As we have seen in the last couple of episodes, we have entered into a new
phase of the Pacific War, one that was to be dominated by Allied offensives.
The initiative won at Midway and ratified at Guadalcanal and New Guinea now allowed the
Allies to launch their next offensives deeper into the heart of the Japanese Empire, with
new objectives such as the important Lae-Salamaua base, the island of New Georgia and the strategic
Gilbert Islands. Yet before these new offensives could be launched, the Allies had to prepare for
these operations; and, for that, they needed to meet and discuss their course of action.
One of these key meetings would occur in March, bound to change the course of the
Pacific War forever, so join us as we delve into another exciting episode of our series.
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As we’ve previously examined on this series, planning for the Pacific theater
of operations was plagued by two main problems: the strategy of Europe First,
which relegated the Pacific to the status of a secondary theater;
and the interservice problems between Army and Navy over the question of overall command.
Since neither side was willing to accept the proposals of the other,
the Americans would have to adopt compromise solutions, which satisfied no one completely.
This resulted in makeshift operation-to-operation arrangements that had to be reexamined constantly
as conditions changed. With the end of the Guadalcanal Campaign and the completion of
the first phase of the July 2 Directive, the question of command resurfaced yet again.
Back in January, Admiral King had even proposed to form an integrated command under Admiral Nimitz,
which was to include the Southwest Pacific Area of General MacArthur, once the reduction of Rabaul
had been carried out successfully. Yet General Marshall would deftly evade King’s major premise,
forcing the Admiral to turn to the conduct of current operations. Both men, however,
agreed that the capture of Rabaul, with its key port, supply and staging facilities, was still
top priority, so they decided to call a conference between the three main Pacific commanders as soon
as possible to iron out the details about the coming offensives. In the meantime, the South
Pacific Area of Admiral Halsey would experience how troublesome it could be to cooperate with
MacArthur even in the face of extreme danger, which further emphasized the need for overall
command or, at least, for closer coordination in the theater. Additionally, King was dissatisfied
by MacArthur’s failure to provide any detailed plans about the second phase of operations.
He felt that unless more definite information was provided, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff
should call upon Nimitz and Halsey to furnish their plans for going ahead in the Solomons,
in alleged support of MacArthur. By mid-February, it was finally agreed that,
instead of a conference in the Pacific, the commanders would just send their representatives
to Washington to present their plans. On March 12, the Pacific Military Conference
thus opened as important representatives of the Southwest , South and Central Pacific
Areas met at Washington, determined to get additional means for their respective areas.
Lasting until March 28, the sessions would be conducted under the supervision of the Joint Staff
Planners, headed by Rear-Admiral Charles Cooke and Major-General Albert Wedemeyer. At the first
meeting, MacArthur’s representatives presented the Elkton Plan for the seizure of the New Britain-New
Ireland-New Guinea area, which essentially covered phases two and three of the July 2 Directive and
was based upon the concept of “elbowing forward” on the eastern and western approaches of
Rabaul . MacArthur’s ambitious plan was to first seize operating airfields on the Huon Peninsula
and New Georgia; then to simultaneously move in and establish air bases on western New Britain and
Bougainville; and finally to capture Kavieng, thus isolating Rabaul, which would be taken
by amphibious assault. For his plan, MacArthur calculated that twelve and two-thirds divisions
and thirty air groups would be required for his Southwest Pacific Area, while ten divisions and
fifteen air groups were to be assigned to Halsey’s South Pacific Area. Furthermore,
of this total of 22 and 2/3rds divisions, ten would have to be amphibiously trained.
The strengths called for in the Elkton plan were much greater than those projected by the
War Department, which estimated that there would be eight divisions and six air groups in the South
Pacific and nine capable divisions and fifteen air groups in the Southwest Pacific by October 1.
Yet all members agreed that the forces required as shown in the Elkton plan were the minimum
necessary, so it was decided to refer this problem to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate whether
to augment the forces allocated to the Pacific or to modify the current directives for Pacific
operations. Both King and Marshall would present two alternatives, and although the Army believed
that aircraft requirements in the Pacific were met and that giving them more could void
the Casablanca decisions and affect the planned Combined Bomber Offensive against the Luftwaffe,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would finally approve the Navy plan to cancel one division
allotted to the South Pacific in exchange for increased air allocations for the Elkton plan.
With these increases, the conferees agreed that only the second phase of the July 2 Directive
could be carried out, including offensives against Madang, the southern portion of Bougainville,
Cape Gloucester and the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, but not Kavieng and Rabaul.
