By late November, Guadalcanal had become an island of death and starvation for the Japanese invaders.
As their express runs failed to adequately supply the stranded soldiers on the island,
hunger and diseases started to take a heavy toll on their numbers, rapidly becoming one of
their key causes of death. Some soldiers had to kill each other for the limited food, and those
who did not would become too weak to even move, never mind fight. This was mainly because the 8th
Fleet had switched to using submarines to deliver provisions to this Death Island in early November;
but the critical food crisis would force the Japanese to prepare their destroyers for another
express run, one that would turn into a savage nighttime naval battle. Join us as we delve
into the Battle of Tassafaronga and we continue with our coverage of the Battle of Buna-Gona.
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As we’ve already seen, after the disastrous defeat at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal,
Admiral Yamamoto and the IJN had decided that the decisive battle for the Island of Death had been
lost. In fact, their efforts were now directed to the defense of Buna, as if the Allies expanded
across New Guinea, they could threaten Rabaul, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The loss of
Guadalcanal paled before this host of hazards, so they were already planning to abandon the island.
The Tokyo Express runs that had been executed to maintain Japanese forces on Guadalcanal had
also been very costly for the invaders, resulting in the loss of many destroyers for little gain.
Additionally, the use of destroyers meant that the Japanese had to expend much larger
quantities of fuel than they wanted because of their strained oil supply situation.
With a cycle of bright moonlight incoming and with a particularly strong enemy air force on the
island, this endeavor seemed to be riskier than ever. Thus, for three weeks since November 16,
the Japanese had been employing submarines to bring provisions to their stranded forces on
Guadalcanal; yet each submarine could only deliver 20 to 30 tons of supplies, about one day’s worth
of food, so a critical food crisis would rapidly develop, finally forcing the 8th Fleet to return
to using destroyers for their express runs. This time, however, the destroyers would pull ashore a
central line of watertight drums half-filled with 330 pounds of rice and barley that
would be thrown off the destroyers’ decks, thus reducing their exposure period off Guadalcanal.
On the night of November 29, Admiral Tanaka’s Reinforcement Unit then prepared to depart
the Shortlands, with four destroyers bringing 240 drums each to Tassafaronga,
two destroyers bringing 200 drums each to the mouth of the Umasani River and Tanaka’s two
destroyers giving them a screen. In turn, the Americans led by Admiral King were pushing to
get more reinforcements after their heavy losses at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
Admiral Halsey would also see the refurbished carrier Saratoga and the battleship Indiana
come back to reinforce his command; and in replacement of Admiral Callaghan’s shattered unit,
Admiral Kinkaid was to form Task Force 67 with the mission to thwart possible new enemy landings.
For night combat, he would have to develop a new operations plan based on the recent experience,
forming one destroyer and two cruiser groups , each one led by a SG radar ship.
Kinkaid intended to exploit his radar advantage with a surprise destroyer torpedo attack followed
by cruiser gunfire from afar. Additionally, cruiser float planes would conduct scouting
and illuminating duties for the task force. But before Kinkaid could implement his plan, Admiral
Theobald would be replaced by Kinkaid as North Pacific Area commander because of his substandard
performance and his needless squabbling with Army and Air Corps officers. Furthermore, Rear-Admiral
Charles McMorris would also relieve Admiral Smith as North Pacific Force commander. In Kinkaid’s
stead, Rear-Admiral Carleton Wright became the new commander of Task Force 67, implementing Kinkaid’s
plan and immediately heading towards Guadalcanal to intercept Tanaka’s Reinforcement Unit.
As he departed Shortland, Tanaka had crafted his course to evade aerial detection , yet by 09:30 on
November 30, an Allied plane had begun to shadow him. At the same time, a Japanese search aircraft
warned of enemy destroyers and transports off Guadalcanal, so Tanaka signaled his ships to
expect action that night. As Wright approached Lengo Channel knowing that the enemy might arrive
sooner than expected, he encountered a convoy of three transports and three destroyers. Halsey then
ordered the destroyers Lamson and Lardner to join Task Force 67 in a questionable move, since they
didn’t know Kinkaid’s battle plan and thus would be left on the squadron’s rear. During the night,
Tanaka carefully entered Iron Bottom Sound to the south of Savo Island and then started to approach
Guadalcanal, with the destroyer Takanami deployed 10 miles in advance as a scout.
By midnight, the Japanese had arrived off Cape Esperance and were moving towards their various
drop points. Yet at 23:06, Minneapolis’ SG radar reported ships to the west at 23000
yards, giving the upper hand to the Americans . But the Takanami’s lookouts trained for night
vision spotted the American formation 6 minutes later, and only six minutes
later they spotted the American formation. With this information, Tanaka reacted quickly and
suspended the resupply operation, rapidly ordering his forces to prepare to fight. Then, at 23:16,
Commander William Cole asked permission for a beam torpedo attack against Tanaka’s main body,
yet Wright hesitated for 2 minutes, because he wanted the target angle to become acute,
something that completely wasted what could have been a devastating first blow for the Americans.
