Last week, we covered the end of one of the most legendary figures of the Pacific War:
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Along with him also went the hopes of the Japanese Empire that they could
have a triumphant comeback; both of them finally crashing deep into the jungles of Bougainville.
The week before, however, we also covered the end of Operation Longcloth, the first Chindits
expedition, with the British-Indian long-range penetration unit making its difficult way out
of Japanese-controlled Burma and receiving the hero’s welcome. Today, we’ll further continue from
there with the direct aftermath of Operation Longcloth, as the first Arakan Campaign at
last comes to an end, thus sending the British to lick their wounds once again in the Pacific War.
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As we last saw, General Irving’s Arakan offensive had turned into yet another unmitigated disaster
for the British Empire in the Pacific War. A new series of blunders had cost many men to the more
than five British-Indian brigades engaged in the campaign, while at the same time giving
enough time for General Koga’s 55th Division to regroup and launch a devastating counteroffensive.
Only faith had allowed the 47th Indian Brigade and the 6th British Brigade, now under the overall
command of General Lomax, to narrowly escape destruction after the Japanese had successfully
cut their lines of communications. Furthermore, the disastrous events at Donbaik and Rathedaung,
two bulwarks that could not be taken away from Japanese hands; ending with the final withdrawal
of Allied troops east of the Mayu River, had seriously undermined the Indian morale.
At this point, most of the shaken and disease-ridden battalions in Arakan
were also nearing exhaustion, with losses amongst vitally-needed junior leaders being
particularly heavy, and most now contained a large proportion of recently-arrived, physically-weak,
inadequately-trained and mostly-sick recruits psychologically unprepared for the claustrophobia,
sights, sounds and humidity of the jungle. As no trained formations were available in India to
replace them, however, there was little option but to retain them in combat. By early April,
although Lomax had skillfully managed to stabilize the front at the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road,
the alarm bells were finally ringing in New Delhi. Thus, on April 14, Marshall Wavell
appointed General Slim’s 15th Corps to lead the British-Indian retreat and the defense of Bengal,
as Lomax was still struggling to create order from the chaos that was the 14th Indian Division.
Yet the Japanese, sensing the inherent weakness in the defending Indian forces,
continued to push the defenders to the north with relative ease.
On April 24, they finally reached the British defenses covering Buthidaung and Maungdaw,
aiming to secure better defensive positions for when fighting resumed after the monsoons . The
55th Indian Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe with a carefully prepared plan to
entrap and destroy the leading Japanese elements advancing along the spine of the Mayu Mountains;
yet the defensive effort would quickly fall apart after two exhausted and demoralized
battalions gave way. Thus, the Indians had to start their fighting withdrawal north. Reportedly,
so low was their fighting efficiency at this point, that on April 28, the men of the 8/13th
Frontier Force Regiment fired off nearly all of their ammunition at an imaginary opponent;
and when attacked the following day, they would have no option other than to retreat.
The withdrawal finally culminated with the capture of Buthidaung on May 9, with the 55th Brigade
narrowly escaping destruction only by abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment while trudging
by foot over the jungle-covered hills to safety. Five days later, the port of Maungdaw was also
evacuated and the British-Indian forces started to take positions in the open rice-field country
near Cox’s Bazar, far away from the jungles they feared so much. Luckily for the British,
General Koga would halt his counteroffensive after successfully recapturing the Maungdaw-Buthidaung
line, leaving their shattered, demoralized and broken opponents in approximately the
same positions from which the attack had begun five months earlier. Although he could have
continued forward, he chose to do this because the coming monsoon season was nearing its start.
Despite enjoying overwhelming numerical superiority at the start of the campaign,
superior artillery and a monopoly in tanks, the first British offensive to free Burma had ended
once again in a catastrophic defeat . Although the cost for the Army in India had not been
particularly high, with 916 dead, 2889 wounded and 1252 missing; the Indian high command had suffered
another heavy blow, with the myth of Japanese superiority, excellence and skill as a jungle
fighter being strongly reinforced in the minds of British and Indian troops, something that gravely
affected their morale. At the same time, Operation Longcloth was also reaching its final conclusion,
as the last remaining columns made their way back into Allied territory. Although a third of
the Chindits would fail to return, and despite the harsh criticism of British-Indian officers
about their effectiveness, the operation had been moderately successful, as we have seen in past
episodes. Wavell himself was very pleased about the performance of Brigadier Wingate’s forces;
such was his faith in the long-range penetration that he would order the formation of the 111th
Indian Brigade, personally selecting Brigadier Joe Lentaigne to lead this second Chindit unit.
