This is Dr Charles Von Pigeonspluff,
and he has just invented a mind uploading machine.
He invites his mate, Professor Jeffrey Spamhammer
over, to test it out.
The machine works like this:
Professor Spamhammer is placed inside the machine,
The machine then scans the position of every synapse and neurone, or some other science-sounding shit
and builds up a model of the professor's brain. The model is then transferred to Doctor Pigeonspluff's computer, and digital Professor Spamhammer
then wakes up in a computer simulated environment.
This is called mind uploading. Ok, but what happens next?
Problem 1: can we say that digital
Professor Spamhammer is actually a person? Well, probably, yeah,
IF we can say he's conscious. We can't just murder biological
Professor Spamhammer, because he's self-aware.
If digital Professor Spamhammer also appears to be self-aware, we should probably endow
him with the same rights we endow every other human with.
"I'm sorry, I didn't quite catch that."
Yeah, thanks, I wasn't actually talking to you
AT ALL
but cheers anyway
Problem 2: Can computers even run digital minds?
Maybe there's something fundamental to meaty goo blobs and biology
that makes us conscious that can't be replicated on a machine.
For example, if it turns out that wibbly magic souls make us conscious,
then maybe you can't model wibbly magic souls
on computers, for some reason. In which case, fine.
But it's a bit hard to argue with that one.
Or, if it turns out that something quantum mechanic-y makes us conscious,
then maybe you can't model quantum mechanics on a computer.
For some reason. The problem is that if you ask someone,
"What is consciousness?" And they given you any answer that doesn't resemble,
"I don't fucking know,"
they are probably lying. We have no idea what consciousness is yet.
It might be a feedback loop, it might be a particular brain area doing fancy tricks,
it might be tiny little consciousness kittens
frolicking around in your hypothalamus. We have no idea.
Fuck off kittens.
However, if Professor Spamhammer's brain could be scanned and recreated on a computer,
it is very hard to see why digital Professor Spamhammer wouldn't be conscious too.
"I'm sorry, I didn't quite catch that."
Yeah, again, nothing to do with you. Yeah, so
you're just interrupting.
Cheers.
Now since Doctor Pigeonspluff's spent most of his money on
variously coloured mankinis,
he decides to earn some extra cash by building more mind uploading machines and selling them.
Which leads us onto Problem 3:
How much computing power does it take to run a digital mind?
If it's lots, like a government project, maybe
only around 3 or 4 digital minds will exist in the whole world at any one time.
On a scale of 1 to FUCK
this is probably an OK scenario
because, much like nuclear weapons, most of the people
who get hold of the technology won't use it for doing awful shit. Hopefully. But
if, for some reason, it takes
only modest computing power to run a digital mind, and the world and their mum can do it, then
things get a little... FUCK
Let's imagine 1000 people have access to the technology - just normal folk -
And 999 of them are Ethical Emilys
And only run simulations of, say, dead relatives.
Well, top respect to the 999 Ethical Emilys, but what about that one
Mean Maxine? If Mean Maxine is feeling nasty, she could,
say,
take a mind copy from an unwitting biological human, then go on to
subject that digital human copy to experiences
most un-nice, like, oh, you know,
roast them perpetually above a searing inferno, or
keep them constantly drowning in simulated water or
subject them to their worst fears, constantly, whatever that
might be or force them to travel on British trains while
the companies insist on raising the ticket prices, slowly but steadily
making it more and more prohibitively expensive
all the while insisting it's "necessary" somehow for some reason,
knowing that you'll pay anyway, even if it costs 45 quid
to get to London - ONE WAY - which is more that it costs to fly to
FUCKING SPAIN AND BACK. Because we're the train company
and you're a pleb and you'll shut up and like it.
Meanwhile, we're reclining in a bath of your money, smearing each other in
caviar and Nutella that we bought with your money
then sleeping off the caviar and Nutella in a massive four poster bed
and the pillows have feathers in them.
No, I'm just joking, they're full of YOUR FUCKING MONEY.
Or, just generally torturing digital minds.
In some horrific fashion without end.
Fun side note:
If running millions of simulations at a time
really is possible at some point, then since there'll be a million simulated worlds
to every real world, it is
statistically far more likely we are living in a simulation now, than not. So, there's that.
Anyway,
that leads us onto Problem 4:
Should the digital copy of Professor Spamhammerbe treated
as Professor Spamhammer himself or a totally new entity?
Well, that largely depends on what you think about teleporters.
If you put Professor Spamhammer in a teleporter, break him down
molecule by molecule then recreate him somewhere else, did you just
murder him and bring a duplicate to life or is consistency preserved?
Well that largely depends on your theory of identity.
Fancy shmancy big words ahead.
Either you're a fan of spatial tracking identity or
form tracking identity. Spatial
tracking identity means that you draw a line behind where the Professor has been
and as long as the line isn't broken, we can say it's the same Professor.
When he gets into the teleporter, the line is broken
so we say he isn't the same Professor Spamhammer that steps out of the teleporter.
He's a copy, and that's fine, but if instead
you're a fan of form tracking identity, then
you might say that things can be considered the same if they retain the same structure,
and since the telepoter makes a perfect replica,
Shut up Heisenberg
We might say that it is
the same Professor, even though spatial tracking is broken. He'll behave the same way,
remember all the same stuff, fine, yeah, great.
And what happens if the teleporter goes cocoloco
and spits out another copy, and another
and one more for luck. They'll all be identical and they'll all claim to be
the Professor. How can they all be genuine? Which leads us onto
Problem 5: should we consider these digital minds as
new variations of homosapians and treat them accordingly?
As before, that depends on if we think they're conscious.
Exhibit A: two simulated Professors, one is conscious,
the other is not. You don't know which is which.
Both appear genuine, both get pissy if you talk to them or force them to
travel on British trains. Both respond in exactly
the same way to your questions, so how are you going to decide which one is
self-aware?
Maybe you can't. You just have to assume they both are.
And if human biological consciousness is just
one form of self-awareness, then digital minds may be able to
modify themselves in ways we can't possibly imagine.
To these digital minds, standard, baseline humanness
might be the boring ground floor, with another
hundred, thousand, million other wonderful
or horrific possible states they can experience.
Just because they're digital, rather than biological,
doesn't mean we can treat these new creatures like second-class citizens.
They're not just our creations, they're our brethren.
And just as we afford other members of the human ra- "I'm sorry, I didn't quite catch that."
Yeah, how about now? Did you quite catch that, did you? Did you? Fucking hell.
Yep. So, treat artificial intelligence with respect.