Just days after simultaneous defeats of the Dakota at Fort Ridgely and New Ulm,
Colonel Sibley and Governor Ramsey began to draft a counteroffensive. In the last week,
Sibley had taken command of about 1,200 men: Elements of the Sixth,
Third, and Seventh Minnesota Infantry Regiments as well as mounted militia.
Initially these men arrived in poor condition. Most without uniforms or ammunition that fit their
arms. However, he recently acquired a large number of new Springfield rifles from eastern arsenals.
For those reasons, his army had been inactive in the first weeks of the war. His decision to wait
was met with insurmountable criticism from the rest of the state. In order to hasten the process,
Governor Ramsey pressed the Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, into providing ammunition, weapons,
and Federal aid from other states to Minnesota. The Federal government acknowledged the frontier
war, but found themselves more engrossed in the current campaign of the Civil War. Few in
Washington understood the true severity of the crisis.
However, Governor Ramsey did manage to obtain permission from President Lincoln to temporarily
halt Minnesota’s draft of recruits for the war. In the meantime, he would also pass state laws
requiring the population to give up desperately needed horses and wagons. Fortunately for Sibley,
the Lower Sioux were also delayed from further action as well. After his repulse from New Ulm
and Fort Ridgely, Little Crow believed that in order to throw the whites out of Minnesota,
he would need to unify the rest of the Dakota subdivisions. Although he had some others such
as the Wahpekute in his ranks, almost all of his men were his own Mdewakanton and Kaposia.
In the days after his twin defeats, he sought a council of war with the Wahpeton and Sisseton
who had for the most part been only observing the ongoing war. In a meeting that is said to
have had 1,000 Sioux attend, very little would come out of it. Many in the upper Sioux tribes
had relatives that were among the hundreds he held captive. Little Crow protected them,
but he refused to release them in the event he would need to sue for peace in exchange.
Worse yet, Little Crow’s scouts further east returned with reports of Sibley
continuing to gather force as more troops arrived at Fort Ridgely. To Little Crow,
he now had only two options left: begin another offensive with his battered,
yet still high-spirited troops or try to negotiate peace with Colonel Sibley. But the attitude of
Minnesota’s population toward the Indians as a whole would make such a peace impossible.
As streams of refugees reached the eastern settlements,
cries for revenge and even outright genocide of all Sioux echoed throughout the state. The
St. Paul Journal published an article on August 28th, in which it stated:
“The utmost energy and determination is indicated by those in authority to suppress the revolt.
There will be no prisoners taken in this war!” Another newspaper, the St. Paul Press did not
sugarcoat its messaging: “We must do one of two things, either kill every Sioux Indian
within our borders, or drive them out of the state. Let it be a war of extermination.”
Little Crow advocated an attack around an area known as “The Big Woods”,
where he knew much grain was to be found. And if the settlements there were overrun,
it could lead to the turning of Sibley’s northern flank.
The other Sioux Sachem, notably Big Eagle and Mankato, instead wished to again advance on the
Minnesota river and crush Sibley’s still gathering army. Neither side could come to an agreement,
and both would part ways to their own desired objectives on the days of the 28th-29th of August.
Yet when both bands neared their destinations, they found that the
Minnesotans had been taking the initiative. In the north, Hutchinson, Forest City, St. Cloud,
Glencoe, and other settlements had built strong fortifications and raised their own
militia. This “army” of volunteers fell under command of Militia General John H. Stevens.
In the south, New Ulm had been reoccupied by the state militia under Captain Charles Flandrau,
now overseeing the defense of Minnesota’s southern front
Meanwhile, Sibley’s mounted men reconnoitered the Yellow Medicine area in hopes of locating
the braves. Two of his most experienced scouts had found Big Eagle and Mankato’s men encamped along
the Birch Coulee. He then dispatched the Cullen Frontier Guards as well as Company A of the Sixth
Minnesota. This small detachment would be led by the State Militia Captain Joseph R. Brown.
Little did they know they were observed by scouts of Mankato and Big Eagle,
who would agree that Brown’s men would make for an easy target.
On the 31st, Brown’s advanced troops departed from Fort Ridgely to the Redwood Ferry area.
The next afternoon, the Cullen Guards crossed the Minnesota river southward and found Little Crow’s
abandoned village; which had been abandoned long before the Minnesotans found it; no
Indians were found that day and the soldiers, thinking the Dakota had abandoned the area,
pitched their tents. In truth, Mankato and Big Eagle’s band of 350 warriors were close by.
At 4:30 AM on September 2nd, the horses in the camp became noticeably restless.
One private then spotted what he thought to be Indians approaching on all sides.
As he fired a shot to warn the rest of the camp, a sporadic volley was fired in return.
In just a few minutes, thirty men were struck as they sprung from their tents.
