At the start of February 1942, Japanese troops under General Tomoyuki Yamashita
arrived on the southern shore of malaya. They had rampaged south for the last 50 days,
and could now set their sights on the last Allied toehold on the peninsula- the jewel in Britain’s
crown of far east possessions- Singapore. -
Singapore was an island. In the mind of Winston Churchill this made it ideal to
function as a fortress, to hold out against Japanese attack until help could arrive.
He described the water surrounding it as a ‘splendid moat’.
But to Churchills consternation he was informed on January 19th 1942 that very little defensive
work had been done to fortify the northern shore of the island against attack from the mainland,
either before the war or during it. Churchill was furious, fuming to the chiefs of staff that
“..the fortress of Singapore…was not entirely fortified against an attack from the northward.
What is the use of having an island for a fortress if it is not to be made into a citadel?”
Churchill though should perhaps have known that Singapore was never intended to be a ‘citadel’
or any other kind of fortress for that matter. The defenses of the naval base were set up to defeat
attacks from the sea, with defence on the landward side to be provided by troops fighting in Malaya,
keeping enemy troops well to the north and out of artillery range of the naval base.
Therefore no land defences had been constructed on Singapore Island,
but this did not stop Churchill from getting it into his head that Singapore
was a fortress that could hold out against the odds. Precisely how he expected the naval base,
which if we remember was the main reason for holding Singapore in the first place,
to continue functioning while under artillery fire in the front line, was a mystery.
Many of the commanders on the ground in Singapore thought there was little chance of holding the
island for very long. Orders were orders though, Churchill was very clear that he wanted no
thought of surrender until “until protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore city”.
So it fell to Arthur Percival, the General Officer Commanding in Malaya to organize the defence.
Percival had an impressive-sounding 85,000 troops on the island, but around 15,000 of these were
non-combat personnel. This left a multinational force of around 70,000 troops available. There
were 13 British battalions, mostly part of the newly-arrived 18th division which was at full
strength. 6 Australian battalions in the 8th Australian Infantry Division, which had been
restored to full strength with the addition of 1900 untrained replacements. 17 Indian battalions
which were the battered remainder of the Indian III Corps. 13 of these were the product of merging
battered units together earlier in the campaign and only 1 was at full strength. There were also
2 regular Malay battalions, and 3 battalions from the straits settlements volunteer force.
It was a large but flawed force, with low morale from the weeks of retreat they had been through.
The Allies did have some things going for them though; for example there was a large amount
of artillery on the island. 9 artillery regiments as well as a variety of naval guns which, despite
what you might have heard, *were* able to fire at targets on land- they were just stocked with
armour piercing rounds for anti-ship fire, not the high explosive rounds good for artillery fire.
The key decision for General Percival in early February was where to position his forces.
In his opinion, the most likely area for Japanese landings was in the north east,
in the vicinity of the Naval base. Both General Wavell, the Allied Supreme Commander for South
East Asia and General Gordon Bennett, in command of the Australian troops, thought it more likely
the Japanese would cross in the north west where the strait was narrower, but Percival was adamant.
The strongest Allied force- the fresh British 18th division- would be positioned in the north
east along with the remainder of the Indian 11th Division. The Australian 8th division would take
the western sector along with the 44th and 15th Indian brigades, leaving the two Malayan brigades
and volunteer forces to secure the southern coast. The 12th Indian brigade would be maintained as the
only reserve formation. -
Across the water, General Tomoyuki Yamashita was also weighing up his options.
He correctly assessed that the British defences were stronger
around the north-eastern side of the island, so decided to land his forces on the western side.
Two of his three divisions were already on the western side since that was where
they had advanced from, so organizing the landings would be an easier logistical task.
Yamashita planned for the first wave to attack the positions of the Australian 22nd Infantry Brigade.
He would deploy the full force of the 18th and 5th divisions, with sixteen battalions hitting the
beaches to overwhelm the 3 australian battalions that would oppose them. Heavy reinforcement was
then planned – the 1st tank regiment would land on the established beachhead, while the
Imperial Guards division would make a second landing on the northern shore of the island,
supported by the 14th tank regiment. -
At just after 8.30 pm on February 8th Australian sentries spotted landing craft emerging out of the
dark. They opened fire, with Vickers machine guns and short range mortar fire sinking and damaging
a number of invasion barges before they could make the shoreline. Pre-arranged light signals
for artillery support were fired into the air, but there were so many Japanese troops landing
the batteries struggled to keep up with demand. Invading troops arrived on the beach in force from
8.45, and the battle quickly became chaotic. The terrain on the coast here was a mix of beaches,
tidal swamps and small streams, difficult to attack and even worse to defend, since
permanent positions could not be maintained in areas that were underwater for half of each day.
