Hello and welcome to another episode of Military TV
Integrated Air Defence Systems or (IADS) are a key feature of modern warfare. IADS like
the one Russia has deployed on NATO’s Eastern Flank and which China is creating within the
First Island Chain are complex, multilayered defense systems incorporating a range of ground-based
and aerial sensors, as well as surface-to-air missile systems. IADS are not in themselves
a new phenomenon. However, the SAM systems and radars which make up modern IADS are much
more capable than previous generations. The territory which they can cover is also much
larger than in previous generations due to several very long-range SAM systems such as
the Russian S-400, S-300V4 and Chinese HQ-9. So, today we want to discuss about “What
is a Modern Integrated Air Defense System?” So sit back, relax and enjoy this video!
Air defense, long-neglected in the low-threat air campaigns that dominated the past 18 years
of combat operations, is again at the fore of defense planning. The June 2019 shootdown
of a US Navy RQ-4A high-altitude remotely piloted aircraft variant flying over the Persian
Gulf by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard forces raised tensions significantly between the
United States and Iran, nearly leading to a retaliatory military strike. The high-altitude
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, used extensively for operations
in the Middle East, was brought down by an Iranian derivative of the Russian Buk M3 or
(SA-17), a medium-range surface-to-air missile system. The relative ease with which Iran
shot down the US ISR asset raised concerns among many defense analysts and observers.
Mitchell Institute Dean and retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula said subsonic, non-stealth
aircraft such as the RQ-4 “were not designed to operate in areas covered by advanced SAM
or air-to-air threats.” Advanced SAM threats have proliferated around the world, he said,
even to second-rate military powers like Iran. Senior Air Force and Department of Defense
officials have been warning about this threat for some time.
America’s technological edge, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy pointed out, is
under pressure from would-be adversaries looking to dull the competitive edge the US Air Force
could once virtually guarantee in any conflict. As famed airpower theorist and retired USAF
Col. John A. Warden III once observed, since 1939, “no country has won a war in the face
of enemy air superiority, no major offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled
the air, and no defense has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority.”
Attaining air superiority, he added, has “consistently been a prelude to military victory.”
These defensive capabilities, such as radars, communication systems, and SAMs, are purposely
organized into what is termed an “integrated air defense system” or an IADS.
And now, we are about to explain what is an IADS?
An IADS is the “structure, equipment, personnel, procedures, and weapons used to counter the
enemy’s airborne penetration of one’s own claimed territory,” according to one
Air Force intelligence expert. Rather than a single weapon or person, it is an amalgamation
of elements, organized to minimize threats in the air domain. Thus, an effective IADS
performs three functions air surveillance, battle management, and weapons control. Of
these, air surveillance alone includes five specific sub-functions: detect, initiate,
identify, correlate, and maintain. Air surveillance is often described as the “eyes” of an
air defense system. A radar will “detect” an aircraft entering an IADS’s area of coverage,
while the “initiate” function transforms radar returns into “tracks.” The “identify”
function examines the track and categorizes it as friend, foe, or unknown.
These three phases occur relatively independently, which necessitates a “correlate” function.
For example, if a system sees three tracks in close proximity, a sensor operator has
the option to consider the tracks a single entity or three different aircraft. Correlation
is important as it can have a significant impact on weapon resourcing. Finally, the
“maintain” function allows for specific tracks to be continuously monitored. In modern
systems, much of this can be automated, resulting in less “man in the loop” processing and
more “man on the loop” paradigms. After surveillance, the battle management aspect
of an IADS includes four functions: Threat evaluation, engagement decision, weapon selection,
and engagement authority. The term “air defense” provides the functional
characteristic of an IADS from a target development perspective, and aids in understanding what
a specific system does, how it functions within a greater target system, and its significance.
It is obvious that systems like the S-400 or the Pantsir are designed for air defense.
But other systems, such as the Su-35 or the MiG-35 Fulcrum fighters, may also provide
air defense, just as the US Air Force F-15C Eagle performs the defensive counter-air (DCA)
mission. At the last point, we will talk about the
Integration and Air Defense Integration marries a variety of systems into
an efficient defensive enterprise, and allows for the three functions of an IADS to occur
simultaneously and repeatedly. In effect, it takes the linear IADS kill chain and allows
parallel kill chains to occur concurrently within the broader system. Outdated approaches
to defeat IADS are reminiscent of the childhood “telephone game” where one breaks a link
in the chain and the whole system fails. Modern IADS, though, are more resilient and operate
much like social media platforms: Removing one user or component does not stop a Facebook
post from spreading. The use of multiple attacks to deny, delay, and degrade the “message”
must occur in an IADS, since it is improbable that anyone attack can permanently break every
critical link. Modern integration allows the concept of “skip
echelon” to occur with regularity, where communications skip an intermediate step of
an organization. If a mid-level battle management node is destroyed or isolated from the rest
of an IADS in a combat action, an individual air defense unit can reach out directly to
a division or leadership headquarters. This represents a significant change from the Iraqi
IADS of Operation Desert Storm, the Serbian IADS of Operation Allied Force, or even the
Libyan IADS of Operation Odyssey Dawn. Most of these IADS, built with 1980s or even
1970s technology, featured limited communications means and static assignment of air defense
roles. Today’s modern IADS can be integrated via the networks and tools listed above, allowing
for more seamless data sharing, limited only by commanders’ decisions to delegate roles,
responsibilities, and decision-making. The paradigm of “IADS rollback” in modern
air operations, as a result, is woefully outdated if not adapted to a multi-domain, multi-effect
approach. A modern IADS can now easily mitigate the destruction or isolation of singular nodes
potentially faster than the complex problem-solving approach to current rollback strategies.
In conclusion, The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies Russia and China as “revisionist
powers” that aim to challenge US military advantage in every domain. Modern IADS, as
had described, enable these nations to challenge the US military and create environments where
they can potentially project their own forces to degrade and eliminate American advantage.
It is therefore imperative that intelligence analysts and planners understand and adopt
a thorough understanding of modern, complex IADS in order to properly communicate about
these threats to decision-makers at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, in support
of campaign goals. Thanks for watching and see you in the next
episode.