In a huge turn of events, Russia’s monumentally important Crimean Bridge was attacked in the
morning hours of October 8, 2022.
The bridge itself connects the Russian mainland to Russia-annexed Crimea, and it is hard to
overstate the bridge’s value.
The structure cost Russia $3.6 billion to build
and the best U.S.-based analogy I can think of—both symbolically and monetarily—is
if someone attacked the Golden Gate Bridge.
We do not yet know who hit the Crimean Bridge, but all speculation right now is focused on
Ukraine.
The country’s official Twitter account simply responded by describing the attack as a “sick
burn”.
And in the absence of official credit claiming, that’s the premise we will be going with
for the rest of this video, though it is possible that a militant group or false flag operation
is at work here.
In any case, why was it hit, and what are the consequences?
The simplest answer is that it will limit Russia’s ability to resupply both Crimea
and the southern front of the war.
A logical next step is to attack past Kherson city and into the rest of the oblast so as
to make
Crimea a de facto island for Russia once again.
But there are deeper questions here as well.
Fortunately, we have an easy reference for those.
A few weeks ago, I published a video on ten reasons why Ukraine had not yet—emphasis
on yet—destroyed the bridge.
They were the military difficulty, civilian casualties, Ukraine’s own value for the
bridge, the one-time cost problem, devaluing the Crimean Land Bridge, monitoring, escape
routes, population sorting, maintaining moderates, and tit-for-tat retaliation.
Let’s talk about what the attack means for each of these.
As a starting point, the clearest answer to the original video’s question appears to
be the military difficulty.
Ukraine could not hit the bridge with HIMARS artillery,
the lack of navy crossed that off,
and planes would be risky.
Apparently the solution apparently was to drive a truck with explosives and time the
detonation to hit a fuel tanker on the parallel rail bridge.
Success here requires having Ukrainian agents operate inside of Russian-controlled territory
and have some sense of the train schedules.
The operation also solved the second concern about civilian casualties by timing the attack
in the early morning hours on a Saturday, when few cars would be on the road.
The remainder of these points illustrate how the bridge’s destruction will come with
a number of indirect costs to Ukraine, so let’s briefly discuss each of them,
starting with Ukraine’s value.
A section of the bridge has already come down, and the rest might have sustained too much
damage to still operate without significant repairs.
It might very well be inoperable as long as the war continues, but could be a relatively
simple fix afterward.
That is good news for Ukraine because it would allow for Ukraine to rapidly regain much of
the value of the bridge if Kyiv were to succeed in retaking Crimea.
Of course, all of this is very early speculation, from the source of the attack to the damage
done.
Russia has suggested that rail services would resume within 24 hours, suggesting that the
problems are confined to the vehicle bridge.
Keep that all in mind as we discuss the other issues relating to the strait,
including the one-time cost problem.
If something like a bridge is permanently destroyed, then you cannot use it as future
bargaining leverage against your coercive bargaining opponent.
Imagine this white line represents the expected division of territory from a fully fought
war.
and the space between the white and red lines is Russia’s opportunity cost for continued
fighting.
Destroying the bridge shifts the red line closer.
Now Russia is less inclined to make concessions to Ukraine.
But if the bridge is easily repaired, most of the value for peace persists.
Moreover, Ukraine still enjoys the benefits of a higher probability of victory now that
Russia cannot use the bridge as a logistical hub.
That pushes the red line with it.
And it’s almost all good news for Ukraine.
It also means that Russia need not obsess over the Crimean Land Bridge if Ukraine ultimately
cannot retake the peninsula.
Moscow’s troops could still retreat from those areas and hope to keep a Russian-held
Crimean Peninsula running, as soon as the artificial bridge is reconstructed.
In the meantime, Western intelligence will have a harder time monitoring
military equipment coming into the area, as none of it will be funneled through the easy-to-track
bridge.
But that was a side benefit for keeping it standing and never a real, pivotal consideration.
Regardless, the lack of an escape route will complicate Ukraine’s desire to retake and
hold the peninsula over the long term.
If Ukraine invades, Russian troops no longer have a proverbial golden bridge to retreat
across.
That means the Ukrainian army will suffer more casualties even if there is a successful
operation.
Part of what might be motivating the decision is that Ukraine has experienced few issues
thus far fighting constrained Russian forces near Kherson, who also lack a golden bridge.
Meanwhile, there are two longer-term problems that Kyiv will have to confront, beginning
with local allegiances.
Due to the Sevastopol Naval Base and Crimea being a part of Soviet Russia
until a transfer order in the 1950s,
the Crimean population naturally has greater affinities for Russia relative to the rest
of Ukraine.
However, it is possible that the bridge was standing for long enough for the Russian-friendly
citizens sorted themselves back to Russia,
leaving a greater share of Ukrainian-leaning citizens than at the start of the war.
Post-recapture of Crimea, Ukraine will need to maintain the support of the moderates.
These are the people with affinities in both directions.
Their support requires that they have access to Russia, but that is easy to solve if the
bridge can be quickly rebuilt.
Finally, the biggest problem Ukraine will experience in the short-term is tit-for-tat
retaliation.
Russia undoubtedly will want to extract a price for the bridge’s destruction.
We know from the current battlefield that Moscow’s response won’t be to run offensive
operations and push the line of control further west.
Russian troops simply do not have that capability.
Perhaps the attack will increase the Russian public’s support for the war, though.
This would allow for Putin to order a larger mobilization, and eventually Russia will have
enough strength to make that a possibility.
But that’s months away.
In the shorter term, expect to see conventional retaliation in the form of bombs raining down
on the western portions of Ukraine.
And then there is the nuclear question.
Putin previously threatened the use of nuclear weapons to defend Russian territory.
And by Russian law, Crimea has been Russia for the last eight years.
I would expect increased saber-rattling on that front—and one hopes that it remains
pure threats and not actual actions.
What do you think will be the consequences of the destroyed bridge?
Let me know in the comments.
If you want to know more about how we got here, you will love my book that purely focuses
on the causes of the war.
Check below for more information on that.
And if you enjoyed this video, please like, share, and subscribe, and I will see you next
time.
Take care.