I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the
second class, who are headed by Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he calls himself.
And now I will try to defend myself against them: these new accusers must also have their
affidavit read.
What do they say?
Something of this sort: That Socrates is a doer of evil, and corrupter of the youth,
and he does not believe in the gods of the state, and has other new divinities of his
own.
That is the sort of charge; and now let us examine the particular counts.
He says that I am a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that
Meletus is a doer of evil, and the evil is that he makes a joke of a serious matter,
and is too ready at bringing other men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about
matters in which he really never had the smallest interest.
And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove.
Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you.
You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?
--Yes, I do.
Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains
to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them.
Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is.
...
Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say.
But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying,
that you have no interest in the matter?
Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.
--The laws.
But that, my good sir, is not my meaning.
I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.
--The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
What do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?
--Certainly they are.
What, all of them, or some only and not others?
--All of them.
By the goddess Hera, that is good news!
There are plenty of improvers, then.
And what do you say of the audience, do they improve them?
--Yes, they do.
And the senators?
--Yes, the senators improve them.
But perhaps the members of the citizen assembly corrupt them?
Or do they too improve them?
--They improve them.
Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and
I alone am their corrupter?
Is that what you affirm?
--That is what I stoutly affirm.
I am very unfortunate if that is true.
But suppose I ask you a question: Would you say that this also holds true in the case
of horses?
Does one man do them harm and all the world good?
Is not the exact opposite of this true?
One man is able to do them good, or at least not many; the trainer of horses, that is to
say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them?
Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals?
Yes, certainly.
Whether you and Anytus say yes or no, that is no matter.
Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the
rest of the world were their improvers.
And you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young:
your carelessness is seen in your not caring about matters spoken of in this very indictment.
And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which is better, to live among bad citizens,
or among good ones?
Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered.
Do not the good do their neighbors good, and the bad do them evil?
--Certainly.
And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him?
Answer, my good friend; the law requires you to answer.
Does anyone like to be injured?
--Certainly not.
And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them
intentionally or unintentionally?
--Intentionally, I say.
But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbors good, and the evil do them
evil.
Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am
I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have
to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him, and yet I corrupt him,
and intentionally, too; that is what you are saying, and of that you will never persuade
me or any other human being.
But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally, so that on either view
of the case you lie.
If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you
ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better
advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally--no doubt I should;
whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, which
is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.
I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great or
small, about the matter.
But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young.
I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods
which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their
stead.
These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say.
--Yes, that I say emphatically.
Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat
plainer terms, what you mean!
For I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach others to acknowledge
some gods, and therefore do believe in gods and am not an entire atheist--this you do
not lay to my charge; but only that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes--the
charge is that they are different gods.
Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?
--I mean the latter: that you are a complete atheist.
That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus.
Why do you say that?
Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, which is the common creed
of all men?
--I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone,
and the moon earth.
Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras; and you have but a bad opinion
of the judges, if you fancy them ignorant to such a degree as not to know that those
doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, who is full of them.
And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there
are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma
at the most); and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends
to father such eccentricities.
And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?
--I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.
You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself.
For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and
that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado.
Has he not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me?
He said to himself: I shall see whether this wise Socrates will discover my ingenious contradiction,
or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them.
For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as much as if he
said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them--but
this surely is a piece of fun.
I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his
inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer.
And I must remind you that you are not to interrupt me if I speak in my accustomed manner.
Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings?
...
I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption.
Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses?
Or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players?
...
No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself.
There is no man who ever did.
But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine
agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
--He cannot.
I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless
you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new
or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say
and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits
or demigods; is not that true?
...
Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that.
Now what are spirits or demigods?
Are they not either gods or the sons of gods?
Is that true?
--Yes, that is true.
But this is just the ingenious riddle of which I was speaking: the demigods or spirits are
gods, and you say first that I don't believe in gods, and then again that I do believe
in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods.
For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the Nymphs or by any other
mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of
their parents.
You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses.
Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you as a trial of me.
You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me.
But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same
man can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and
demigods and heroes.
I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary;
but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my
destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain; not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but
the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will
probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.