(intro music)
Hi, my name is Greg Ganssle
and I'm a part-time lecturer[br]in the Department of Philosophy
at Yale University, and a Senior Fellow
at the Rivendell Institute.
And today we're talking about
the philosophical problem of evil.
In previous discussions,[br]we've seen the charge
of contradiction or the deductive
logical problem of evil discussed.
And this is the claim that[br]there is a contradiction
in asserting that God[br]exists, God is wholly good,
all-powerful, and all-knowing,[br]and that evil exists.
The solution to this charge[br]of contradiction, we found, was
in the idea that God might have[br]a good reason to allow evil.
A good God can allow evil if[br]He has a good reason to do so.
It's from this point that[br]the second major argument
in the philosophical[br]problem of evil begins.
This is the evidential argument.
Rather than "the charge of contradiction,"
I like to call this "the unicorn[br]objection."
Just like a unicorn might exist
but they're awfully hard to find,
this argument starts with[br]the idea that maybe God
has a reason to allow the evil we witness,
but it sure seems like there[br]is no reason out there.
So let me see if I can make[br]this a little more rigorous.
I'm following an important[br]paper that was published
by philosopher William Rowe in 1979.
This argument goes something like this[br](and I'm going to simplify).
Premise one:
There are unjustified evils in the world.
Premise two:
If God exists, there will be
no unjustified evils in the world.
Conclusion: Therefore, God does not exist.
Let me clarify a few things
before I try to give a bit of an answer.
So, what is an unjustified evil?
An unjustified evil is an evil
where there is no good reason to allow it.
No good being would allow this evil
if he could prevent it.
The argument is that there are
cases of evil like this in the world,
and if there are, then God does not exist.
Now, notice the way I set up the argument,
it's actually a valid deductive argument.
So why would we call this[br]an evidential argument?
The answer is the first premise,
"There are unjustified[br]evils," can only be supported
with an evidential case.
We cannot argue that, beyond[br]the shadow of a doubt,
there are unjustified evils.
We have to weigh the[br]evidence, pro and con,
for the claim that there[br]are unjustified evils.
So let's begin to do that.
Well, William Rowe in his[br]article tells a story of a deer
who's caught in a forest[br]fire and suffers horribly
for four or five days before she dies.
And he points out that in the[br]case of suffering like this,
we cannot see any reason that[br]God might have to allow it.
It looks like an unjustified evil.
And we can go through and look at some
of the standard reasons God[br]might have to allow evils
and show that they don't[br]seem to apply in this case.
For example, human free[br]will seems to be irrelevant
especially if the fire[br]was caused by lightning.
Secondly, the fact that it's a good thing
to have a regular cause and effect world
doesn't seem to apply,[br]because God could always end
the deer's misery without[br]really interfering
with the regularities of the world.
So here's a case that looks[br]like an unjustified evil.
How is a theist going to respond?
Well, another philosopher named
Steven Wykstra begin this way.
He said, "We're looking for a reason
that God could have to allow this evil,"
or "We're looking for what we could call
a justifying reason."
And William Rowe's argument[br]goes something like this.
First: It doesn't seem like[br]there's a justifying reason.
Secondly: Therefore, probably
there is no justifying reason.
And that's the kind of reasoning
that's supporting premise one.
The evidence we bring[br]to bear to premise one
is that, as much as we think[br]about it, we cannot discern
a justifying reason, so it[br]seems like there is none.
Then we conclude not[br]that there definitely is
no justifying reason, but[br]that it's likely, or probably
there is no justifying reason.
And then our conclusion becomes[br]"Probably, there is no God."
Now what Steve Wykstra does with this
is he thinks hard about this inference
from "It seems like there[br]is no justifying reason"
to "Probably, there is no justifying[br]reason."
I'm oversimplifying his case quite a bit,
but it's as if he's making this claim.
Sometimes inferences of that kind
are very strong and[br]sometimes they're very weak.
So here's some examples.
Look around the room.
It seems like there are no[br]live elephants in the room.
Therefore, probably there are[br]no live elephants in the room.
That seems to be a[br]pretty strong inference.
What about this one?
Look around the room again.
It seems like there are no[br]carbon-14 atoms in the room.
Therefore, probably there are[br]no carbon-14 atoms in the room.
Well that doesn't seem like[br]a very strong inference,
even if you look around the room twice.
What is the difference?
The difference can be captured[br]in the sentences of the form
"If there were a ____,
we would probably know it."
Now we'll take the first case.
"If there were a live elephant in the[br]room,
we would probably know it."
That is true.
You look around the room,
and a live elephant is something[br]you're going to notice.
If the room is small[br]enough, there aren't a lot
of large objects a live[br]elephant could hide behind.
So it's a very strong inference.
But think about the carbon-14 atom.
"If there were a carbon-14 atom in the[br]room,
we would probably know it."
That turns out to be false.
You cannot detect tacarbon-14 atom
simply by glancing around the room.
So sometimes these inferences are strong
and sometimes they're weak.
Now let's go back to Rowe's argument.
What is it with which[br]he fills in the blank?
A justifying reason.
A reason God could have[br]to allow this evil.
So we look at a particular case of evil.
And we asked the question "If there were
a justifying reason,[br]would we probably know it?"
If the answer to that question is "Yes,"
then Rowe's argument is strong.
If the answer is "No," then it's weak.
Let me tell you why I think it's weak.
First of all, if God[br]exists, we would expect
that many of His reasons for[br]doing things are going to be
stuff that we cannot figure out.
Secondly, we can figure[br]out reasons God might have
for lots of the evils in the world:
things due to free will,
due to cause-and-effect universe.
There are lots of evils that we encounter
where we can figure out what[br]a justifying reason might be.
Third thing: every philosopher recognizes
that we're not going to[br]be able to figure out
God's reasons in every case.
So we all accept the idea[br]that there are many cases
we can figure out and there are many cases
we shouldn't be able to figure out.
The question is, are there[br]too many cases of that kind?
And this is where the disagreement is.
I think, if you have other[br]reasons to think God exists,
then you're in good grounds for saying
that this argument is not strong,
because the number of cases
we cannot figure out is[br]not necessarily so great
to render existence of God unlikely.
This is one of those cases
where both the theist and the atheist
can say that the other side
can be perfectly rational[br]in their beliefs.
It's a matter of assessing[br]the evidence differently.
In fact, in Rowe's article[br]where he first put forward
this argument, he makes this point.
He says he thinks it's[br]perfectly reasonable
for a theist to continue to believe in God
even in spite of this argument.
So we've looked at the[br]evidential argument from evil,
simply one version of it by William Rowe.
And I've explained how[br]a theist can respond, to see
whether it's still[br]reasonable to believe in God.
Of course, many philosophers have launched
different versions of this argument
which are more complicated
and perhaps more difficult to answer.
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