Cole’s destroyers would have to wait until 23:20 to launch 15 torpedoes against the enemies,
although the attack would end up being completely ineffective and the destroyers would then retire
around Savo to leave the cruisers to fight alone. Meanwhile, Wright unleashed a torrent of
gunfire on the Japanese, particularly against the Takanami, which would rapidly start burning and
thus attracted more attention. But before being disabled by the avalanche of gunfire, the Takanami
got to launch her full load of eight torpedoes, successfully scoring two critical hits on the
Minneapolis and one on the New Orleans by 23:30. The two torpedoed cruisers then became burning
wrecks, lighting the Pensacola as she passed by and making her an attractive target for Tanaka’s
remaining destroyers. Out of the 26 torpedoes unleashed by the Japanese destroyers , only one
got to hit Pensacola amidships at 23:38, although this was enough to immediately disable her.
Ten minutes later, two additional torpedoes hit Northampton, rapidly causing massive flooding and
fires that sank the cruiser hours later. But just four minutes before Northampton was hit, Tanaka
had ordered his ships to break contact and retire. The Japanese destroyers would then proceed up
Guadalcanal’s coast to start the return journey to the Shortlands, unsuccessfully launching some more
torpedoes at the Americans and finally discovering the devastating fate of the Takanami. Finally,
the three remaining torpedoed cruisers would see a magnificent performance by their crews, as they
managed to save their ships for another day with great determination, ability and resourcefulness;
yet these vessels would then require many months if not an entire year for repairs.
Though surprised and having his ships encumbered by cargo on their decks, Tanaka had scored a
brilliant victory that confirmed that the IJN retained its superiority in night combat. In turn,
the Americans had suffered another disastrous defeat, which would later be considered as one
of the worst defeats in US naval history. There were many flaws pointed out on the American
performance, such as Cole’s failure to fire on first contact without awaiting orders or Wright’s
maintenance of a steady course through much of the action, which made his ships excellent targets.
After the war, Tanaka would even say “the enemy had discovered our plans and movements,
had put planes in the air beforehand for purposes of illumination, had got into formation for an
artillery engagement, and cleverly gained the advantage of prior neutralization fire.
But his fire was inaccurate, shells improperly set for deflection were especially numerous,
and it is conjectured that either his marksmanship is not remarkable or else the illumination from
his star shells was not sufficiently effective”. All of these flaws would lead to further
discussion in the Pacific Fleet about changes in tactical doctrine and the need for technical
improvements; and in spite of their defeat, the Americans had actually prevented the Japanese
from landing the desperately needed supplies on Guadalcanal, albeit at a high cost. Tanaka
would then attempt a second run on December 3, successfully dumping 1500 drums off Tassafaronga,
yet American aircraft would destroy all but 310 of them before they could be pulled ashore.
Now, it’s time to move to the Buna-Gona area, where the Allies were planning to launch an
attack on all fronts on November 30. This week first takes us to Gona, where the Japanese
were attempting to reinforce their positions. Back on November 24, the Japanese had landed
an infantry unit of 80 soldiers that would be immediately deployed at the southern end of the
mission to repel the Australian attacks. In the meantime, General Adachi had placed Major-General
Yamagata Tsuyuo of the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade in charge of the Buna Detachment,
which encompassed all units in Buna-Gona that were not under the South Seas Detachment.
Yamagata would depart Rabaul on the early hours of November 29 with the first echelon of his command,
but Allied bombers would intercept his four destroyers proceeding without air cover in
the Vitiaz Strait, forcing them to turn back and preventing the reinforcement of Gona.
At the same time, Brigadier Eather was also increasing his numbers, as the 21st Brigade of
Brigadier Dougherty, the same that had previously been relieved by the 25th Brigade at Ioribaiwa,
started to arrive at the battlefront. On November 28, the 2/14th Battalion was the first to reach
Eather’s position, although it would immediately continue further north and then northeast through
a long stretch of kunai to strike at Gona from the east. Yet as they moved to their assembly area,
they ran into strong opposition at the village of Banumi, which was held by Japanese laborers.
Despite their well-positioned and well-defended firing posts, the inexperienced laborers
would be easily overrun as a deadly mortar barrage devastated their lines. Nonetheless,
they would manage to cling to the village by nightfall, though the defenders were losing heart
and they were completely surrounded by the enemy. As the 2/14th concentrated on clearing Banumi,
Dougherty instead deployed the 2/27th Battalion on the western bank of Small Creek to launch the
attack against Gona from the east. Next morning, the 2/14th would attack again after another deadly
mortar barrage. Valiantly resisting for an entire day against a superior and battle-hardened force,
the Japanese would finally break and run by November 30, some desperately swimming into
the sea where they were easily picked off and some successfully escaping into the jungles.
