The Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is a clause in the National Constitution of
Japan outlawing war as a means to settle international disputes involving the state. The Constitution
came into effect on May 3, 1947, following World War II. In its text, the state formally
renounces the sovereign right of belligerency and aims at an international peace based on
justice and order. The article also states that, to accomplish these aims, armed forces
with war potential will not be maintained, although Japan maintains de facto armed forces,
referred to as the Japan Self-Defense Forces which may have originally been thought of
as something akin to what Mahatma Gandhi called the Shanti Sena or a collective security police
force operating under the United Nations. In July 2014, the Japanese government approved
a reinterpretation which gave more powers to its Self-Defence forces, allowing them
to defend other allies in case of war being declared upon them, despite concerns and disapproval
from China and South Korea, whereas the United States supported the move. This change is
considered illegitimate by some Japanese parties and Japanese citizens since the prime minister
circumvented Japan's constitutional amendment procedure.
Text of the article The full text of the article in Japanese:
The official English translation of the article is:
Historical background The failure of the collective security of
the League of Nations led to the realization that a universal system of security could
only be effective if nations agreed to some limitation of their national sovereignty with
regard to their right to belligerency, and if the Security Council which had been a "closed
shop" during League of Nations times, would open itself up to UN Members who would cede
constitutional powers in favor of collective security. Like the German Article 24, which
was incorporated in the post-war German Constitution, and which provides for delegating or limiting
sovereign powers in favor of collective security, Article 9 was added to the Constitution of
Japan during the occupation following World War II.
The source of the pacifist clause is disputed. According to the Allied Supreme Commander
Douglas MacArthur, the provision was suggested by Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara, who
"wanted it to prohibit any military establishment for Japan—any military establishment whatsoever."
Shidehara's perspective was that retention of arms would be "meaningless" for the Japanese
in the postwar era, because any substandard postwar military would no longer gain the
respect of the people, and would actually cause people to obsess with the subject of
rearming Japan. Shidehara admitted to his authorship in his memoirs Gaikō Gojū-Nen,
published in 1951, where he described how the idea came to him on a train ride to Tokyo;
MacArthur himself confirmed Shidehara's authorship on several occasions. However, according to
some interpretations, he denied having done so, and the inclusion of Article 9 was mainly
brought about by the members of Government Section of Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, especially Charles Kades, one of Douglas MacArthur's closest associates. The article
was endorsed by the Diet of Japan on November 3, 1946. Kades rejected the proposed language
that prohibited Japan's use of force "for its own security," believing that self-preservation
was the right of every nation. The article's acceptance by the Japanese government
may in part be explained by the desire to protect the imperial throne. Some Allied leaders
saw the emperor as the primary factor in Japan's warlike behavior. His assent to the "anti-war"
clause weakened their arguments for abolishing the throne or trying the emperor as a war
criminal. Interpretation
Soon after the adoption of the Constitution of Japan in 1947, the Chinese Civil War ended
in victory for the Communist Party of China in 1949 and the establishment of the People's
Republic of China. As a consequence, the United States was left without the Republic of China
as a military ally against communism in the Pacific. There was a desire on the part of
the United States occupation forces for Japan to take a more active military role in the
struggle against communism during the Cold War.
If Article 9 is looked upon as a motion to abolish war as an institution—as envisaged
in the 1961 McCloy-Zorin Accords—then the Korean crisis was the first opportunity for
another country to second the Japanese motion and embark on the transition toward a true
system of collective security under the United Nations. In fact, however, in 1950, following
the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was pulled out of Japan
and sent to fight on the front lines in Korea, and so Japan was left without any armed protection.
MacArthur ordered the creation of a 75,000-strong National Police Reserve to maintain order
in Japan and repel any possible invasion from outside. The NPR was organized by United States
Army Col. Frank Kowalski using Army surplus equipment. To avoid possible constitutional
violations, military items were given civilian names: tanks, for instance, were named "special
vehicles." Shigesaburo Suzuki, a leader of the Japan Socialist Party, brought suit in
the Supreme Court of Japan to have the NPR declared unconstitutional: however, his case
was dismissed by the Grand Bench for lack of relevance.