The Australian troops were very thinly spread, to the point that virtually no units could see
any other friendly groups. This, combined with the destruction of allied phone lines
by Japanese artillery, made a co-ordinated response close to impossible despite the fierce
resistance being put up by individual units. By midnight, despite a furious battle the large
numerical superiority of the Japanese had told and they had pushed off the coast, getting themselves
the foothold on Singapore they were after. A side note here: you’ll notice throughout
the video I’m talking about Japanese regiments battling Allied brigades. You would ordinarily
expect a brigade to be a larger unit than a regiment, but functionally these were the
same size, due to differing unit structures in the Japanese and British armies. For a brief
explainer on why that is, check out this video on the Historigraph Extra channel.
Thousands of Japanese troops came ashore overnight,
and the bulk of the 5th and 18th divisions were ashore by the end of the next day.
As a result Percival was immediately forced to commit his only real reserve- the 12th Indian
Brigade- to shore up the Australians. Despite the size of the Japanese force that had landed though,
Percival did not move any units from the eastern side of the island, and the reinforcements he
had moved west constituted only about 1000 men. It was not enough. On February 9th the Japanese
pushed forwards in the north west, capturing Tengah airfield and driving the Allied forces back
to the ‘Jurong line’. This defensive perimeter had been hastily surveyed in late January,
and was the main defensive barrier on the western side of the island. If it held, then Percival
still had a viable front line to work with. It may not come as a surprise to you that it not
only didn’t hold, but fell apart with remarkable speed. In the early hours of December 10th,
the Imperial Guards division under General Nishimura forced its way ashore, driving a
wedge between the 27th Australian brigade and its beleaguered western neighbours. The northern edge
of the Jurong line was now outflanked, and without waiting for orders the 12th Brigade moved back to
prevent the Guards from smashing into their rear. At the same time, General Percvial was circulating
plans for a final fall back line around Singapore city itself, if such a retreat became necessary.
But in a microcosm of Britain’s struggles with communications throughout the Malayan campaign,
when the 15th and 44th brigade commanders got a hold of the plans, they assumed the orders were
to go into action immediately. Unable to confirm over the telephone as all the lines were shot,
the two brigades fell back off the Jurong line, fatally compromising it.
By the end of December 10th the line was lost, and there was no let up from Yamashita. Both
the 5th and 18th divisions surged forwards, while the Guards continued to land troops in the north.
General Percival desperately tried to regain some measure of control.
He took a battalion from each brigade of the 18th division and created an ad-hoc group
known as ‘Tomforce’ to plug the gaps emerging in the north. He also planned a counter attack to
retake the Jurong line, but the preparations for it were quickly overtaken by Japanese advances.
Overnight on February 11th Yamashita’s 5th division pushed from Tengah airfield,
scything through 12th Indian brigade and an Australian battalion to take the key road junction
at Bukit Timah, complete with its important supply depots. By 7.30 the Japanese 18th division had cut
straight through the Indian 15th Brigade, as the Allied line threatened to collapse.
The Allied troops were now in disarray, but ammunition shortages on the Japanese side
were beginning to make themselves felt. With no rail connections to the mainland,
resupplying the attacking force was not easy. As a result the pace of the attacks slowed,
allowing Percival to concentrate a counter attack. Three battalions were ordered to
retake Bukit Timah, but this failed amid heavy defensive fire in the afternoon of February 11th.
There was more bad news on the east of the island, as the growing strength of
the imperial guards division made itself felt and allied communications fell apart once again.
Under pressure, the 27th Australian brigade fell back unannounced,
leaving the left flank of what was left of the Indian 11th division horribly exposed. The
11th division was forced to move south, meaning the naval base would now have to be abandoned.
General Percival was also forced to dispatch another brigade sized force from 18th division
to fill gaps between his other units, weakening his best formation once again.