King and the Navy would also fight for the question of command, but they could
only secure minor concessions as the Army clung firmly to the provisions of the July 2 Directive.
Thus, MacArthur retained direction of the operations against Rabaul, while Halsey, working
under general directives from MacArthur, would be in direct command of operations in the Solomons.
Once the matter had been settled by March 21, the representatives began to discuss how to
carry out these plans. Halsey’s staff officers proposed to assault Munda early in April,
but MacArthur’s representatives, who also outlined their own plans for sweeping the Japanese
out of the Huon Gulf, asked that the Halsey offensive be timed, accordingly, for mid-May.
In the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would determine that Halsey was to wait until MacArthur
had an airbase in the Trobriands. With the conference at an end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would finally issue this new directive on March 29. In conclusion, the Pacific Military Conference
had succeeded at bringing about an adjustment of demands vis-a-vis supply for the Pacific.
The theater representatives therefore gained a small victory with the Navy’s assistance, but
the War Department had also been able to keep the increases within bounds and the operations within
reality. Both groups could feel some measure of satisfaction over the outcome, as the projected
operations in the Pacific, which later assumed the codename Cartwheel, were going to carry the United
States through 1943. After the conference, Halsey would immediately fly to Noumea to pay a call
on his new “boss” in Brisbane; this personal meeting would kickstart a fruitful relationship
between the two commanders, one that would be important for the future of the Pacific War.
As a side note, Admiral King would also institute the new numbered-fleet system on March 15,
renaming Halsey’s South Pacific Force to 3rd Fleet and MacArthur’s naval forces to 7th Fleet,
under the command of Vice-Admiral Arthur Carpender. Additionally,
Allied air units in the Solomon Islands would be combined into a joint command: the AirSols,
led by Rear-Admiral Charles Mason , which was subordinated to Halsey’s South Pacific Area.
Meanwhile, the Japanese were also making a shift in their strategic plans. Admiral Yamamoto,
after trying unsuccessfully to win a decisive naval action against the US at Midway, the Eastern
Solomons and Santa Cruz, had decided to wait for Nimitz to overextend and give him the big break.
But the loss of six carriers and many destroyers in less than a year required conservation of
these two variable [vessel?] types, so Yamamoto would safeguard his carriers beyond the range
of American aircraft and would only grant a small ration of destroyers to the exhausted 8th Fleet of
Admiral Mikawa, who was by now seen as one of the main culprits for the loss of most of the
Solomons. The disastrous Battle of the Bismarck Sea also served as a decisive reason for a vital
revision of joint Army-Navy operational policy, whereby first priority was definitely shifted
from the Solomons area to New Guinea. There, Generals Imamura and Adachi continued to bring
the last elements of the 20th and 41st Divisions to the Madang-Wewak area; though after March,
Allied air attacks on Japanese ships unloading or at anchor, especially night bombing raids,
would increasingly interfere with transport operations. With the bulk of these forces already
landed by the end of February, however, the 20th Division of Lieutenant-General Aoki Shigemasa was
ordered to move towards Lae, constructing a supply road via the Finisterre Range,
the Ramu and the Markham River valleys. On March 25, Imperial General Headquarters
would finally issue a directive, mainly aiming to reinforce and secure the key Lae-Salamaua area.
Furthermore, this directive would place the IJA and its airforce in command of the defense of New
Guinea, while the IJN and its aircraft was to take over the defense of the Solomons and Bismarcks.
Moving back to the CBI theater, new and important developments were unfolding during the First
Arakan Campaign. As we last saw, the British offensive had been met with staunch resistance by
the Japanese defenders, who managed to hold their ground at Rathedaung and Donbaik despite the enemy
numerical superiority. Yet again, the British military command, and General Irwin in particular,
had made a number of blunders, such as launching set-piece frontal attacks in restricted areas,
using armored vehicles in “penny packets” or firing insufficient weight of artillery shells
to damage the enemy defenses. These blunders would cost the British the initiative in the campaign,
and would allow General Koga’s forces to prepare for a counteroffensive . As the fighting in Arakan
bogged down into stalemate by early February and the military efficiency of the 14th Indian
Division was questioned, General Lloyd had been reinforced with the fresh but woefully deficient
in jungle fighting 71st Indian Brigade and with the well-trained British 6th Brigade,
though it had also only gotten some rudimentary instruction for jungle combat. The 55th Indian
Brigade had suffered enormous losses during an attack against Donbaik on February 18; and so,
it would be relieved by these two fresh units. Yet large numbers of Japanese were also being
redeployed to the area from Central Burma for an attack from east of the Mayu River.