On August 1, 1952, a new National Safety Agency was formed to supervise the NPR and its maritime
component. The new agency was directly headed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Yoshida
supported its constitutionality: although he stated in a 1952 Diet committee session
that "to maintain war potential, even for the purpose of self-defense, [would] necessitate
revision of the Constitution." He later responded to the JSP's constitutionality claims by stating
that the NSF had no true war potential in the modern era. In 1954, the National Safety
Agency became the Japan Defense Agency, and the National Police Reserve became the Japan
Self-Defense Forces. In practice, the JSDF are very well equipped
and the maritime forces are considered to be stronger than the navies of some of Japan's
neighbors. The Supreme Court of Japan has reinforced the constitutionality of armed
self-defense in several major rulings, most notably the "Sunakawa Case" of 1959, which
upheld the legality of the then-current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
In July, 2014 Japan introduced a reinterpretation which gave more powers to its Self-Defence
forces, allowing them to defend other allies in case of war declared upon them. This move
potentially ended the long running pacifism and drew heavy criticisms from China and Korea,
whereas the U.S. supported this move. Debate
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution not only forbids the use of force as a means to
settling international disputes but also forbids Japan from maintaining an army, navy or air
force. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, the Self Defense Forces are not land, sea
or air forces, but are extensions of the national police force. This has had broad implications
for foreign, security and defense policy. According to the Japanese government, “‘war
potential’ in paragraph two means force exceeding a minimum level necessary for self-defense.
Anything at or below that level does not constitute war potential.” Apparently when the SDF
was created, “since the capability of the SDF was inadequate to sustain a modern war,
it was not war potential.” Seemingly, the Japanese government has looked for loopholes
in the wording of the peace clause and the “constitutionality of the Japanese military
has been challenged numerous times.” Some Japanese people believe that Japan should
be truly pacifist and claim that the SDF is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however,
has ruled that it is within the nation’s right to have the capacity to defend itself.
Scholars have also discussed “constitutional transformation…[which] occurs when a constitutional
provision has lost its effectiveness but has been replaced by a new meaning.”
The Liberal Democratic Party has interpreted Article 9 as renouncing the use of warfare
in international disputes but not the internal use of force for the purpose of maintaining
law and order. The opposing party, the Democratic Party of Japan, tends to concur with the LDP's
interpretation. At the same time, both parties have advocated the revision of Article 9 by
adding an extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense
against aggression directed against the Japanese nation. The Japan Socialist Party, on the
other hand, had considered the Japan Self-Defense Forces as unconstitutional and advocated the
full implementation of Article 9 through the demilitarization of Japan. When the party
joined with the LDP to form a coalition government, it reversed its position and recognized the
JSDF as a structure that was constitutional. The Japanese Communist Party considers the
JSDF unconstitutional and has called for reorganization of Japanese defense policy to feature an armed
militia.
The interpretation of Article 9, has been determined that Japan cannot hold offensive
military weapons — this has been interpreted to mean that Japan cannot have ICBMs, nuclear
weapons, aircraft carriers or bomber fleets. This has not inhibited the deployment of submarines,
AEGIS equipped destroyers, a helicopter carrier, and fighter planes.
Since the late-1990s, Article 9 has been the central feature of a dispute over the ability
of Japan to undertake multilateral military commitments overseas. During the late 1980s,
increases in government appropriations for the JSDF averaged more than 5% per year. By
1990 Japan was ranked third, behind the then-Soviet Union and the United States, in total defense
expenditures, and the United States urged Japan to assume a larger share of the burden
of defense of the western Pacific. Given these circumstances, some have viewed Article 9
as increasingly irrelevant. It has remained, however, an important brake on the growth
of Japan's military capabilities. Despite the fading of bitter wartime memories, the
general public, according to opinion polls, continued to show strong support for this
constitutional provision. The different views can be clearly organized
into four categories: The current pacifists believe in maintaining
Article 9 and claim the SDF is unconstitutional, and would like to detach Japan from international
wars. The mercantilists have divided opinions about
Article 9 although the interpretation is broadened to include the SDF, and believe that the SDF’s
role should be retained to activities related to the United Nations and for non-combat purposes.
