Pimple,
the Allied aircraft would make deceptive passes over it, dropping bombs on Green Hill well ahead
of the attacking infantry in the hopes that the Japanese would vacate the Pimple just like they
had done before. Although shrewdly conceived, the plan would go astray, as the Japanese would
not move back as they vacated the Pimple, instead moving forward onto the southern slopes. Unable to
break through, the Australians would be once again forced to withdraw. Worried about the situation,
General Nakano had ‘deemed it necessary to dampen the enemy’s initial enthusiasm’ by sending two
companies of the 115th Regiment to reinforce Mubo, also sending a battalion of the 102nd
Regiment to occupy the Nassau Bay area. To Moten’s relief, this second failure also convinced Savige
that attacks should not be made against prepared enemy positions in circumstances under which heavy
casualties would be incurred without commensurate results; that such positions should be outflanked,
neutralized and isolated from sources of supply and water; and that the enemy should be constantly
harassed by raids, ambushes and fighting patrols. Despite this, another company attack supported by
aircraft and artillery would be launched on May 7, yet again trying to flank the enemy positions and
yet again failing to do so because the defenders managed to pin the attackers down with machine-gun
and sniper fire . During these attacks on the Pimple, the 2/7th Battalion lost 12 killed and 25
wounded for no gain at all, and the situation was only going to get worse for the Australians there.
Meanwhile, on May 3, the attack on the northern part of the Bobdubi Ridge finally began as the
recently-arrived platoon headed towards New Bobdubi. The commandos found a strong enemy
presence in the village, so they instead decided to head towards Old Bobdubi, occupying the South
Coconuts area by May 4. Just behind, they set up a Vickers machine-gun position later known
as Old Vickers, which allowed them to harass the enemy movements and to see as far as Salamaua,
the mouth of the Francisco and part of the track to Mubo. The Japanese quickly responded to this
threat by sending some reinforcements to the area, successfully recapturing the South Coconuts with a
counterattack on May 5, though the commandos would continue to hold the Old Vickers position. On this
day, the Australians would also set up a Vickers near Gwaibolom, which allowed them to fire on the
Komiatum Track from a long distance. The next day, a patrol managed to sneak through the Francisco
River, finding the North Coconuts area unoccupied and successfully establishing a position there.
With the enemy virtually surrounded, the commandos began a heavy bombardment of the Center Coconuts
on May 7, forcing the Japanese to withdraw. The Australians rapidly took advantage of this
to occupy the area, something that aroused the enemy, who counterattacked three times but was
driven back in each opportunity. Around midday, however, the Japanese would skillfully use their
mortars to force the commandos to pull back; but on the following day, some 60 reinforcements
from Salamaua would be ambushed by the North Coconuts detachment, suffering the loss of 20 men.
On May 9, disaster finally struck the Mubo area when a booby-trap suddenly exploded in front of
Captain Tatterson’s defensive perimeter on the Jap Track. Almost immediately, the Japanese opened
fire on the Australian’s right flank; and soon, this incursion would evolve into a strong attack,
with the enemy starting to feel for weak spots. As the defenders realized that the Japanese were
trying to encircle them, Colonel Guinn would send a small force back along the track to keep it
open. Though Tatterson’s men resisted tenaciously, Japanese progress was slow and steady, and they
would eventually manage to cut the track to the rear of the defenders. This left Tatterson’s
men completely isolated, and they would have to ferociously fight many defensive actions against
the heavy and repeated assaults of the Japanese, who would also start to bring many reinforcements,
a total of about 500 troops from the 102nd and 115th Regiment, over the following days.
Furthermore, the Japanese battalion stationed in the Nassau Bay area had been ordered to
"capture the high area on the right bank of the Buyawim River fork” in coordination
with the May 9 attack, something that would have endangered the Lababia camp position.
But luckily for the Australians, rumors of Australian movement ahead left the Japanese
commander undecided, and he would eventually decide to "hold firmly the important points on
the right bank of the Bitoi mouth" instead. Meanwhile, Guinn decided to concentrate
his forces on the Lababia camp and began to send strong patrols to break the enemy ring;
but to no avail, as the enemy was too strong. This finally forced Guinn to signal Moten that
one battalion was too small to carry out effectively the role assigned to the 2/7th.