Threatened by this new menace and by the approaching monsoon season, Lloyd informed Irwin
that he was assuming the defensive; yet Marshal Wavell and General Irwin rapidly overruled this,
as the Indians desperately needed a victory to shake off their belief of Japanese superiority.
While Irwin personally prepared to lead this new assault, General Koga had finally brought
the bulk of his 55th Division to Akyab, so his counteroffensive was about to begin.
As we have previously covered, the 213th Regiment attacked the Kaladan Valley on March 7,
successfully driving off the covering detachment of the V Force. The 112th Regiment then applied
heavy pressure on the Indian defenders north of Rathedaung, who had no other choice but to pull
back to Zedidaung, leaving the 47th Indian Brigade trapped at the Hwitze bridgehead.
Furthermore, Japanese units would also carry out an effective combination of deep and wide
outflanking maneuvers and infiltration tactics against the British line of communications.
Although the 71st Brigade would be sent to extricate these forces a week later,
Irwin would decide to carry out his last assault against Donbaik anyways,
which had also been reinforced by some of Koga’s men. On March 18, the 6th Brigade of Brigadier
Ronald Cavendish therefore launched a deliberate frontal attack on a narrow front, despite advice
from other commanders to outflank the positions along the mountain crest. As the set-piece attack
made little progress and only got to penetrate a small distance, the British would once again
suffer heavy casualties from the Japanese counterattacks and supporting artillery fire.
Meanwhile, the 213th Regiment had secured the eastern side of the Mayu River against the
increasingly demoralized Indian troops and the 112th Regiment was preparing to cross the river.
After the last failure, Irwin and Wavell also had no other choice but to prepare to
hold their ground, so this was to be Irwin’s last attack against Donbaik.
Wavell expressed great disappointment at the lack of imagination and tactics of his subordinates,
believing that any plan that wasn’t a blunt frontal assault could have been successful.
On the night of March 24, the Japanese would finally cross the Mayu River; and, using narrow
paths through the jungle, they advanced over the crest of the supposedly impassable Mayu Range.
The following day, they set forth to cut the 47th Brigade’s line of communications to Kyaukpandu,
capturing the mountain crest near Atet Nanra on March 29. In response, General Lloyd immediately
ordered the 47th and 6th Brigades to retreat west of the mountains to avoid entrapment,
thus acting contrary to his instructions to hold his position until the monsoon season broke.
Yet Irwin would quickly countermand his order, sacking him of his position and assuming direct
command of the 14th Indian Division. He also ordered elements of the 26th Indian Division,
led by Major-General Cyril Lomax, to bolster the British presence on the peninsula.
Furthermore, Lomax was to assume command of all Arakan forces upon reaching the area; but in the
meantime, Irwin would continue to run the show. Just as Lloyd had foreseen, however, disaster
finally struck as the 112th Regiment managed to build a roadblock north of Indin village on
April 3 , successfully cutting the lines of communication of the 6th and 47th Brigades.
Cavendish then attempted to clear it at once, yet his efforts would be in vain; and soon,
Japanese soldiers would manage to infiltrate the British positions at Indin village on the
night of April 5, successfully overrunning the headquarters of the 6th Brigade and capturing
Cavendish in the process. One of Cavendish’s last acts before being overrun was to order
the British guns to open fire on Indin, something that caused many casualties on the unsuspecting
Japanese and ended up killing Cavendish himself. Upon assuming command of the Arakan forces,
General Lomax immediately realized the seriousness of the situation and ordered a retreat from Indin.
During the ensuing confused fighting, the 6th Brigade would narrowly escape destruction by
retreating along the beach road and the 47th Brigade would similarly avoid capture by
destroying its heavy equipment and then escaping in small parties cross-country to the beach,
and along it, to reach British lines, thus ceasing to exist as a fighting force. Following this
catastrophe, Lomax would skillfully regroup his rear brigades to defend the Maungdaw-Buthidaung
road and would further reorganize his shattered forward troops as they escaped northwards. Yet
this was far from the end, as General Koga had no intention to stop there: he wanted to exploit this
great opportunity and take the fight all the way to India. Finally realizing the worrying situation
his troops were in, Wavell decided to appoint General Slim to lead the Arakan forces with
Lomax as they prepared to face the brunt of the Japanese assault. But this is it for this week;
next episode we’ll take a look at some new and very important developments at the Solomons and
New Guinea, as the Japanese prepared to launch a huge aerial counteroffensive: the Operation I-Go.
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