- [Narrator] In response to the Watergate scandal,
Congress enacted several amendments to
the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974.
First, the amended act capped contributions
to Federal candidates for elected office at 1000 dollars.
Second, it limited personal spending in support
of candidates, also known as independent expenditures,
to 1000 dollars per candidate per election.
Lastly, the act established the Federal Election Commission
to administer and enforce these provisions and set forth
a process for appointing its voting members.
Under the process, the President pro tempore of the Senate,
the speaker of the house,
and the President will each select two members.
These members would then be confirmed
by both houses of Congress.
Several political parties and candidates filed
a lawsuit challenging the acts constitutionality.
They argued that political contributions
and expenditures were forms of political speech.
And therefore the limits and the act
abridged First Amendment freedoms.
The District Court upheld the legislation
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court granted cert.
There were two issues presented.
First, whether the contribution and expenditure limits
in the act unconstitutionally burden
the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association.
And second, whether the appointment process for
the Federal Election Commission violated
the Appointments Clause of article two, section two.
In a per curiam decision,
the court held that political contributions limits
don't violate the First Amendment,
but independent expenditure limits are unconstitutional.
The court further held that the appointment process
that allowed members of Congress to make appointments
to the Federal Election Commission violated
the appointments clause.
To determent whether the limits on contributions
and independent expenditures were unconstitutional,
the court considered whether the limits restricted
First Amendment freedoms of expression or association.
Next, the court asked whether the abridgment
of those freedoms could be justified by
an important governmental interest
and narrowly tailored means.
With regards to the contribution limits,
the court acknowledged that contributions
are a form of political expression.
They express support for a candidate
and demonstrate affiliation with political party platforms.
Nevertheless, the court recognized
that preventing corruption or even the appearance
of corruption was a sufficiently important
governmental interest to justify the restriction.
Due to the enormous cost of running for political office,
candidates depend on outside contributions.
This dependency creates an increased risk of donors giving
large contributions in exchange for future political favors.
A so-called quid pro quo.
Further, the court found that the acts contribution limits
were narrowly tailored to the governments interest
in preventing corruption because the act
still permitted individuals to express
their political support in other ways, like volunteering.
However, the cap on independent expenditures
was a different story.
The court explained that expenditure limits,
in contrast to individual contribution limits placed
significant restraints on the freedom of expression.
The court reasoned that in modern society,
virtually all methods of communication require money.
In addition, the court found that the governmental interest
in preventing corruption failed to justify
the expenditure limits.
The act banned only those expenditures that expressly
advocated for the election or defeat of a candidate.
These limits could easily be circumvented by dancing around
express advocacy for or against a specific candidate.
The court also rejected the other asserted
governmental interest equalizing the power
of political voices because the government doesn't
have a legitimate interest in suppressing the speech
of some to amplify the speech of others.
Finally, the court decided that the appointments
procedure violated the Appointments Clause.
The act provided that the members
of the Federal Election Commission would
be appointed in part by Congress.
However, the Appointments Clause states
that only the President, not Congress,
can appoint officers of the United States.
The Commission members counted
as officers of the United States because
they were given enforcement authority
which is a function of the executive branch.
Because the act didn't comply with the Appointments Clause,
the court held that FEC members could
only exercise traditionally legislative powers.
At least until the act was amended.
Buckley versus Valeo laid the groundwork
for equating money with speech.
In so doing, the decision has a fundamental impact
on campaign finance laws.
On First Amendment grounds, the court restricted
the government's ability to limit the amount
of money spent in national elections.
Political action committees,
which are groups formed specifically to raise
and spend funds in elections flourished as a result.
(scratchy pencil writing)