The largest airborne operation in history begins on a Sunday. September 17th, 1944.
The first Allied paratroopers and gliders descend in Holland in the early afternoon.
Thousands of men land as many as sixty miles behind enemy lines. And despite the fact that
the battle ahead would last nine days, it was in the first vital hours of the Operation
that the outcome of the whole battle, and the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians
on both sides, would be decided. Intro graphic
Last time we saw how the Allied battle plan wasn’t without its flaws, and how the Germans
weren’t as ill prepared as the Allied Generals believed. And as the battle begins, the question
we have to ask ourselves is … did the Allies make efficient use of the first vital hours
of the operation? It’s the middle of the day, there’s plenty of light and despite
a few accidents, no serious casualties are sustained on the drops. The element of surprise
works in the Allies’ favour. Taking advantage of German confusion, most of the Allied objectives
are taken quickly within a few hours. Most. The American 101st Airborne Division lands
north of Eindhoven and secures most of its target bridges. But as the 2nd Battalion of
the 506th Regiment (which included Easy Company from the Band of Brothers Series) approached
the bridge at Son, an 88 and nearby German sentries managed to delay the paratroopers
long enough to blow the bridge. The Americans were just 50 metres from the bridge when it
blew up in their faces. The 502nd Regiment fought their way through
to the bridge at Best, which the Germans also managed to blow before it fell into American
hands. So the 101st failed to capture a bridge on the canal at the southern end of their
sector. XXX Corps can’t cross a canal without a bridge, so when they eventually arrive,
there’s going to be delays as they build another one
And if that wasn’t bad enough, a glider from the 101st crashed near Student’s headquarters
and plans for the entire Operation, Operation Market Garden, were in Student’s hands by
around 3pm that same day. Day One. But the 101st weren’t the only ones having
trouble. The 82nd landing near Nijmegen did secure the heights at Groesbeek, the Heumen
bridge and the bridge at Grave. Browning had also flown in and now set up his headquarters
on the Groesbeek Heights. I’m mentioning that because Gavin and Browning had both decided
the Groesbeek heights were the priority for the Operation and had to be taken. And they
were taken, because there were literally no Germans there. As a result, a good portion
of 82nd Airborne were just sat on the Groesbeek Heights shelling the nearby woods (the Reichswald)
because a sizeable German counter-attacking force was believed to be in there. Time was
ticking down to take what was the REAL priority - the road bridge at Nijmegen. Now, the 1st
Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Shields Warren, had been ordered to take Nijmegen
bridge that day. However, Warren was first ordered to secure some of the suburbs of Nijmegen
and prepare them for defense, which took him most of the day. So early on, things weren’t
looking so good at Nijmegen either. If the 82nd fail to take the Nijmegen Bridge, there’s
no way XXX Corps can build a bridge over the Waal. Nijmegen Bridge has to be taken. But
it isn’t. At Arnhem, the British land in fields surrounded
by woods. This works in their favour as it prevented the Germans seeing exactly what
the British were up to. But it also didn’t work in their favour, as they were 8 to 13
miles away from their main objective, Arnhem Bridge. But General Urquhart had prepared
for this. Knowing that it would take hours to fight their way over several miles of enemy
held territory, he decided to send 1st Airborne’s Reconnaissance Squadron, supplied with Jeeps,
ahead. The idea was to send the jeeps ahead to the Arnhem road bridge in a coup-de-main
(or surprise) attack, then wait for reinforcements from the rest of the division to arrive. Neither
trained to use them, nor were they meant to be used for anything other than reconnaissance,
this lightly armed and unarmoured force wouldn’t last long in a major firefight, but it might
be able to slip behind enemy lines and might be able to get to the bridge quickly.