They advocate minimal defense spending, and emphasize economic growth.
The normalists “call for incremental armament for national defense and accept using military
force to maintain international peace and security”. They support the revision of
Article 9 to include a clause explaining the existence and function of the SDF.
The nationalists assert that Japan should remilitarize and build nuclear capabilities
in order to regain pride and independence. They also advocate revision of Article 9 to
promote armament. Evidently, opinions range from one extreme
of pacifism, to the other extreme of nationalism and complete remilitarization. The majority
of Japanese citizens approve the spirit of Article 9 and consider it personally important.
But since the 1990s, there has been a shift away from a stance that would tolerate no
alteration of the article to allowing a revision that would resolve the discord between the
JSDF and Article 9. Additionally, quite a few citizens consider that Japan should allow
itself to commit the Self-Defense Forces to collective defense efforts, like those agreed
to on the UN Security Council in the Gulf War, for instance. Japan’s ability to “engage
in collective defense” has been argued. The involvement of Japan in the Gulf War of
1990, or lack of involvement, has provoked significant criticism. Despite U.S. pressure
on Japan to assist America in Iraq, Japan limited their involvement in the war to financial
contribution primarily because of domestic opposition to the deployment of troops. As
a result of the painfully ardent disapproval from the U.S. during the Gulf War, Japan was
quick to act after the September 11 attacks in 2001. It was clear that “the September
11 attacks led to increased U.S. demands for Japanese security cooperation.” On October
29, 2001 the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was passed, which “further broadened
the definition of Japan’s self-defense.” The law allowed Japan to support the U.S.
military on foreign territory. This law provoked “citizen groups [to] file lawsuits against
the Japanese government in order to stop the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq and to confirm
the unconstitutionality of such a dispatch,” though the troops sent to Iraq were not sent
for combat but for humanitarian aid. Japan has actively built U.S.-Japan relations precisely
because of Article 9 and Japan’s inability to engage in an offensive war. It has been
debated that, “when [Koizumi] declared support for the U.S.-led war on Iraq in March 2003,
and when he sent Japanese forces to aid the occupation in January 2004, it was not Iraq
that was in the Japanese sights so much as North Korea.” Japan’s unstable relations
with North Korea, as well as other neighboring Asian countries has forced Japan to batter
and bend Article 9 to “permit an increasingly expansive interpretation” of the constitution
in the hopes of guaranteeing U.S. support in these relations.
In May 2007, the then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe marked the 60th anniversary of
the Japanese Constitution by calling for a "bold review" of the document to allow the
country to take a larger role in global security and foster a revival of national pride. Aside
from Abe's Liberal Democratic Party, as of 2012, the Japan Restoration Party, Democratic
Party of Japan, People's New Party, and Your Party support a constitutional amendment to
reduce or abolish restrictions imposed by Article 9.
A constitutional amendment would require a two-thirds majority and pass referendum to
effect it. Despite numerous attempts by the LDP to change Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,
they have never been able to achieve the large majority required, as revision is opposed
by a number of Japanese parties including the DPJ and the Japanese Communist Party.
International comparisons In the Italian Constitution Article 11 is
similar to the Japanese analogue, but the use of military forces is permitted for self-defense
and also for peace-keeping purposes, if agreed with international organizations:
Italian: English translation:
Reinterpretation in 2014 In July 2014, Japan's government approved
a reinterpretation of this article despite concerns and disapproval from its neighbours.
This reinterpretation would allow Japan to exercise the right of "collective self defense"
and exercise military action if one of its allies were to be attacked. It is considered
by some parties as illegitimate, posing a serious danger to Japan’s democracy since
the Prime Minister circumvented the constitutional amendment procedure, dictating a radical change
to the meaning of fundamental principles in the Constitution by way of Cabinet fiat without
Diet debate, vote, or public approval. See also
Japan Self-Defense Forces Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group
Foreign relations of Japan Chapter I of the United Nations Charter
Perpetual peace References
This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the
Library of Congress Country Studies. - Japan
External links Regular updates on and analysis of Japanese
politics Global Article 9 Campaign