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Ever wondered what really happened in the torts classic: Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad.
Today I will provide you with the rest of the story, and after that the rule from the
case.
Hi, this is Beau Baez, and today I am going to help you understand Palsgraf v Long Island
Railroad, a 1920’s New York State case that is read by law students around the world.
The opinion was written by Benjamin Cardozo, one of the great jurists of the 20th century.
Here is Cardozo’s version of the injury: Helen Palsgraf was waiting to catch a train,
when suddenly there was an explosion near her, which caused a penny scale to fall down
on her.
The explosion occurred when two men attempted to board a moving train.
One of the two men got on without difficulty, but the second man looked like he was going to fall.
This second man was carrying a non-descript package wrapped in newspaper.
To keep the man from falling, one railroad conductor on the train pulled him up while
a second conductor on the platform pushed him onto the moving train.
In that process the package, which happened to contain fireworks, fell down, causing an
explosion on the tracks.
Cardozo’s facts leave much to be desired.
Here is the rest of the story, based on the trial documents, all of which Cardozo had
access to.
First, there was another package of “fireworks” found on the train station from a third unidentified
man who did not make it onto the train.
The firework we are talking about was 18 inches long and 4 inches in diameter.
Now, I don’t know about you, but that sounds like a bomb to me.
Apparently, during that time the press called it a firework because they were concerned of panic
and possible bomb attacks in New York City.
Second, Helen Palsgraf suffered minor bruises but significant psychological harm.
For the rest of her life, Helen Palsgraf spoke with a stutter and had to stop working as
a maid because she was scared to leave her home.
Third, the “fireworks” didn’t explode immediately upon impact, but rather the train
dragged them along the tracks right up to where Mrs. Palsgraf was sitting, exploding 10 feet away from her.
Fourth, the case was argued by both plaintiff and defendant as a proximate cause case.
Cardozo ignored the proximate cause issue and came up with a completely different rationale
for ruling against Helen Palsgraf—a theory that neither party discussed in briefs nor
at oral argument.
By the way, the Railroad lost the proximate cause argument at the intermediate court of
appeals, because it was a lousy argument.
The Railroad’s argument was that the passenger’s negligence was an intervening cause that broke
the Railroad’s causal link.
But that was a silly argument as the passengers were negligent before the railroad’s negligence.
You can’t have an intervening event that comes before the railroad’s negligence.
By all accounts, Helen Palsgraf had a slam dunk case in her favor at New York’s high
court.
Fifth was Helen Palsgraf’s lawyer.
He was a high powered New York lawyer who was not known for taking torts cases, let
alone a case on contingency from a poor maid.
This lawyer practiced in the Woolworth building in New York City, which was the world’s
tallest building at the time.
To this day, we don’t know why he took this case.
Alright, now let’s move on to the law.
Cardozo’s majority opinion determined that the railroad owed no duty of care to Helen
Palsgraf because she was not within the range of apprehension.
In other words, she was not a foreseeable plaintiff and foreseeable plaintiffs are determined
under the duty element, not the proximate cause element.
In this case, the railroad conductors were clearly negligent to the passengers they unreasonably
helped onto a moving train.
But as to Helen Palsgraf, there was no reason for the conductors to believe that a package
wrapped in newspaper would explode, thus moving Helen Palsgraf outside the range of
apprehension.
If Helen Palsgraf was to sue anyone, Cardozo suggested she should have sued the two passengers,
who were never identified by the police.
The Andrews dissent argued that the duty element should be interpreted much more broadly to include
all injured victims, and that foreseeability should then be determined under proximate
cause.
Andrews also noted that the defendant never asked the jury to determine if Helen Palsgraf
was a foreseeable plaintiff, which the jury should have determined as a matter of fact.
What Cardozo should have done in this case was remand the case back to the trial court on the
factual issue of whether Helen Palsgraf was a foreseeable victim, but Cardozo precluded
that possibility by saying that both sides conceded the point of unforeseeability, therefore
the court could rule on the unforeseeable plaintiff issue as a matter of law.
After the opinion was issued, Palsgraf’s attorney filed a motion for reconsideration,
pointing out that Helen was only 10 feet away from the explosion.
Cardozo denied the motion, stating in one sentence that while she may have been close
to the explosion, she was not close to the spot where the conductors negligently caused
the package to fall onto the tracks.
And there you have it, the rest of the story and rule from Palsgraf.
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