However, Sepp Krafft’s SS Training and Replacement Battalion was one of the closest units to
the British landing zones, and seeing the paratroopers land, he decided to quickly form
a blocking line near Wolfheze and to scout out the British positions to gain vital information…
because observation was obscured by the trees. Krafft wasn’t sure what the British were
trying to achieve but his line would cause the British some problems in those first vital
hours. It was the Northern end of this blocking line that the British Reconnaissance squadron
drove into, barely minutes after the line had been formed. The small force of jeeps
was stopped by heavy machine gun fire and even a flamethrower attack. They then tried
to advance by foot, but were driven back. The first attack towards Arnhem had failed.
Fitch’s 3rd Battalion marched along the Utrechtseweg, south of most of Krafft’s
positions towards Arnhem. Unfortunately for Fitch, General Urquhart accompanied the Battalion,
and slowed things down. Lieutenant Cleminson’s platoon took out a German car... this one…
and it was only after the war that they found out it was General Friedrich Kussin, Arnhem’s
commandant who had only just finished briefing Krafft on the situation. Despite this success,
3rd Battalion got embroiled in fighting Krafft’s Battalion, including an incident where General
Urquhart himself was shot at by machine guns and mortar fire.
Dobie’s 1st Battalion was to take the route that started along the Ede-Arnhem railway,
but hearing reports of tanks ahead, Dobie chose to circle north of the route instead.
This had the benefit of bypassing Krafft’s blocking line, but he soon became caught in
fighting in the wooded areas north of Wolfheze. The German unit was a hastily formed Kampfgruppe,
or battlegroup (which we’ll explain later), named after it’s commander ‘Weber’.
Consisting of ninety or so Luftwaffe signallers, and despite being poorly armed and inexperienced,
they attacked the paras as best they could. They didn’t do a lot of damage, but they
did cause a delay. To the South, Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost’s
2nd Battalion had been given the dual task of taking the Arnhem Rail Bridge and the main
objective… the Road bridge. Frost’s men got into combat almost immediately, destroying
a small column of vehicles, probably a reconnaissance company from Krafft’s Battalion, but was
quick to get going towards the bridges. Bypassing the important Heveadorp ferry (capable of
transporting troops across the Rhine, but overlooked in the initial planning), they
reached Oosterbeek by 6pm and overwhelmed the token German resistance there. Detaching
Lieutenant Barry’s 9th Platoon supported by 8th Platoon with orders to take the Rail
bridge, Barry lead a section of nine men onto the north end of the bridge itself. He thought
he could take the entire bridge, but as he got to the centre of the bridge above the
water, the bridge exploded. Luckily, none of the men with him were killed by the explosion,
but the Rail bridge was destroyed. No matter, this wasn’t the main objective. The main
objective was the Arnhem Road bridge. Now, it had taken three hours for 2 Para to get
to this point. The German guards at the rail bridge had had plenty of time to prepare their
explosives, so the chances of the Road bridge being there when they got to it.... They had
to go on.
Shortly before the destruction of the Rail bridge however, Field Marshal Model, German
Commander in Chief of Army Group B, fled his headquarters at the Hartenstein Hotel for
fear of being captured. Interestingly, it’s claimed that Model wrongly came to the conclusion
that the British landed in Holland purely to capture him! There’s no evidence of that.
But it is true that he fled the hotel, and having assessed the situation, at 17:30 he
(and the staff of IISS Corps) issue the first and perhaps most important order to the German
units in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area. Immediate counter-attacks were to take place, with 9th
SS Panzer Division to concentrate against the British at Arnhem, and the 10th SS Panzer
Division to drive to Nijmegen, secure the bridge there and prevent any relief from getting
to the British at Arnhem. At the same time, Student’s 1st Fallschirmjäger Army was
to combat XXX Corps’ advance and the 101st Airborne at Eindhoven.
This was a significant order. The Germans had decided to halt the relieving forces at
Nijmegen. If they did that, the British at Arnhem would be trapped miles behind enemy
lines... and doomed. At 18:00 Krafft suspected that he’d been
outflanked (he had). Fearing the possibility of encirclement, he withdrew his force, which
in turn allowed elements of 3rd Battalion to continue towards the bridge. Having delayed
3rd Para, Krafft’s force retreated to the Dreyenseweg and helped reinforce a new battle
group that had been hastily set up there, Kampfgruppe Spindler.
