The idea behind Operation Postmaster was a sensitive and potentially catastrophic bone of
contention that had British authorities torn apart as 1941 drew to a close.
On the one hand, the Small-Scale Raiding Force and Special Operations Executive
operatives that had come up with it were more than eager to show the world the capabilities
of commando warfare. In their mind, stealing several German ships right
in front of the noses of the Third Reich would be a risky yet attainable operation.
On the other hand, some British officials were concerned about the mission taking place on
the island of Fernando Po, a Spanish African territory. The event could ignite a diplomatic
conundrum if the mission failed and British commandos were captured in neutral territory.
The Franco regime was all but a wartime ally of Nazi Germany, and an act of aggression on their
territory had the potential to be the last drop that pushed Franco into joining the Axis powers.
Even so, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was unmoved by the threat of an
Axis Spain and wanted to prove that his secret commandos could shift the tides
of the war. Operation Postmaster was happening even if it meant pulling Spain into the fight…
Turmoil in West Africa
In the summer of 1941, the Special Operations Executive or SOE experiment was still in its
infancy. Despite Churchill's confidence in its ability to help the war efforts,
most Allied military authorities didn't place much hope in the elusive commandos
that the Prime Minister seemed to advocate so passionately.
Nevertheless, even the most skeptical British leaders knew that the covert
commandos had an unparalleled ability to operate independently and deep within
enemy territory, which made them ideal informants for the British government.
A need for such a skillset suddenly arose when the British Admiralty
received a distressing report about the presence of German
U-boats employing refueling bases in the Vichy French rivers of Africa.
The Combined Operations Command assembled a team
of elite operatives from the Special Operations Executive and the daring
Small-Scale Raiding Force or SSRF to locate and investigate the enemy submarine bases.
On August 9, 1941, a group comprising five members of the SSRF embarked on a six-week
voyage from Dorset, England aboard a 65-ton Brixham yacht trawler known as Maid Honour.
After an uneventful journey, the team arrived at Freetown, Sierra Leone,
on September 21 and joined forces with a group of SOE soldiers. The commando team then infiltrated
the West African territories to begin their search for the hidden Nazi U-boat bases.
Several weeks passed, and the British operatives failed to locate the targeted naval bases.
Nevertheless, a new target earned their interest. The men had discovered that a port in Santa Isabel
Fernando Po, a Spanish island off the West African coast, was home to three Axis ships.
The vessels were identified as Duchessa d'Aosta, an Italian cargo liner weighing 7,872 tons,
a sizable German tugboat named Likomba, and a diesel-powered barge called Bibundi,
which was also believed to be of German origin.
The commandos managed to get their hands on the ships' manifests,
which reported their cargo as carrying wool, tanning materials,
and copper. However, some of the pages were mysteriously missing, which led the British
renegades to assume they were carrying ammunition, weapons, and war supplies…
Reluctance
The operatives divided their attention; some stayed near the port to watch over the Axis
ships' every movement while the rest began to sketch an ambitious operation to steal the vessel.
However, even after the planning was ready,
they struggled to get the green light from the Admiralty, which was heavily concerned
with executing a covert operation in a neutral territory friendly to Germany.
It took three months, but the Admiralty finally accepted Operation Postmaster on November 20.
The scheme called for the involvement of 17 locally recruited men, 11 SSRF Commandos,
and four SOA agents. The plan involved transporting the raiders to the island
via tugboats, where they would work together to seize the Axis vessels
while simultaneously diverting the attention of enemy soldiers.
But before the commandos could begin their preparation, the whole affair faced a massive
obstacle as Sir George Gifford, the British General Officer of West Africa Command,
declined to support the operation, especially if it involved local men.
He believed that, regardless of how the planners assessed
the situation, the likelihood of failure significantly surpassed that of success.
Following Giffords's denial to cooperate, the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Madrid
also refused to support the operation, and the Admiralty was forced to suspend the mission.
Everyone was hesitant because the Axis vessels were harbored on a
Spanish island. The country remained neutral throughout the war despite
Spain leaning towards the Axis powers and almost joining them at one point. As such,
the operation could be interpreted as espionage and piracy against the Spanish regime.
Nevertheless, Churchill insisted fiercely on proceeding with the
mission and was livid at the constant setbacks.
The Party Animal
Months passed, and Spain began tightening its relations with the Axis powers. In response,
the SSRF started to pressure the Admiralty to revisit Operation Postmaster. Finally, on
January 6, 1942, the Foreign Office and Admiralty reversed their decision and approved the mission.
