The Imperial Japanese Army of the Second World War had
one enemy more cunning than all others, an opponent they had been fighting for a decade
before the war even started — the Imperial Japanese Navy. It was
one of the worst cases of inter-service rivalry the modern world has ever seen.
The Imperial Japanese Army, IJA, and the Imperial Japanese Navy,
IJN, despised each other to the point that it heavily compromised their war effort.
But how did things get that bad? As always, the roots of the problem run deep through history.
Japan rose meteorically from a reclusive feudal society to become the democratically-governed
Asia-Pacific hegemon in the decades preceding the Second World War.
Their crushing victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war had left the IJN as the
major naval power in the Pacific. The IJA had also tested their mettle during the Great War
and fought against the Bolsheviks as part of an international coalition during the Russian Civil
War. Both services realised they had the power to massively increase Japan’s international reach.
The thing is, Japan was a new industrial society.
A small island nation, they didn’t have seemingly limitless space for expansion like the Americans,
nor dominions rich in resources like the British and French. The Japanese economic
pie wasn’t very big, and the Army and Navy were continually fighting for a bigger slice
In pretty much any other circumstance everywhere else, if the Army and Navy
can’t sort out the military budget, the civilian government steps in and sorts it out for them.
But this couldn’t happen in Japan because the civilian government had problems of their own.
The economy was dominated by Zaibatsus — effectively mini national economies.
These were family-run business conglomerates that operated their own central banks,
factories, supply chains, and everything else. Japan had four major Zaibatsus that together
dominated Japan’s civilian and military production. Two of these Zaibatsus were
allied with the Army and two with the Navy, and they were viciously opposed.
As they wielded massive economic power, the Army and Navy both managed to purchase
seats at the political table. Each service was represented by a minister in the Japanese cabinet,
and these ministers had veto power over new legislation.
Appointed by their respective services, these ministers couldn’t be removed and
only answered to the Emperor himself. This meant they had effective control over Japanese policy.
The only thing that could save this gigantic
mess was the alignment of the IJA and IJN’s strategic goals. This should have been easy,
as both sides needed to secure access to natural resources and a captive market for Japanese goods.
The problem was that both services were looking in different directions.
The Navy favoured the “southward drive” — a strategy that involved taking over
the European colonies in Asia for their resources, especially Java. In this instance,
they forecasted their main enemy would be the United States. The Army, on the other hand, was
focused on exploiting turmoil in China and Russia to invade Manchuria and Siberia to the west. They
weren’t concerned with the Americans, as their primary enemies were the Chinese and Soviets.
Right as the Army and Navy were arguing over literally everything, the Great Depression
hit and turned what was already a huge mess into a fustercluck of legendary proportions.
The conservative military ministers had forced the democratically-elected government into supporting
only right-wing policy. Economic hardship also popularised ultra-nationalism,
and the country careened towards a crisis point.
In 1930, the London Naval Treaty was ratified by Japan,
limiting the number of battleships they could have. The IJN was furious and,
in November, a Navy-aligned ultra-nationalist shot the Prime Minister in retribution.
The Army struck back with two attempted coups, both in 1931. They planned to
incite riots and then seize power once martial law was declared. Both plans were discovered
by the secret police, but the ringleaders weren’t punished. In light of these failures,
the Army had to secure its position. To do this, they fabricated a terror attack in Manchuria and
invaded without permission from the Government. They ran the region as a military colony.
The navy was being outplayed, so on May 15 1932, 11 young naval officers assassinated the Prime
Minister again and attacked the residences of other important Army-leaning politicians.
They weren’t punished either.
After several minor events, a faction in the Army launched yet another coup in February 1936.
This one had the backing of three full regiments, and yet again, they tried to shoot the prime
minister, which probably qualifies as one of the most dangerous jobs in the world.
They didn’t get him, but they did kill another two previous prime ministers,
bringing the total of dead prime ministers to four. When word reached the Navy,
they went to battle stations and threatened to blow the Army to pieces from the harbour.