To the west, the 3rd and 2/33rd Battalion also launched simultaneous attacks to soften the main
Japanese defenses, but their advance quickly came under enfiladed fire that forced them to withdraw.
Meanwhile, Eather had also deployed the 2/16th Chaforce company of Lieutenant Alan Haddy on the
west bank of Gona Creek since November 21, so the Japanese were completely besieged. As the
defenders were isolated and lacked communications with Giruwa, Major Koiwai was instructed to stage
a rescue by sea of the forces at Gona on November 30. Departing Sanananda during the night with two
companies of his battalion, Koiwai would reach the Gona beaches after midnight but
failed to identify his compatriots’ positions and eventually had to withdraw under Australian fire.
That same morning, the 2/27th attack would start after a heavy aerial bombardment that inflicted
many losses on the defenders. Yet the Australians were slow to advance after the raids, and by the
time they did the defenders were ready for them. The 2/27th would only manage to take a couple of
footholds over the beach before machine-gun fire from concealed bunkers and sniper fire brought
them to a halt. Additionally, Lieutenant Haddy had managed to take control of Kikori village and then
continued further west to the village of Napopo, where they successfully repelled the vanguard of
the 1st Battalion of the 41st Regiment, which had been marching from the mouth of the Kumusi and was
now starting to reach Gona. Thus, from this point onwards, this village would be known as “Haddy’s
Village”. On December 1, the 2/27th resumed its attack under smoke cover with bayonets fixed,
initially infiltrating the center of the enemy line but suffering heavy casualties against the
tenacious defenders, who finally forced them to retreat across Gona Creek. During the night,
Yamagata’s second echelon also finally arrived at Basabua as the enemy B-17s were successfully
intercepted by Zeros, though further air attacks would force them to relocate to the mouth of
the Kumusi River, so they would have to push down the shoreline towards Gona after landing.
Over the next couple of days, the tide slowly started to turn against the worn-out defenders,
as many diseases such as diarrhea and malaria devastated the Japanese, who couldn’t even go
far from their bunkers because of the strong artillery and mortar shelling.
Most of the Australian charges were successfully repelled at a high cost for the attackers,
but occasionally a post would be overrun, so the defensive line started to gradually
whittle away until the Japanese were squeezed into a small area by December 5.
Now, however, we have to move to the Sanananda front,
where the American attack to cut off Colonel Tsukamoto’s forces was reaching its climax.
Reinforced by anti-tank and cannon companies on November 29 and placed under the command of Major
Bernd Baetcke, the left wing commenced its assault the following morning, initially gaining ground
against the fierce defenders. Yet the staunch Japanese fortifications would soon slow them down,
and it wouldn’t be until Captain John Shirley led his Company I in a deadly bayonet charge that the
enemy defenses would finally be pierced. Shirley’s men then set up a perimeter defense astride the
track just south of the Cape Killerton junction, thus dividing the Japanese defenses into two main
positions. The rest of the Baetcke Detachment , meanwhile, was still in the bush 1400 yards
west of the roadblock, and they couldn’t move in lest their supply line would be put at high
risk. Because of this, Captain Meredith Huggins was sent with a ration party to move supplies
into the roadblock, eventually getting through after a particularly hard fight. On December 1,
the Japanese immediately started to launch their first wave of constant counterattacks,
which would manage to hold Shirley’s men in check for the foreseeable future.
As the Americans had dug in on a fairly open space in the midst of swampy jungle surrounded by tall
trees, vulnerable to sniping and surprise attacks, the roadblock perimeter would be
easily reduced, killing Shirley in the process. Huggins then took command of the forces there,
thus giving that position the name of Huggins’ Roadblock. In the following days, the Japanese
would continue to repeatedly attack the roadblock while at the same time pushing back all attempts
to break through their lines, gradually wearing down Huggins’ men and placing their position at
high risk. After nine days of marching and fighting, the 126th Regiment had finally
achieved the same result Captain Catterns had carried out in a day with one-third the American
strength, but this was to serve as valuable experience for the US national servicemen.
And moving on to Buna, General Harding was about to launch another offensive on November 30,
supported by the closely-integrated artillery of Major-General Albert Waldron.
At 06:30, Warren Force finally commenced its attack, but yet again they would suffer
a storm of well-directed fire that would force the Americans to take to the ground.
As Warren Force had thus stunned itself once more against the Japanese defenses, Urbana
Force had been marching through the darkness and swamps to a point above the Triangle since 04:00.
Colonel Mott’s advanced had mixed results, with two companies quickly pushing through
to the south-eastern edge of the objective, two companies getting lost in the swamps or failing
to get through the Japanese fortifications and one company successfully skirting the enemy
defenses to get to Siwori village. But this was only the start of the American offensive,
an offensive that would be interrupted by a sudden shift of command, as we’ll see in
our next episode of the Pacific War. If you don’t want to miss that episode, make sure to subscribe
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