Immediately, the SEO and SSRF agents began to reformulate their plan as
the Admiralty prohibited using the original 17 locals. Now the
mission would be executed solely by members of the British military.
The first step was infiltration, and SOE agent Richard Lippett obtained employment with the
Liverpool shipping company John Holt & Co, which had business offices on the island. As such,
he gained significant access to the port and the personnel working on it.
Soon, Lippett learned that the crew from Duchessa d'Aosta were a wild bunch of sailors who loved to
party when they were off duty. Lippett was able to infiltrate one such soirée
aboard the ship and learned a great deal of information about the vessel and its crew.
Lippett then conveyed the vital information to the
rest of the task force and planned for a rather joyful diversion plan.
Using his new reputation as a roisterer, the undercover agent prepared a lavish dinner
party for the officers of Duchessa d'Aosta the same night the attack would take place.
Meanwhile, the rest of the British operatives acquired two large tugboats,
Vulcan and Nuneaton, which they would use to get into the port's vicinity
and deploy foldable kayaks to reach the targeted ships.
Execution
On January 14, the raiders closed in on Santa Isabel Harbor while Lippett
welcomed his party guests on the Fernando Po shore.
Vulcan was the first vessel to approach the enemy ships covered by darkness. Aboard,
Major Gus March-Phillipps, the operation commander,
led ten other operatives toward their target, Duchessa d'Aosta.
Four other raiders disembarked from Nuneaton, rowing their foldable kayaks;
they then made their way toward Likomba and Bibundi. The tension was unbearable
as the operatives moved in complete silence and hoped that Lippett's trap had been successful.
The port's lights were extinguished at night as part of wartime protocol,
which gave the raiders a significant advantage as they approached their objective.
Even so, the stakes were massive, especially regarding the massive Duchessa d'Aosta, which
had a larger crew and more advanced communication assets that could be used to alert Axis forces.
Crewmembers aboard the ship soon noticed the tugboat approaching,
but they didn't think much of it and failed to report the anomaly. On Likomba, however,
a watchman spotted the commandos just as they attempted to climb up her side.
The guard asked the crew to identify themselves while shining a light on
Commando Captain Graham Hayes. The captain was armed with a pistol,
and he thought he would be able to pull it out before the watchman fired at him. However,
doing so would ruin the whole operation and put the lives of every operative at risk.
Instead, the raider used the little German he knew and managed to persuade
the guard that he was bringing a letter for the ship's captain.
Two German sailors then approached and helped Hayes board the vessel.
Once on deck, the Germans became highly suspicious, but before they could react,
the SOE agents were pointing 45-caliber machine guns at them and immediately took control of the
situation. Within minutes, the men had set up explosive charges to the ship's anchor chains.
Burundi, moored next to Likomba, offered no resistance and was soon ready to be taken as well.
The raiders then guided Nuneaton alongside Likomba to take her and Burundi in tow.
The commandos then detonated the explosives, and the two smaller ships began to be towed away
right under the noses of the Axis guards. Just as the explosions were going off,
11 commandos from Vulcan succeeded in boarding Duchessa d'Aosta. One team placed
charges on the anchor chains while another group searched below deck and apprehended prisoners.
The raiders had now taken control of the three Axis ships,
but the explosions had alerted the townspeople and guards…
Aftermath
Despite alerting the entire town, the locals didn't try to stop the ships that were being
towed away, and they attributed the attack to an aerial raid. The town's anti-air emplacements
began to fire vehemently into the night sky, although there were no warplanes to target.
The SAM fire helped the commandos continue their escape, as the fear
of aerial attacks also prevented the locals from turning on the harbor's
light. The operation took less than 30 minutes and was a formidable success,
with the operatives achieving their goals without firing a single shot or suffering one casualty.
Nevertheless, the Spanish government was seething, with Foreign Minister Serrano Suner describing the
event as an: (QUOTE) "Intolerable attack on our sovereignty, no Spaniard can fail to be roused
by this act of piracy committed in defiance of every right and within water under our
jurisdiction. Do not be surprised if we return the answer which the case demands—that of arms."
Even so, the Spanish had no evidence of any British involvement,
and their threats were inconsequential.
Richard Lippett, however, was soon captured by Spanish authorities and questioned repeatedly.
Despite the accusations, he convinced them that he was not involved in the ships'
departure and did not spend any money on the party for the ships' officers.
Nevertheless, he was detained until January 27 and could not depart the island,
but he eventually sneaked out by canoe and arrived in British territory on March 1, 1942.
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