As shells were being loaded, the Emperor personally stepped in to diffuse the situation.
The Army’s failed coups and invasion of Manchuria opened the door for the Navy to take over,
and Japan was effectively run by admirals.
By 1936, civilian democracy had completely given way to the military.
While the Army had been at war with the Chinese and Soviets since the early 30s,
the war began for the Navy in 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbour. The petty interservice rivalry
was still going strong, but they knew they had to work together to fight the REAL enemy,
even if they still couldn’t agree who that was. To keep things simple, the Army controlled everything
that happened on land and the Navy everything at sea. Both services also had their own air forces,
paratroop regiments, and support staff. If an Army plane landed on a Navy base,
they wouldn’t be repaired or refuelled by the Navy ground crews. Likewise, if Army intelligence
knew about an enemy naval attack, telling the Navy about it would be pretty low-priority.
The best example of this dysfunction in Japan was their abysmal record of intercepting bombers.
The Army argued that US bombers flew over the ocean — making it a Navy problem. The Navy
argued that they bombed ground targets — making it an Army problem. While their superiors argued,
fighter commanders refused to share intelligence and therefore found it impossible to field large
numbers of planes against enemy bombers — which, as the Germans found, was essential for defence.
Only 74 US bombers were lost to fighters over Japan, while thousands were lost over Germany.
Seeing as they couldn’t agree on strategies, both services just did what they wanted.
The Navy pushed southwards, taking over European colonies in the Pacific,
and the Army pushed westwards, fighting the Chinese and Soviets.
Cooperation was rare and only seemed to happen when things were going exceptionally well.
Things weren’t going well for the Japanese in 1943, during the Guadalcanal campaign,
and cracks in Army-Navy cooperation began to show. 36,000 Army troops were fighting on the island and
depended on resupply by sea. This was done in the most inefficient way possible. So much Army
equipment was piled on Navy destroyers that the ships couldn’t properly defend themselves. If they
were attacked, the sailors pushed the supplies off the decks into the sea so they could bring their
guns to bear. When they reached the Army bases, they pushed supplies, packed in steel drums,
overboard without stopping, making the soldiers swim out to pick them up. Three-quarters of the
critical rations and ammo would always be lost, but who cares? It was only Army stuff.
US ships were inflicting heavy losses on the IJN during these Guadalcanal supply runs.
Consequently, the admirals withdrew to preserve their force — without telling the Army — and
effectively abandoned them. Orders eventually came from the top demanding the Army be evacuated,
but not before they lost over 25,000 soldiers to starvation.
It wasn’t just the Army who suffered due to this dysfunctional relationship;
the Navy did too. Cemented during the Battle of the Coral Sea,
winning the Pacific naval war was all about airpower. The Japanese had a lot of high-quality
planes, but they were split between the Army and Navy air forces. As they were at the forefront,
the Navy took the brunt of plane losses. What happened when the Navy could no longer launch
sufficient planes to defend themselves? The Army said, “That’s your problem, mate.”
The best example of this backwards logic was the sinking of the battleship Yamato — one
of the most powerful battleships ever built. Having lost command of the air in early 1945,
the Navy kept the ship in port. When the island of Okinawa was threatened by Allied invasion,
the Army petitioned the Emperor to make the Navy do something.
They called the ship “nothing but a hotel for admirals” and the Navy "inept." To save face,
or maybe just to prove a point, the Navy sent Yamato and a surface force on a suicide mission.
The mighty ship was crippled and sunk by air attacks, which I suppose proved the Navy right.
With all this infighting going on behind the scenes, it’s honestly incredible Imperial
Japan managed to fight for as long as it did. When they surrendered, the Army and Navy argued about
who lost Japan the war, but they were probably happy in the end, seeing as neither service won.
That was the insane story of the rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.
But what do YOU think? Does this explain why the Japanese Army in the Pacific was
so often poorly supplied? What do YOU think would have happened if one faction
controlled the government? Do YOU think that if the Emperor hadn’t stepped in,
the Army and Navy would’ve had an all-out battle? Let us know in the comments!