Wavell’s plan was to use the two Chindit brigades alternately during 1944.
Yet the most important consequence of Operation Longcloth would be the blaze of publicity that
would occur after the return of the Chindits, as the expedition behind the enemy lines was the
only success to report in the Far East. Making the headlines in every newspaper in England and India,
the success of the Chindits would successfully lift the British-Indian morale and would further
help dispel the myth of Japanese invincibility, completely attracting attention away from the
recent reverses suffered at Arakan. At this point, Wavell had also
flown to Washington to partake in the Trident Conference, which lasted from May 12 to May 25.
Although the main focus of the conference was in the European theater, Wavell would
put his knowledge on the Burma campaign at the disposal of the American and British conferees,
who would have to decide what to do for the CBI theater. With thick jungle preventing the use of
modern weapons, with monsoons limiting the amount of potential attack time and with few options for
naval support, there was not much that could be done to help China other than air support.
Thus, the US and the UK would decide to bypass a ground attack in Burma and instead use the element
of surprise by air attack, such as in Operation Torch, the Allied Invasion of North Africa.
Not long after, Prime Minister Churchill would inform Wavell that he was to succeed
Lord Linlithgow as Governor-General and Viceroy of India . In his stead, General Claude Auchinleck
was to assume as Commander-in-Chief, India, having full responsibility for operations in
Burma and India. Meanwhile, the Japanese had also reorganized their forces to carry out a
more successful and active defense of Burma. With the creation of the Burma Area Army on March 27,
under the command of Lieutenant-General Kawabe Masakazu, the 55th Division of General Koga was
separated from General Mutaguchi’s 15th Army to quell the insurgencies of the Shan, Karen and
Kachin guerrillas and to react to long-penetration incursions from India or Yunnan, such as the
one recently carried out by the Chindits. Back in India, the low fighting effectiveness
of the British-Indian troops had reached a new scandalous level, so General Irwin had to issue
a note on May 15, explaining why Eastern Army had been beaten and explicitly identifying as
the main reasons for defeat the poor training and absence of fanatical quality of Indian troops in
comparison to their Japanese analogs, as well as the poor planning by junior and senior officers.
Although his observations were admitted to be largely correct, Irwin's refusal to admit that
any blame attached to himself and his staff was resented; and soon after, he would be
relieved of his command. The British knew that they needed an intensive basic and specialized
training programme, and though work had already begun on this in the past year, the creation of
training divisions and the expansion of this training programme would be proposed again, in
an effort to make full use of the next six months to improve the physical fitness of the troops, to
train fresh junior officers, to adapt the Indians to jungle fighting and to mentally prepare their
forces for the intense fighting that was still to come. In the meantime, because they hated and
distrusted Wingate’s extravagant and unorthodox methods, Irwin and his staff had ordered all
copies of Wingate’s reports to be withdrawn, thus delaying the release of the reports for
weeks or indeed months, in an effort to prevent any chance of Wingate leading a second expedition.
Yet the political allies of the Indian brigadier in London would eventually give a copy of this
report to Prime Minister Churchill, who was impressed by the work of the Chindits.
With this new and unexpected ally, Wingate and the Chindits had secured for themselves
the chance to carry out a second expedition. But now, we have to head over to New Guinea,
where new developments were unfolding as a prelude to the important Lae-Salamaua Campaign.
As we last saw, the Okabe Detachment had been defeated during the Battle of Wau,
being forced to withdraw back towards Mubo, where they began to regroup in an area of high ground
around Waipali and Guadagasal. Still, however, the Japanese had high hopes of launching a successful
counteroffensive in New Guinea; and for that, they had planned to bring the 51st Division
in a large convoy across the Bismarck Sea. Yet their hopes, and their convoy, would be sent to
the depths of the Bismarck Sea in one of the most devastating Allied air attacks of the Pacific War.
But despite being denied of these considerable reinforcements, equipment and supplies, the
Japanese would not fall back from Mubo . Neither would Brigadier Moten’s 17th Brigade take the
opportunity to launch a counteroffensive against Lae, which was lightly-defended at this point and
could have been taken easily. This was because the battle had sowed trepidation into the Australian
command structure, and thus they would refuse to take the offensive in fear of a Japanese followup.
The reticence of the Australian command to undertake large-scale
offensive operations in March, April or May was also due to critical supply limitations,
as poor weather severely restricted the necessary air movements. Furthermore, all three of Moten’s
battalions were understrength , although he also had at his disposal three independent
companies of Australian commandos, which were essentially at full strength at this point.
