Today, the majority of sciences and philosophers accept that causal determinism is true.
Causal determinism is the idea that the universe’s state right
now determines what happens next regardless of our will.
If that’s the case, though, doesn’t that mean we have no free will and thus,
aren’t morally responsible for the decisions we make? Well, the philosophy of compatibilism
believes free will, moral responsibility, and determination are compatible and fit together.
In this video, I’ll take a look at the very best compatibilism arguments
from philosophers and try to conclude if free will and true moral responsibility can exist.
I’ll also let you know if I’m a compatibilist or incompatibilist for anyone who cares.
So, the core argument that free will and moral responsibility are not compatible with determinism
is called the Principle of Alternative possibilities. It goes like this…
(1) An agent is responsible for an action only if said agent could have done otherwise.
(2) An agent could have done otherwise only if causal determinism is false.
(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.
To prove we have moral responsibility or free will,
one must debunk this argument which is what compatibilists have set out to do.
The first serious compatibilists were empiricists Thomas Hobbes and David Hume
who argued free will is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes
in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way.
For example, say I desire to get a beer and set out to a local bar. If I make it to the
bar exercised my free will, but if a flood or disaster blocked me I didn’t have free will.
However, there are many issues with this classical compatibilist argument, one such being mental
illness. Say I set out to get a beer and make it to the bar but also suffer from alcoholism.
I acted as I wanted, yet, it would seem I really didn’t act of my own free will at all.
Compatibilism didn’t change much until Harry Frankfurt’s argument
against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities shook things up.
Frankfurt attacked premise one of the PAP argument and believed responsibility is compatible with
determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.
He believed he had a convincing case to show we’re still morally responsible
even if there was no option to do otherwise.
Here’s an example Frankfurt-style case:
Say Black, a neuroscientist, wants to assassinate an influential political figure that’s coming to
town. During surgery, he implants a chip into a patient's brain; we’ll call this patient Jones,
which will make him shoot this political figure when activated. The political figure comes into
town, and Jones attends a rally with a concealed weapon gun he always carries. Black is ready to
switch the device, but Jones shoots this man himself without Jones needing to act.
Suppose Jones is morally responsible for the death but is not free to do others due to causal
determinism. In that case, moral responsibility doesn't seem to require that an agent have the
freedom to do otherwise. Frankfurt makes it seem that if determinism threatens free will
and moral responsibility, it is not because it is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise.
Thus, Frankfurt and his proponents believe they’ve found away around PAP and
saved moral responsibility.
However, philosophers such as Princeton philosopher Carl Ginet
argue back Frankfurt-style cases are simply begging the question.
Critics argue that if the agent’s inclination and decision are deterministic,
that pulling the trigger was fully determined,
then proponents of Frankfurt cases are assuming that moral responsibility does not require
alternative possibilities from the start. They are assuming the very thing being debated,
that moral responsibility doesn’t require alternative possibilities.
On the other hand, if the agent’s inclination and decision are indeterministic, opponents argue that
the agent can do otherwise. This isn’t good for Frankfurt because the entire point of his case
was to show a situation where an agent is morally responsible and was unable to do otherwise.
It appears the Frankfurt-style cases don’t dismantle the PAP but they do bring up an
interesting issue. Yes, perhaps all our desires and actions are fully influenced by
internal or external sources, but, there appears to be different degrees of determinism
and control. It’s one thing to murder someone because you had the desire to,
but an entirely different thing to be forced by someone else to so.
This has led philosophers like Patricia Churchland and Bruce Waller
to argue that free will is really about how much control we have over a situation.
So, most arguments for compatibilism you’ll hear today are variations of Frankfurt’s
original ideas where they try to distinguish between internal desires vs external factors.
The only other semi-coherent arguments for compatibilism are
more ontological and approach the topic from what exactly a person really is.
One such example I’ll quickly touch on is Sean Carroll’s poetic naturalism
where he believes there are a variety of ways to talk about the world and what is real on different
levels of emergence, using language dependent upon the level of emergence we’re talking about.
For example a hurricane looks like it’s own unique entity when viewed from above.
But when you inspect it closer, you’ll see it’s just wind, water, and temperature.
That’s emergence in a nutshell.
To Carrol a human being is one level of emergence in nature
with it’s on ontology or vocabulary like alive, dead, and freely acting.
When we talk about the brain’s physical mechanisms like neurons,
that’s an entirely new ontology where concepts and vocabulary like
‘alive’ dead’ and ‘free will’ don’t make sense and shouldn’t be used. Therefore,
humans have free will because it’s a fitting description with that layer of emergence.
These emergent compatibilism theories haven't really caught fire mainly because critics such
as neuroscientist Sam Harris have argued descriptions like ‘having free will’ and
‘freely making choices’ don’t appear to be a good, fitting description about what a person
is. Perhaps humans feel like they’re free, but that's a different description than being free.
Ok, so is there any hope for free will and moral responsibility?
It appears that we’re left with two shards of free will, if you want to call it that.
There are different levels of control. The more control we experience,
the less we can act on our desires and change our lives.
The future is still unpredictable, as far as we know as of the recording of this video. Causal
determinism is not fatalism. We’re not fated for a particular future no matter what we do.
To me free will is simply, options, which makes me a semi-compatibilist I suppose.
Although true free and moral responsibility clearly doesn't exist, we can choose which
external stimuli to respond to, which will shape our future more toward our desires.
For example, say I’m very overweight and doctors tell me I will most likely
have a heart attack soon. If I get in touch with my desire to lose weight,
I can then throw away all the junk food in my house. This creates a more healthy eating
environment I react to which then causes me to actually lose weight and avoid the heart attack.
I’m fully deterministic, yet having options to throw out junk food and
get healthier food allowed me to shape my destiny.
In conclusion, I think compatibilism can be summed up by this quote by Sam Harris.
“A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings.”
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