What future does the Russian Navy have? While Russia's naval forces have played
an important role in the war their performance has been, at best, mixed.
The Russian Navy has successfully blockaded ports and launched missiles against targets
across Ukraine, but along the way it lost its Black Sea flagship,
lost one of its most important amphibious warfare vessels, failed to ensure control of Snake Island,
and failed to prosecute decisive amphibious operations in the Ukrainian littoral.
The Russian military will in the future face substantial budgetary constraints. While it is
true that Russia's economy has withstood sanctions better than expected thus far, this situation is
unlikely to hold in the long term, especially if the United States can maintain the coalition.
It is not obvious at this point that the Navy will
be able to command sufficient resources to maintain itself, much less rebuild.
The Baltic is for all intents and purposes closed to Russia upon the
accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. In no conceivable conflict could Russian warships
(even submarines) use the Baltic without running the risk of imminent destruction.
The accession of Finland complicates Russian access in the north, giving NATO better
eyes on the major Russian naval bases in the Arctic, including the ballistic missile fleet.
Russia has the most flexibility in the Pacific, but Japanese re-armament and the increasingly
fraught relationship between Tokyo and Moscow make significant action difficult to contemplate.
Indeed, even the Black Sea is now perilous for Russia. If Ukraine survives this war as a
political entity it will undoubtedly possess anti-ship weapons that will make operations
dangerous. Turkey, notwithstanding its often difficult relationship with the rest of NATO,
now holds the key to naval power in the Black Sea.
Russia has reportedly canceled procurement of additional Project
22610 patrol vessels over concerns about performance. The average construction
period of the Admiral Gorshkov frigates is currently running at more than a decade,
with only three of the ships having been delivered since the first was laid down in 2006.
The existing fleet has big problems. One looming question involves Russia's aircraft carrier,
the Admiral Kuznetsov. The Kuznetsov has served as the object of fun over the past
15 years as much or more than serving as an active combat vessel, having suffered
multiple mechanical mishaps including several fires and the collapse of a crane.
The two other large surface units in the fleet are the two surviving battlecruisers
of the Kirov class, Pyotr Velikiy and Admiral Nakhimov. The latter has been in refit for the
last two decades, while the former has as of yet played no significant role in the war.
Russia's amphibious flotilla has proven singularly useless during the war,
except to the degree that it temporarily pinned Ukrainian forces in Odessa. The
inability of the flotilla to conduct an assault on Odessa or to keep Snake Island
supplied has demonstrated a significant shortfall in Russian capabilities.
The presence of the large, flat-decked amphibious warship such as the French Mistral might have had
an impact in the early days of the conflict, although Ukraine's acquisition of substantial
numbers of anti-ship missiles would put such a vessel in considerable danger now.
Russia has laid down two amphibious assault ships of similar size to the Mistrals,
but it is not obvious that the government will be able to pay
for the vessels or that Russian industry can actual construct them.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) was awakened by a shocking drone attack. Ukraine targeted naval
units in and around the main Russian base in the region, the Sevastopol naval base.
According to the footage circulating on social media, Ukrainian unmanned
surface vessels (USVs) carried out kamikaze attacks on the BSF units.
An Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate, possibly the flagship Admiral Makarov,
and mine countermeasure (MCM) ship were reportedly hit by the Ukrainian USVs.
The reports suggest that Ukraine attacked the base simultaneously
with UAVs and USVs. According to a Russian Defense Ministry statement,
8 UAVs (Unmanned Aerial vehicles) and 7 USVs were involved in the attack. In the same statement,
Russian MoD said that the naval units attacked by the drones were providing
security for the merchant ships carrying grain at the grain corridor for months.
This incident has shown the significance of such threats, and in particular, NATO allied
naval forces have begun to develop additional measures against such threats from the air,
surface, and subsurface. This is because such attacks can occur at the ships’ weakest times,
such as when warships are resting or replenishing and not as ready as when they are deployed at sea,
or when they are operating close to shore, passing through a strait, and so.
Russian intelligence failed to detect Ukraine’s coastal missile batteries were operational on
the coast, so the Moskva had to be deployed outside the effective range of those missiles.
The U.S. has officially stated that it has provided Harpoon missiles to Ukrainian forces,
Russia has sent a rescue tug to Snake Island,
and the ship has sailed in the A2/ AD area of these missiles,
BSF lost area air control after losing Moskva, but insisted on sending small
patrol boats with weak air defenses and lost several boats to TB-2 Bayraktar drone attacks.
These are rare incidents that would be subject to the naval academies of the countries,
just like the lessons of the Falkland War are still considered fundamental for many
applications in Naval Warfare. Naval battles don’t occur often in history, many naval
officers from different countries around the world retire without facing a real conflict
at sea. For this reason, it is possible that warships might not show the necessary reaction
the first time they encounter real aggression, but even if they do, it may not be sufficient.
Firstly, Ukraine’s USVs were detected when a USV was aground on a Sevastopol beach. Among
the other analysts, Naval News correspondent H I Sutton analyzed this drone and underlined
that this can be used as a weapon. This could be the first warning to the BSF,
that Ukraine has plans to strike naval units in the Sevastopol base. In this case there
would be two common possible courses of action for the Ukrainian forces;