The first hour of fighting would bring the heaviest loss of life.
After 33 hours of desperate fighting, the struggle ended on September 3rd at 11:00
AM when the rest of the Sixth Minnesota and Sibley himself finally relieved the defenders.
The Battle of Birch-Coulee would prove an American defeat despite the withdrawal of the warriors.
Sibley had lost 47 men severely wounded. 13 were killed, as well as 90 horses:
depriving Sibley of his only mounted force - a loss he could not afford to replace when facing
such an enemy. The Indians lost only a small, unconfirmed number of men. The loss had taught
Sibley how his enemy fought, and he would learn from them. While Big Eagle and Mankato had been
diverted from attacking further downriver, Sibley placed his forces on the defensive once again.
Whilst the Dakota had nearly inflicted a disaster on the U.S troops on the Birch-Coulee,
Little Crow had been compelled to retreat from the northern settlements.
It was rapidly becoming clear that the Dakota may be unable to achieve any meaningful victory. His
defeat would be enough to force Little Crow to send two letters to Colonel Sibley himself. In
which, he would plead for negotiation and an honorable peace, agreeing to hand over the
hundreds of captives held in his camp. “You have not done as I wished in giving up to me
the prisoners” replied Sibley, in reference to an earlier request for their safe return.
Although Sibley’s situation had been frustrating for the first few weeks of the war, he was finally
receiving aid from Washington. More Springfield rifles as well as 50,000 rounds of ammunition.
On September 6th, Major General John Pope had been sent to assume overall command of American
forces against the Dakota. Although Pope had been bested at Second Bull Run by the Southern rebels,
he would be one of few outsiders to grasp the severity of the war in Minnesota. He would attempt
many times to divert federal troops to the state’s frontier, but most of these were unsuccessful.
As for Little Crow, two options remained: desperately attempt to
unify the Wahpeton and Sisseton to his side, or engage the Americans in a decisive battle
on the ground of his choosing. He first tempted the solidarity of the Sioux.
Little Crow would argue that the Americans, if victorious, would bring retribution among
all Indians in Minnesota, and not just his own faction. Despite his warnings,
the Sioux of Minnesota would never fully unify against the American government.
Needless to say, Little Crow was quick to give up on diplomacy. His last hope of victory would rest
upon a decisive battle in which Sibley’s army was destroyed. Little Crow planned all of this
without the knowledge that Sibley’s small army had climbed to 1,500 men, now outnumbering his own.
Sibley’s patience had finally paid off, and his army would move under
authorization from General Pope to locate and destroy the hostile bands of the Dakota.
On September 22nd, Sibley’s army made camp east of Lone Tree Lake. Unknowingly in the
direct path of the now advancing elements of Big Eagle. The next morning, the troops were awoken
at 4:00 AM to prepare their march. While most of the men were eating breakfast three hours later,
some of the unruly and demoralized men of the Third Minnesota left camp foraging for potatoes.
Nothing seemed out of the ordinary until they had crossed the creek’s bridge onto
the prairie. Here, one of the men’s dogs began barking frantically. Only now did
the Minnesotans discover the Indians hiding directly in front of them.
With no choice, the Dakota men sprung up from the prairie grass and fired a ragged volley,
wounding several soldiers and halting the wagons. But instead of running from the face of an ambush,
a single private, and then more men responded by returning fire. Later in his life,
Big Eagle recounted this event: “This brought on the fight, of course, but not according
to the way we had planned it. Little Crow saw it and felt very badly.” Back at camp,
the gunfire could be clearly heard and Sibley sprang into action. The rest of the Third
Minnesota then raced to save their comrades who were holding, but becoming quickly outnumbered.
They would reach the survivors just in time,
and put their skirmishing drill to good test against Big Eagle’s men.
As the firing progressed, Little Crow brought forward his own band, giving a loud war-whoop
as more unseen braves followed. “The whole prairie seemed to be alive with them.” Wrote one soldier.
This compelled the 3rd Minnesota to retreat, but they did so in good order.
The men of the regiment were more than eager to avenge their surrender at Murfreesboro.
Reinforcements sent by Sibley finally finished the mile-long march to their
aid. The first of these coming from the Renville Rangers. The Dakota chiefs also
received the last of their men with the arrival of Mankato, bringing their numbers to about 300.
In the face of the growing number of Indians, the 3rd Minnesota made a sudden charge against
the Dakota, driving a portion of them back in disarray. “Remember Murfreesboro! Fight,
boys! Remember Murfreesboro!” Roared the Sergeant J.M Bowler.
With the momentum of their own charge stalled, Little Crow sent a detachment of braves to attack
Sibley’s right flank. In response, the Sixth and Seventh Minnesota were rushed forward.
Company F of the Sixth was then deployed on the far left.
