The Soviet artillery rained down relentlessly on the advancing German columns of mechanized
infantry and panzers, many of which were powerful Panthers and Tiger Is.
Despite the barrage, the Second Panzer Corps, composed of elite Waffen SS Divisions, pressed
onward to achieve their objective: encircling the entrenched Soviet forces at the Kursk
salient.
Operation Citadel was the Reich's last gamble to stop the overwhelming Soviet counterattacks
that risked destabilizing the entire Eastern Front.
Failure would condemn the Reich to a defensive posture for the remainder of the war.
At Prokhorovka, approximately 87 kilometers southeast of Kursk, the Germans were greeted
with an unexpected sight.
An entire column of Soviet tanks had become bogged down, ironically trapped by some T-34s
that had fallen into an anti-tank ditch constructed by Soviet infantry.
It was an ideal chance to assert their authority.
As the tide of battle ebbed and flowed, both sides remained determined to prevail, their
fates hanging in the balance of a brutal and unforgiving conflict…
Operation Citadel
In early March 1943, following their defeat at Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht command began
preparing Operation Citadel.
The Soviet-post Stalingrad advance had created a vast salient around the town of Kursk, some
90 miles into the German defensive line.
This immense bulge presented itself as either a spearhead for the Soviet Army or a perilous
pincer trap for the Germans if they were to initiate an offensive—precisely the objective
of the operation.
Citadel was meant to swiftly destroy the Red Army forces with two giant pincers from the
north and south that would envelop the enemy at the Kursk salient to stabilize the Axis
lines of the Eastern Front.
The entire operation was a gamble, drawing many elements from the Heer's reserves.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein advocated for an immediate attack to preserve the element
of surprise and catch the Soviets off guard.
However, Hitler postponed the operation, awaiting the arrival of additional Tiger I tanks to
bolster the armored divisions.
Soon, the Soviet Stavka learned of the German plans and used the delay to form several defensive
perimeters around the region and halt the German advance.
More Soviet armies were also called to Kursk to outnumber the attackers.
By the last days of June 1943, the Wehrmacht was finally ready to launch Operation Citadel.
The Greatest Tank Battle
General Walter Model commanded the forces to strike from the north, while Manstein led
Army Group South.
The 4th Panzer Army, led by Colonel General Hermann Hoth, would drive northward.
Concurrently, General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps and the XLVIII Panzer Corps formed
the left and right wings.
The II SS Panzer Corps comprised the elite Waffen SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das
Reich, and Totenkopf divisions.
Air support would be provided by Colonel General Otto Debloch's Luftflotte 4 and the 8th Air
Corps.
The Soviets, in response, built hundreds of anti-tank ditches, placed minefields, and
positioned anti-tank guns within three fortified belts.
General Nikolai Vatutin commanded the Voronezh Front at the southern front, while Colonel
General Ivan Konev led the Steppe Front in reserve.
The Germans deployed over 300 panzers, while the Soviets fielded 650 tanks of various models,
with each side also possessing numerous assault guns.
Operation Citadel commenced on July 5, 1943.
Although the Panzer Corps managed to breach the first defensive belt by the end of the
day, the advance was difficult due to the minefields, anti-tank ditches, and small-scale
Soviet counterattacks.
On July 6, The II and III Panzer Corps raced to the second Soviet line of defense, prompting
Vatutin to commit all of the Voronezh Front to the defense effort.
Clash of Steel
While the Germans kept pushing, Marshal Zhukov decided to drive directly into Model's formation
and strike from the north.
At the same time, other Soviet forces raced to engage Hoth's armored units south of Kursk.
On July 12, General Rotmistrov and his 5th Guards Tank Army engaged the 2nd SS Panzer
Corps to halt its advance.
The Leibstandarte was armed with reliable Panzer IVs and 13 state-of-the-art heavy Tiger
Is armed with 88-millimeter high-velocity guns.
Despite being outnumbered, the II Panzer Corps boasted superior training and equipment, including
Panthers and Tigers.
In contrast, the 5th Guards had over 650 tanks and numerous self-propelled guns.
The resulting tank battle was fierce and devastating.
Both sides were constantly on the move, avoiding artillery strikes, encirclements, and minefields.
As the broader Battle of Kursk raged, the number of tanks involved in the skirmishes
swelled to almost 1,600.
When the Panzer Corps advance was finally halted, the Soviets reported that the Germans
had lost over 80 tanks.
