The period of 1930 to 1950 saw only four World Cups due to the hiatus of World War 2.
Tactically, though, despite the twenty-year span, tactical evolution occurred at a more
sedate pace, marked by moments of innovation rather
than the massive shifts that would come after 1950.
Before 1930, football had shifted from its form before the 1880s, which saw a 2-2-6
formation, into the 2-3-5.
The second centre-forward dropped back and became the centre-
half.
Similarly, a sort of kick and chase evolved into a team game that relied on shifting the
ball using passing as much as it did the head-down,
run with the ball at feet style that proliferated football before and after the
formation change.
As teams became more organised and coached, football saw that simple
dribbling was ineffective: the pitch was there to be used, and while dribbling never
went out of fashion, passes were used to find the man, and crossing became a feature of
the game.
This gave rise to the importance of the aerially dominant centre-forward, but the most
important position of the era was the centre-half, described by Jonathan Wilson as “a multi-
skilled all-rounder, defender and attacker, leader and instigator, goal-scorer and destroyer.”
The centre-half marked the opposition centre-forward when not in possession, but the
better ones also had licence to get forward, arriving late in the box, and also provided
a deeper-lying creative role, passing as if
a quarter-back.
Teams were built around this player, and the most exciting generally had a creative centre-
half, while the more dour, physical sides such as England, used a stopper in the role.
The 1930 final, contested by Uruguay and Argentina and won by the Uruguayans, saw two
teams of contrasting styles within the frame of the 2-3-5.
Both teams innovated, especially in their use of the inside forwards, who dropped
off a linked the half-backs to the wings.
But while the Argentine side prized flair and individual skill, even though they were
anchored by perhaps the outstanding centre-half of his day Luis Felipe Monti, they were less
able to keep their defensive shape, and the greater organisation and closer passing of
the Uruguay side won the day 4-2.
The importance of tactics, or perhaps more explicitly,
organisation, was already showing.
Further innovation was provided in 1934 by Italy and Austria, though the tournament was
marked by brawls and didn’t do much to elevate the standing of football.
2-3-5 was still the preferred set-up but Italy, using the same
Luis Felipe Monti who had starred for Argentina in
1930 and was now an Italian international, played Monti as a deeper centre-half where
possible.
​ He still had licence to get forward, but Italy
were a physical and organised side who played a
direct style of football, and Monti’s role was to sit deep, mark the opposition centre-forward
out of the game, and counter.
This was especially important against sides who had started to play with a more creative
centre-forward, such as Austria and their outstanding number 9, Matthias Sindelar.
Sindelar was an early form of the false 9, dropping
away from the forward line and allowing the inside forwards Anton Schall and Johann Horvath
to move into the space he vacated.
A man-marking centre-half such as Monti could go with a dropping-off centre-forward
without disrupting team shape too much; attacking flair was sacrificed for structure and
negating the opposition.
Italy beat Austria in the semis and then defeated Czechoslovakia 2-
1 to lift the World Cup.
In 1938, Italy again beat a Danubian side with a deeper-lying centre-forward, this time
the Hungary of Gyorgy Sarosi, but the interesting
tactical innovation came from Karl Rappan’s Switzerland.
Rappan, an Austrian, created the precursor of catenaccio , deploying man
markers and a sweeper, behind a deep playmaker.
This defensive system, which used long, counter-attacking passing, was enough to achieve a
surprise win against Germany, but not enough to beat the more fluid, cerebral Hungary.
Nonetheless, the defensive mind-set of Italy and tactics of Switzerland showed the direction
in which football was heading, teams setting out to negate, rather than match or exceed.
World War II put paid to World Cups in 1942 and 1946, but 1950, hosted by Brazil, saw
the fourth World Cup and the first in which the
Jules Rimet Cup was awarded to the winners.
The winners were not Brazil, though, and their final defeat to Uruguay triggered a period
of national mourning.
Brazil had come into the tournament playing a style developed in Brazilian club football
called the diagonal , which saw one inside forward pushing up, one sitting deeper, and
one of the two halves dropping deeper.
This was a change from the W-M which had now become
largely de rigeur in world football, in which the centre-half had dropped off to become
a third, centre back.
The Brazilians played with style and swagger and brisk, incisive passing that worked within
the triangles created by the diagonal , but as the tournament progressed, Brazilian coach
Flavio Costa switched bac to a W-M, restricting the positional interchanges that allowed
Brazil to attack from everywhere.
In the final, Uruguay, coached by Juan Lopez, set up like Rappan’s verrou .
Despite Brazil taking the lead, Uruguay fought their way back into the game and their
organisation, defensive solidity, and their exploitation of Brazilian left-back Bigode’s
unfamiliarity with the W-M saw them win 2-1.
The match, known as the Maracanazo, was considered by Brazilian’s to be the nation’s
greatest tragedy.
It was also a victory for tactics.