Crew members are airlifted to safety from the foundering 40 million dollar
SuperYacht Yogi shortly after, the vessel plunged to the bottom of the Aegean Sea.
But why did this technologically advanced super yacht sink?
In Part 1 we looked at the events based on the captain's recollections told to
the CEO of the shipbuilder Proteksan Turquoise.
Shortly after his rescue. In Part 2 we will look at the official report, the
response from the shipyard and the questions that remain.
Yogi was one of three sister ships built at Proteksan Turquoise.
However she differed from the other two in that she had been extended by six
meters and the sundeck had been covered with a hardtop. The changes made to the
super structures in comparison to her sister ships had led to a raise in the
centre of gravity. Because of the extra weight on the sundeck she required an
extra 27 metric tons of ballast to be welded to the keel during the build
process to resolve the raised centre of gravity. The yacht's design initially had
the beach club in the aft section of the vessel as one compartment, i.e. no water
tightness between the two compartments. However upon inspection this arrangement
was not compliant and the design needed to be changed and a watertight door
added to create Beach Club 1and Beach Club 2. Upon second inspection the damage
stability analysis said that when these two compartments were flooded this door
would have to remain closed whilst the vessel was on the way.
As explained in part 1 the engine exhausts were wet exhausts meaning the main
exhaust outlets of each engine was underwater however there was no exhaust
temperature alarm downstream of the seawater injection device. This oversight
would emerge during the journey from Istanbul to Cannes.
There was no voyage data recorder or VDR fitted to this vessel. A voyage data recorder is a
seagoing vessel's black box. It records data from the radar, helm data including
all inputs, wind speeds, speed over ground etc. Unlike an aircraft it can record
hours of data as much as 12 hours or more
it also has a capsule with a hydrostatic release unit and a buoyant device that
floats to the surface in the event of a sinking. Unfortunately this vessel did
not require what to be fitted. in June 2011 just two months after delivery yogi
had the technical recall in Genoa, Italy. This was in order to sort out the
problem of the air-conditioning system and to repair the damage caused by a
leak of refrigerant on the trim and on the carpet. During the work period some
technical and aesthetic deficiencies on the stern door had been carried out and
removal and replacements of a door seal which had been deemed poorly bonded but
tight with a silicon seal with a more appropriate colour. In addition on demand
of the captain a 200-litre two compartment tank with submersible pumps
was installed aft of the steering gear in compartment three to collect dripping
water from the Beach Clubs. The installation required the modification
of the draining circuit, however these important modifications although they
effected an installation located under the freeboard deck were not reflected in
the ship's as built drawings. And the French authorities were never informed
of the changes. Freeboard in the simplest terms is the distance
from the waterline to the top of a vessels hull. Changes to a vessel made
below the freeboard deck effectively means below the waterline. Work carried
out during this technical recall although carried out in Italy had been
carried out by a team from the Proteksan Turquoise shipyard helped by local
Italian subcontractors and covered by the warranty.
In October 2011 Yogi went back to the factory for further warranty work and
from October 2011 until February 2012 yogi was in Tuzla for the following work:
Re-coat (or paint) the vessel most likely due to unsatisfactory initial finish, also
the transom or stern door was removed in order to refit the swim ladders chests
and it was necessary to punch the two hinges. The electric connections, the
hydraulics spools and the fastenings had to be replaced.
Operations have been monitored by an expert, a naval architect and tightness
tests had been carried out upon completion.
Although the lower part of the stern door had not been tested. Crew. There were
eight crew on board. A Master, Chief Officer, a Second Officer, TWO Chief
Engineers a Master Mechanic, a Rating holder for bridge watch and one
stewardess. The Captain was 51 years old he joined yogi in July 2011. Chief
Engineer 1 was the joining chief. He was 50 years old he joined yogi on the
30th of January 2012 he was relieving the existing Chief Engineer, Chief
Engineer 2, the outgoing Chief Engineer was 35 years old he had been on the
build of Yogi from October 2010 and this was his final trip and he would be paid
off upon arrival in France. The following sequence of events differs from the
first video in that it was drawn up by the flag state from interviews with the
crew members and of the DPA the Designated Person Ashore as the crew
failed to save any records or the alarm report or written log from the vessel.