The Germans had practiced a new type of unit organisation, called Kampfgruppen. This was
an ad hoc formation, which could be created or disbanded depending on circumstances. It’s
basically a makeshift unit usually cobbled together from bits of other units and then
given a leader and a task. Experienced and decorated in both the Iron Cross and the German
Cross in Gold, SS Lieutenant-Colonel Spindler, commander of the 9th SS Panzer Division’s
Artillery regiment, pulled in as many units under his command as possible, even units
without guns. But he managed, by the evening of the 17th, to assemble a force of infantry,
half tracks and self propelled guns, and possibly even some tank destroyers and Mark IV tanks.
He decided, perhaps off his own initiative, to form a blocking line to prevent the British
from getting into the center of Arnhem. Spindler is a very significant figure in this Operation,
who we will see again and again as the battle progresses.
Frost and 2nd Battalion was lucky enough to bypass Spindler’s line before it solidified.
Following the bend in the Rhine and despite having to detach a company at Den Brink to
deal with the German machine guns there, 2nd Battalion marched into Arnhem. As they moved
through the streets, German vehicles screeched across the Arnhem Road bridge heading south.
Commanded by SS Captain Viktor Graebner, the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion headed towards
Nijmegen. Viktor Graebner was another significant figure at Arnhem and we’ll return to him
again next time. The point is that only a handful of guards were guarding Arnhem Road
Bridge. Frost reached the Road Bridge at 20:00, followed shortly by 1st Brigade headquarters.
They had covered seven or eight miles in five hours. The bridge guards were in a pillbox
on the bridge itself, so 2 Para dug into positions beneath the bridge and waited for 3rd Battalion
and the Reconnaissance Squadron, which ominously hadn’t yet arrived.
That’s because, facing Kampfgruppe Spindler’s determined defensive line, 3rd Battalion had
decided to dig in near Oosterbeek and no further progress was made that evening. Only C Company,
which had gone north of Krafft’s position managed to fight their way to the bridge after
a violent clash in Arnhem itself, resulting in only forty-five men reaching Frost’s
position. 1st Battalion’s commander, Dobie, received word via radio that 2nd Battalion
had reached the bridge and needed reinforcements. He decided to abandon the idea of fighting
to reach the North of Arnhem and to just get to the bridge. He turned South East and fought
throughout the night, losing over a hundred men and only got halfway to their objective
before they too were stopped by Kampfgruppe Spindler. Spindler had stopped two of the
three Battalions from getting to the Arnhem Road Bridge on Day One, and this achievement
is even more admirable when you consider that his force hadn’t existed that morning. By
the late evening of the 17th, another kampfgruppen named “Harder” after its commander (who
was, to slightly complicate things, was under the command of Spindler), moved into Western
Arnhem and cut off Frost’s troops from the rest of 1st Airborne. There was now no way
any more British paratroopers were getting to Arnhem that evening.
In all, around 750 men reached the Road Bridge at Arnhem. Almost all of 2nd Battalion, a
45 man unit from 3rd Battalion, Brigade Headquarters as well as a few more men from other smaller
units had made it. They had with them only limited stocks of food and ammunition. They’d
gone unnoticed by the twenty or so Germans manning the pillbox on the bridge, and a couple
of attempts to knock it out failed, until a 6-pounder and a flamethrower were brought
up. Missing the bunker, the flamethrower hit the ammunition and petrol storage hut behind
it and a large explosion covered the bridge in flame that would burn throughout the night.