In contrast, General Adachi’s 18th Army had brought three divisions to New Guinea since
the fall of Buna and Gona. Two of the divisions were far away to the north in Wewak and Madang,
building airfields and a much-needed supply road via the Finisterre Range, the Ramu and the Markham
River valleys. The remaining formation was General Nakano’s 51st Division, which
counted with two depleted regiments: the 102nd Regiment at Mubo and the 115th Regiment at Lae.
Adachi also counted with the 5th Sasebo and the 2nd Maizuru SNLF marines at Salamaua,
which were brutally trained and specialized in independent operations; while two garrison
battalions from the 7th Naval Base Unit were stationed at Lae. Thankfully for them, no enemy
offensive materialized in the following weeks; and by April, once new transport arrangements could
be put into place, Nakano’s 66th Regiment began moving from Rabaul to Finschhafen and then to Lae,
while the 115th Regiment was successfully reformed . Back at Port Moresby, General Mackay was adamant
to reinforce the Wau-Bulolo position, so on April 18 he requested General Kenney to carry out extra
transport flights to bring some 1300 troops of the 3rd Australian Division into the Wau area.
This would be one of his last actions as temporary commander of the New Guinea Force,
as he would be subsequently replaced by the returning General Herring, who had been on leave.
On April 23, the 3rd Division of Major-General Stan Savige finally arrived at Wau to relieve
Kanga Force, which was dissolved into his division, with orders to prevent any Japanese
moves into the Wau and Bulolo valleys, to protect the airfields therein and to prevent the Japanese
from forming a base south of the Markham River, all of which were defensive tasks.
Savige brought with him the 15th Brigade to reinforce the area, while all the individual
units formerly part of Kanga Force were also assigned under his command. Upon setting foot
on Wau, Savige had immediately recognised three critical issues that would influence the campaign:
understanding the terrain, looking after the troops and improving the lines of supply.
He was also ordered to start preparations to take the offensive against Salamaua, one of the two
main Japanese bases in New Guinea. Thus, Savige drew up a suggested mission statement to destroy
the enemy forces in the Mubo area and ultimately to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River.
But unbeknownst to him, the planned offensive to take Salamaua was only a
diversion for Operation Postern, the combined amphibious–air operation to capture Lae.
Planning for Postern had begun in May, with Generals Blamey and Herring proposing to
seize Nadzab as soon as possible with Brigadier Eather’s 25th Brigade and a parachute battalion,
while the 9th Australian Division, now under the command of Major-General George Wooten,
was to take Lae in early August. Nadzab was an obvious target, undefended and of immense value,
not only for the Lae operation but also for extending the range of Allied air power.
In the meantime, Salamaua was to be left untaken until Postern was launched, something that Savige
himself would not be aware of until early June, or even later, when the campaign had already started.
The only action that happened during these months, secondary to the attacks on Mubo, was carried out
by Major Warfe and his 2/3rd Independent Company. As Brigadier Moten wanted to make a wide flanking
move into the west flank of the Japanese forces in front of Salamaua, he ordered Warfe to move to
Bulwa in the Bulolo Valley on March 4. Five days later, Warfe departed Bulwa for Missim through
a rarely used track that crossed the formidable Kuper Range, which included the daunting Double
Mountain crossing . By March 14, two platoons had been successfully established at Missim to set up
an observation post overlooking Salamaua from the west. Yet Warfe also had major supply problems,
as the tenuous track across Double Mountain broke down under heavy rains,
which would eventually force him to leave only one platoon at Missim. On March 31, however,
a Japanese patrol stumbled into the Australian observation post, ambushing the defenders and
forcing them to withdraw . Alarmed at the presence of Australian troops in this area, Japanese troops
from the 115th Regiment then occupied the northern end of Bobdubi Ridge on April 10. Two days later,
Warfe’s commandos had cut a track on to Bobdubi Ridge and were in a position to attack the vital
Komiatum Hill . What followed was a number of raids and ambushes against Japanese patrols in
the hill until the end of the month, successfully inflicting more than 20 casualties on the enemy
and setting up a new number of observation posts . Meanwhile, as patrols from the 2/5th Independent
Company had clashed with the Japanese around Observation Hill, the 2/7th and 24th Battalions
would be sent to relieve the exhausted commandos, which had been operating in the area for an
astounding eleven months. In an effort to defend the approaches to Wau, troops from the 2/7th
Battalion established one company in a defensive position around Lababia Ridge, while the other
companies were established at Waipali and Mat Mat Hill. As for the 24th Battalion, it would position
its companies to patrol the vast area south of the Markham River and west of Markham Point.
The battles for Mubo and Bobdubi were about to start, and we will cover them in the next episode,
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