The now outnumbered Dakota attempted to bring the rest of their army into the battle, but out of a
counted 728 men, only 300 or so would actually become engaged. To Little Crow’s frustration,
the rest refused to go in. Sibley’s heavy artillery then unlimbered and began firing.
One cannonball had directly struck and killed the chief Mankato, demoralizing his warriors.
The chieftains recognized they had been beaten, and with a final charge from the American line,
the devastated Dakota warriors beat a hasty rout to friendly ground.
In the battle’s aftermath, Sibley’s men suffered seven killed and anywhere between 34-50 wounded.
The Dakota’s losses are said to be anywhere around 14-30 killed with an unknown, but supposedly high
number of wounded. The most deciding factor does not lay within casualties, however. The
morale of the Dakota sank to its lowest level since the winter of 1861, and the warrior band
withdrew to the plains where they would receive a demand of surrender from Sibley. The war-weary
Little Crow knew what fate had in store for him and to avoid capture he fled the state entirely.
The rest of the lower Sioux agreed to release the white and mixed-blood captives in exchange
for peace. In accordance, Sibley’s army marched to the area now known as “Camp Release” on the
26th of September. Here, the 269 captives were given back to the Americans in succession.
"With joyous handshaking we met, and the white prisoners were taken into the soldiers' camp."
Recounted a relieved Gabriel Renville. The 1,658 non-combatants would be marched to Fort Snelling
where they would be held in what was effectively an internment camp. The 498 other Dakota men
suspected of pillaging, rape, and murder of white settlers were instead sent to the city of Mankato,
persuaded by a promise to only punish those involved in the killing from Sibely.
From the end of September to November, a trial for each man was conducted. 393 of the 498 were
convicted and sentenced to death. It is important to say that most of these sentences were carried
out on little evidence or none at all, with little more than crude assumptions to justify them.
President Lincoln took notice and on further investigation he effectively reduced the
death sentences to a more realistic 38. The unpopular pardoning led to a loss of votes
for the Republicans, and when pressed by Governor Ramsay on the issue, the President simply replied,
"I could not afford to hang men for votes.” On December 26th, the 38 were hanged in Mankato;
much to the delight of the viewing crowd. Two more Dakota would be hanged in 1865.
It was discovered a year later that Sibley had actually failed
to conduct the trials according to Article 65 of the U.S Article of War.
Further investigation revealed that most of the trials had lasted no longer than 5 minutes.
None of the proceedings were explained to the defendants, nor were the Dakota represented by
any Attorneys. Carol Chomsky wrote in The Stanford Law Review: “The Dakota were tried, not in a
state or federal criminal court, but before a military commission composed completely of
Minnesota settlers. They were convicted, not for the crime of murder, but for killings committed
in warfare. The official review was conducted, not by an appellate court, but by the President
of the United States. Many wars took place between Americans and members of the Indian nations, but
in no others did the United States apply criminal sanctions to punish those defeated in war.”
The remaining Dakota were marched to St. Paul in a four-mile long column
under military guard. Despite newspapers urging white citizens to leave them alone,
they still came under attack by angry settlers along the way, with some being killed.
After a grueling 150 mile march, the survivors were kept in Fort Snelling where they remained
until Spring. It would be more accurate to refer to this “Fort” as an internment camp. In appalling
conditions, between 102-300 men, women and children died from disease or starvation.
In April of 1863, all of the state’s reservations were abolished and all Dakota except for 208 were
expelled from the state. The government posted a bounty of $25 for the scalp of any remaining
Dakota male. One month later, those in Fort Snelling were finally moved west to
Crow Creek in the Dakota territory. Along the grueling march, 200 more would collapse dead.
With their expulsion, the Dakota Uprising was over, but as manifest destiny reached new heights,
the United States would continue their pursuit westward well into the 1890s.
During the six weeks of the War, 106 American soldiers and between 500-800 civilians had lost
their lives and many more would suffer from permanent wounds. During the war’s height,
over 30,000 refugees fled. Tens of thousands of which would never return.
The Dakota lost 150 in combat-related deaths, 38 from hangings, and 302-502 non-combatants in the
aftermath. The upper Sioux were not safe either. Over 7,000 would never return from expulsion,
regardless if they had remained neutral or helped white settlers escape certain death.
After the American Civil War finally ended in 1865, the state began to heal from its wounds.
By 1870, the desolate Minnesota valley once again flourished. A decade later,
some of the lower Sioux would even return to the state, but they would never again prosper as they
had before. It would not be until 2021 that the Minnesota government transferred ownership
of half of the Lower Sioux Agency back to the tribes. But for decades, the war remained very
much in the minds of its survivors. The Dakota War of 1862 remains not just the darkest moment
in the history of Minnesota, but the “most violent ethnic conflict in American History.”