Later, a convoy of German lorries carrying ammunition supplies attempted to cross the
burning bridge. Yes, the flames exploded the ammunition they carried and this only added
to the inferno. Another convoy (a V-2 rocket unit) was also ambushed on the Arnhem side,
and several men taken prisoner, although the British didn’t realise they were V-2 rocket
operators, which meant the V-2 rocket operators survived the battle. But overall, part of
the British paratroop force had reached their objective and now just had to wait for relief
by XXX Corps. So where were the tanks? XXX Corps had to
go thirteen miles between their start point and the city of Eindhoven. Between Eindhoven
and them was the German front-line. After an artillery barrage, the lead tanks had moved
barely 30 minutes before ...quote... all hell broke lose. German infantry and guns hit them
from the woods on either side of the road, brewing-up nine tanks in the immediate ambush.
The British deployed infantry and Typhoons from the RAF to deal with the Germans, and
the infantry went in to clear the enemy positions, finally allowing XXX Corps to continue. By
this point, the Germans were reacting to the attack, sending in five battalions to try
halt the advance. The whole day was spent fighting one new regiment after another that
British intelligence officers were surprised even existed. And by the end of the day, XXX
Corps had gone only eight miles from their starting point. There were another fifty-six
miles to Arnhem, a bridge at Son to rebuild, and still many more Germans between them.
At least all the bridges were taken on Day One, and those that weren’t could be rebuilt.
Oh, except for one. Nijmegen bridge was still in enemy hands and the 82nd Airborne had yet
to make an attack on it. Finally, at 8pm, Warren was able to send two rifle companies
from 1st Battalion towards the bridge. A and B Companies attacked into Nijmegen, but B
Company got lost along the way, so A Company went on alone. Yes, only one Company was attacking
one of the main objectives in the 82nd’s sector, and it was many hours after the paras
had landed. As they approached the bridge (which at this point was still guarded by
only a handful of Germans), a German convoy of reinforcements from the North arrived.
It was an entire infantry battalion from the 10th SS Panzer Division, supported by a company
of engineers and Viktor Graebner’s Reconnaissance Battalion from 9th SS Panzer Division. The
fighting began, but it was heavily in the German’s favour. B Company arrived later
in the night but they too found the situation hopeless. The Americans did manage to capture
and destroy the firing mechanism for the bridge, meaning the Germans weren’t able to blow
the bridge (not that they were planning to anyway), but they were outgunned and outnumbered
now. The Germans even managed to counter-attack and surround a unit in the post office, who
would stay there surrounded for the next three days. The 82nd had failed to capture Nijmegen
Bridge. The entire Operation depended on the capture
of every bridge. Son had been destroyed, but since it was over a canal, a bailey bridge
could be built in a matter of hours to replace it. But the bridge at Nijmegen spanned a much
larger body of water and a bailey bridge couldn’t be built over that. Nijmegen bridge had to
be taken on the first day. And it wasn’t. So things don’t bode too well for Operation
Market Garden at this early stage, but there was still hope. If 1st Airborne could fight
their way to Frost at the bridge, if XXX Corps could make good the delay and reach and repair
Son bridge quickly, and if the 82nd could somehow capture Nijmegen Road bridge (which
at this point was still a possibility) the battle could be won, and the war, over by
Christmas. The question is, did the Allies make efficient use of the first vital hours
of the operation? And who made the worst mistakes at this early stage? Let me know who you think
it is in the comments below. We’ll continue the fight tomorrow. But before
we leave, it’s worth mentioning SS Captain Viktor Graebner one more time. This guy went
everywhere on the 17th. First he had the Knight’s Cross pinned onto his chest by Divisional
commander Harzer earlier on the 17th (unlike what Wikipedia says, which is why we don’t
rely on it) Graebner sent units to scout out positions along the Ede-Arnhem road, he fought
elements of 1st Battalion, and then he drove across Arnhem bridge at 18:00 - an hour or
two before Frost’s men reached it. At 19:00 he was at Elst, South of Arnhem. And finding
no paratroopers there, he raced to Nijmegen and found no Americans at Nijmegen either.
Yet within 24 hours of this picture being taken, Graebner was dead. We’ll find out
why, tomorrow. Thanks for watching, thanks for subscribing, by for now.