Soviet casualties exceeded 400 tanks, many of which were T-34s.
However, as decades passed and new archival information emerged, it became clear that
the Soviet counterattack at Prokhorovka, though successful in stopping the German maneuvers,
had come at a considerable cost.
Despite thwarting the German advance and effectively nullifying the purpose of Operation Citadel,
the Wehrmacht inflicted substantial casualties on the Red Army, leading both sides to claim
victory at Kursk.
Revising History
After World War 2, few Russian citizens dared question the depiction of the Battle of Prokhorovka
and the larger Battle of Kursk written by former Soviet military historians.
Efforts to do so, even by Western historians and especially by Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS
veterans, have often been met with indignation from Russians who take issue with any questioning
of the Red Army's performance during the critical campaigns of 1942 and 1943.
Although no one has questioned that both encounters were a turning point for the war on the Eastern
Front and in World War 2 as a whole, there has been an ongoing debate about the number
of casualties suffered by the Soviets in the face of the massive German offensive.
In April 2019, British historian Ben Wheatley published an article titled “A visual examination
of the Battle of Prokhorovka.”
In it, he demystified the alleged effectiveness and tactics employed by Soviet armor, revealing
the reality of a Soviet armored disaster based on Luftwaffe reconnaissance photographs taken
between July 14 and 16, when the zone was still under German control.
The images in question were found in the US National Archives and focus on the notorious
anti-tank ditch, Hill 252.2, and other locations where the Soviet armor clashed with the ferocious
Tiger tanks.
Furthermore, the photos offer a deeper understanding of the downfall of the 5th Guards Tank Army's
18th and 29th Tank Corps.
Sitting Ducks
Wheatley asserts that on July 12, 1943, the Germans lost only four Panzer IVs at Prokhorovka,
while the Soviets sacrificed over 200 tanks trying to overrun the Heer's positions.
The historian mentions that dozens of T-34s fell into an anti-tank ditch dug by the Red
Army infantry.
The ditch was over 4.5 meters deep, and by the time the higher-ups realized what had
happened, dozens of T-34s had already lined up to cross a bridge.
As the bugged-down Soviet tanks in the first line tried to free themselves, the entire
column was left vulnerable, with no way out.
The panzers saw an opportunity and approached the bridge, easily picking off the enemy tanks.
Most were destroyed by this small panzer unit.
Military historian Alexei Isayev told BBC Russian that Soviet losses at Prokhorovka
aligned with Wheatley's assessment, with the Red Army losing 237 tanks and over 14 self-propelled
guns.
However, Isayev noted that the Germans might have withdrawn their damaged tanks before
the Luftwaffe took the reconnaissance photos.
Wheatley reports that when the pictures were taken on July 12, there were, at most, 27
panzers either damaged or destroyed.
And other historians have remarked that, in addition to superior German tactics and maneuverability
in combat, the Tiger tanks provided a significant advantage to the opposing army, resulting
in their relatively smaller losses.
Fresh Wounds
Another relevant detail that counters the Soviet narrative of the battle comes from
war photographer Anatoly Yegorov, who was present at Kursk.
During an interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets, his nephew Mikhail Yegorov said that: (QUOTE)
"Most of those photos were not published.
‘Do you know why no panoramic photos of the Prokhorovka battlefield were ever shown
in our country?,’ my uncle asked me.
Because for every burning Tiger, there were 10 of our smashed-up T-34s!
How could you publish such photos in the papers?"
These new discoveries that contradict the Soviet narrative of Prokhorovka have angered
Russian historians and politicians.
Some military historians have even claimed that the beautiful monument erected at Prokhorovka
to honor the fallen Red Army soldiers must be taken down, as it represents a lie.
In response, the Russian ambassador to Germany, Sergei Nechayev, stated: (QUOTE) "Attempts
to rewrite immutable historical facts, falsify the events of those years, play down the decisive
role of the Soviet people in defeating Nazism and freeing Europe from the 'brown plague,'
look unworthy and insulting."
The Kremlin even demanded that the German government prosecute the daily Die Welt, where
the article was published with the participation of retired Bundeswehr colonel and military
historian Karl-Heinz Frieser.
For now, the Battle of Prokhorovka remains a subject of controversy for both Russians
and Germans.
Eighty years later, the heroic deeds and terrible losses of each army continue to expose fresh
wounds for both countries and the descendants of the combatants who fought in history's
largest tank battle to date.
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