In the west of the fast-shrinking Allied perimeter there was better news, as the 22nd
Brigade held out throughout the day against two Japanese regiments. It was a fleeting bit of good
news though, as on February 12th the Japanese bounded forwards to occupy the three reservoirs
in the centre of Singapore island. This was a significant moment, as it cut off
the water supply to Singapore city, putting effectively a ticking clock on Allied resistance.
At noon on February 12th General Percival ordered a retreat back to the final perimeter
around Singapore. His troops were battered- 22nd Australian brigade was down to just 800 men- and
morale was collapsing. The Japanese 18th division ground forwards in the south-west along the
holland road and engaged the 1st Malayan Brigade. It was slow but steady progress until they reached
the area of Pasir Panjang, where the Malayan 1st Battalion was dug in on an area of high ground
known as ‘Opium Hill’. There over the next two days the Japanese tried repeatedly to take the
hill but were repulsed each time by a fearsome Malayan defence led in the front line by 2nd
Lieutenant Adnan bin Saidi. When ammunition ran out the defence carried on with bayonets and bare
hands. Lieutenant Adnan was wounded, but remained alongside his men resisting to the very end.
After finally taking the hill after two days and heavy casualties,
the Japanese troops found Lieutenant Adnan badly wounded.
Perhaps in some kind of retribution for the losses his leadership had cost them, the story
goes that Adnan was strung up by his feet from a tree and bayoneted to death by the Japanese.
Shortly after 1pm on February 14th the same detachments arrived at Alexandra Hospital
and set about committing an even greater atrocity. The hospital by this time was
crammed with 900 wounded soldiers, and had no defenses. When a British Lieutenant
rushed outside to wave a white flag, he was bayoneted on the spot by the Japanese troops,
a hundred of which then rushed inside the hospital and rampaged throughout it. Dozens of patients
and doctors were murdered, including two that were under anaesthetic on the operating table.
The soldiers paused only to loot the corpses, before marching the survivors out of the hospital
and forcing them into a building a quarter of a mile away, where the doors and windows were
nailed shut and they were left overnight without any water or ventilation. The following day,
Japanese soldiers came back, and murdered a further hundred of the remaining prisoners.
These atrocities were carried out probably on the orders of Colonel Masanobu Tsuji.
The historian Peter Thompson records “the motive was to show Percival that an utterly mindless and
totally ruthless force would be unleashed upon the citizens of Singapore if he persisted in ignoring
Yamashita’s demand to surrender.” For Singapore,
it was a precursor of atrocities to come. By this time, in the parts of the city still
under British control, the atmosphere was starting to take on a distinctly last days of rome feel,
with looting and desertion becoming more commonplace, along with the systematic
destruction in the city of anything the Japanese could find use for. Overnight on February 14th
all ships remaining in the harbour left for Java and Sumatra, carrying 3000 refugees with them.
Among the allied generals, surrender was now very much on the table. By the end of February
14th both the 5th and 18th Japanese divisions had reached the outskirts of Singapore and the
water situation was becoming critical. On the morning of February 15th Percival
was informed the city had maybe 24hours before the water system totally failed.
He and all his commanders agreed that since there was no realistic prospect of recapturing
the reservoirs to regain the water, there was now no alternative but to surrender.
At 4.15 that day, Percival and his chief of staff travelled to meet with General Yamashita
at Bukit Timah, to agree to the Japansese demands for unconditional surrender. At 8.30pm the Allied
troops laid down their arms. Singapore had fallen. -
Singapore was Britain’s worst defeat during the second world war. In barely two months,
the whole of Malaya and Singapore had been lost, 80,000 troops had surrendered
and Britain’s entire strategy to contain the Empire of Japan had gone directly in the bin.
It had been two months of successive bad decisions by British and Allied actors. From Admiral Tom
Phillips’ underestimating the power of aircraft and getting Repulse and Prince of Wales sunk,
to the Generals Wavell, Percival, Heath, Bennett and others and their persistent underestimation
of their opponents. The leadership right from the top was hesitant, indecisive and incapable.
The story of the Allied defense of Malaya and Singapore is of an under-strength,
under-equipped and badly led force, that was out manuevered and out thought
at every stage by an enemy they never took seriously enough.
And what of Churchill, whose insistence that Singapore could be held as a fortress
had led to reinforcements being poured into a city in time only to surrender?
He wrote after the war: “I ought to have known.” -