Thankfully, on May 11, a company-sized relief force of 60 men would manage to break through
and reach Tatterson, where they learnt that the Japanese had apparently withdrawn earlier that
morning . Though the Japanese counterattack had ended, Guinn now had to reorganize his forward
positions in the light of all the lessons learned, with Tatterson’s company occupying a position in
depth on the Jap Track and with the relief force occupying the track junction and the Lababia camp.
Furthermore, cleared fields of fire were developed, with trees of all sizes being felled;
and section positions were sited and given mutual fire support, fully dug with connecting crawl
trenches. Irritated at the lack of progress, however, General Savige also ordered Moten to
move his headquarters from the relative safety of Wau and forward into the Skindewai area.
There, Moten decided that he would continue to use one infantry battalion forward while one company
from the 2/6th Battalion would move to Napier and secure control of the coastal area south
of the Bitoi to Nassau Bay by raids. From May 15 onwards, the 17th Brigade would concentrate
more on aggressive patrolling in all sectors than on actual attacks. Strong patrols daily
harassed the Pimple; and on Observation Hill, constant patrolling combined with intelligent
siting of booby-traps almost paralysed movement by the Japanese outside their positions. Finally, on
May 23, Savige would decide to relieve the spent 2/7th with the rested 2/6th Battalion. The forward
move of the 2/6th began on May 27, the same day in which the 15th Brigade headquarters and the first
company of the 58th/59th Battalion arrived at Wau. In the meantime, on May 11, Warfe’s commandos
found the entire Coconuts vacated and immediately moved in to occupy the area.
Though extremely lightly, the 2/3rd Independent Company now held the entire Bobdubi Ridge, from
the Coconuts to Namling. Determined to make the most of the situation, Warfe turned his attention
to the Komiatum Track, starting a long-range fire duel with the Japanese at the top of the hill.
But realizing the importance of holding Bobdubi, the enemy was now better prepared and reinforced,
boasting two heavy machine-guns, a heavy mortar and two mountain guns to wreak havoc on the
Australian positions. The Japanese troops, now commanded by General Okabe, also turned bolder
after receiving many reinforcements in the past few days and subsequently began to launch limited
attacks against the commandos, getting repelled on May 12 and 13. But on May 14 , after a heavy
shelling of the Bobdubi Ridge positions, the Japanese launched a full-scale attack
that overwhelmed the defenders and forced them to withdraw step by step to the South Coconuts area.
Eventually, though General Nakano later criticized the morale and effectiveness of his troops,
the Japanese would manage to overrun the Old Vickers position, forcing the commandos to
retreat into the flat ground south of New Bobdubi to cover the southern approaches
to Warfe’s headquarters . With the enemy coming for him, Warfe eventually decided that retention
of his positions would cause heavy casualties, and that he would probably have to withdraw to
the west , only maintaining his main position at Namling. Heavy fighting thus ensued until
nightfall to gain enough time for the Australians to move all their valuable stores across the
Francisco River, successfully completing the evacuation against the pressure of the enemy.
The next morning, 20 Japanese dive bombers would also bomb and strafe the Bobdubi village, followed
by more attacks in the next few hours, including one in error against the Japanese positions in
the mouth of the Francisco, to the delight of the Australians. Although eventually forced to
withdraw, Warfe and his commandos had successfully managed to lure Japanese resources away from Mubo
and Lae, inflicting many casualties on the enemy with his small, mobile and well-trained force.
They also had much fighting ahead of them, as this was hardly the end of the battle for Bobdubi,
but only the start. To support them, General Savige would also detach a company of the 24th
Battalion to provide left flank protection for the 2/3rd Independent Company in the Hote-Bugasu area.
In response, General Nakano sent 170 soldiers to occupy Hote on May 19, and soon they would
start to exchange fire with the 25 Australians at Cissembob. The outnumbered defenders resisted
fiercely, further inflicting over 50 casualties on the enemy, but they would be eventually forced to
withdraw towards Ohibe. By May 22, the Australians would return to the Hote area only to find it
completely deserted, so they would immediately reoccupy their defensive positions there.
Furthermore, in response to the Hote attack, Savige would decided to send more reinforcements
for Warfe’s forces. For the last days of the month, Warfe would be ordered to reorganize
and rest his force "with a view to more active operations in future", aiming to lull the enemy
on Bobdubi into a false sense of security. But that is it for this week; and in our next episode,
we’ll return to the forgotten North Pacific theater to cover the start of another very
important and bloody engagement: the Battle of Attu. If you don’t want to miss any episodes,
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