The French Flag State full title on screen is throughout the rest of this
video known as BEAmer
At 1830 out of the Dardanelles straits they dropped off the pilot, the
vessel was operating normally. The CEO of Proteksan Turquoise said
afterwards that the AIS was not functioning at this point. Automatic
Identity Systems broadcast the vessel's position on VHF and via satellite and is
a requirement for this vessel. Why was it not working? BEAmer offered no
explanation. After having a southwesterly route the vessel was heading at 185
degrees; speed was said to be 14 knots. On the 17th of February firstly 0140hrs
chief engineer on watch observed that the starboard engine exhausts expansion
ring was split and linking. due to overheating. Note at no point had there been a high
temperature alarm. He tried to call the captain who was on watch at the time on
the bridge but the phone in the engine control room was out of order he then
tried the emergency Inter-Phone system but this was defective as well. They had
just left a four month refit at the shipyard how could both of these devices
be out of order? Why did he not use a handheld UHF or VHF radio? The report
indeed stated that the Chief Engineer did not have with him a handheld radio
even though there were 14 of them on board; this is standard operating
procedure for all deck and engine crew on board a vessel whilst the watch. So
at a critical time when the engineer had to tell the captain to shut down an
engine he had no direct means of communication
with the bridge. Why did the chief engineer not go into the engine room and
stop the engine himself in an emergency he could have done this locally. This is a
photo of the actual engine room on Motor Yacht Yogi, you can see here local
controls for starting and stopping the engines. Instead the chief engineer opted
to leave the engine room and go up to the bridge to tell the captain to stop
the starboard engine. Soon after the other engine on the port
side experienced similar issues. The exhaust and coolant temperature were
also abnormally high. In the Captain's recollections to the yacht builders after the
incident he had said the pause engine was overheating and he'd shut it down
himself however in the BEAmer report he had said
the Chief Engineer asked the Captain to slow down but at the same instant the
engine automatically shut itself down. Yogi was now dead in the water. Now
according to the Beamer report she was rolling and listing to Port. The report
never said what the Captain was doing on the bridge to try to control the vessel
whilst the engines were offline. All three engineers on board investigated
the engine issues. They found the water cooling for the exhaust was insufficient
therefore overheating was occurring. Approximately 0230hrs the Port
engine was restarted and the temperatures were back to normal.
Relief Chief Engineer went to the bridge to inform the captain. When the captain
engaged the engine (clutched in) he observed there was no answer from the
helm, the autopilot was offline and the two steering motors would not start. The steering
motors control the rudders. The rudders were stuck at a 30-degree angle
to starboard. Investigation of the emergency steering room by the engineer
found it was partially flooded with 30 to 40 centimeters of water.
The captain's recollection to the shipbuilder was that one of the interior
watertight beach-club doors blew open and lots of water entered but there was
no mention of this in the BEAmer report. So how did that area become flooded in the
first place? Remember the stern and transom door had been removed under
warranty work prior to the trip. The report stated there had been no
alarms to indicate flooding in these areas. Why? Why were the auxiliary pumps
not able to pump out this water? Were they activated? The vessel had power
right up to the crew being airlifted from the vessel 0428 hours a
Mayday call was made by the captain as they could not steer the vessel and
they could not stop the flooding they were ready to abandon. The crew found refuge
in the super structure of the vessel. At 0745 hours a rescue helicopter was
dispatched by Greek Search and Rescue.
The Coast Guard Reported seas between 34 and 40 knots and winds to 5.5 to 7.5 metres.
By 0830 hours all crew had been rescued. At 1104 hours
the EPIRB beacon ceased to transmit, this was the final position transmitted.
Yogi sank in 500 meters of the Aegean Sea.
The shipyard that built Yogi, Proteksan Turquoise took the brunt of the blame shortly
afterwards before any report or investigation had been carried out.
Rumour and Industry witch-hunting caused the shipyard to suffer financially. The
shipyard was co-founded by President: Memet Karabeyoghu and CEO Hayati Kamhi.
"our yard worked to complete Yogi project for three years."
Karabeyoghu said in an interview shortly afterwards. "Imagine the man-hours,"
"that I've gone into such a thing and then to see all just disappear ...like that?"
"it's a truly sad story" Kamhi said "I mean I couldn't believe it"
"the boat had just left the shipyard in perfect condition a few days before.
"I was stunned!" After the crew had returned to France the owners of the shipyard
requested a formal interview with the Captain and Chief Engineer "But my calls
were never returned." Kamhi said. Three weeks later at the offices of the insurer in
Paris the CEO Kamhi did meet the crew when he, his lawyer and others representing the
shipyard arrived after an invitation they were surprised however that in
addition to the crew members groups of lawyers were in the room. Some
representing the crew, others represented the insurer, and even more representing the
the owner. Moreover cam said he was told that in
order to ask questions of the crew members present he'd have to sign an
agreement stipulating that everything said would be held in strictest
confidence. It took French authorities over a year
to release the report into the sinking of superYacht Yogi. Before the release they
sent a draft copy of the report to the shipyard in order to give them a chance
to respond. In this report the speed indicated was 16.7 knots
at 60% load. The ship had responded that 16.7 knots
was possible but would have been at 100% load. In the final report from the French
authorities the speed has changed to 14 knots.
However the shipyard said if you take the time the pilot was disembarked at
the time they reached their final position you can work out the speed was
indeed 16.4 knots. So was the vessel traveling at full speed in that
weather? This might explain why both engines overheated. The final report left
many unanswered questions. No mention was made of fatigue. Fatigue could have
played a part in the series of events has the crew worked all day at the
shipyard to get that vessel ready to sail. They then sailed to Istanbul and
proceeded to bunker and as soon as they finished bunkering they set sail for Cannes.
They must have contravened Hours of Rest laws! The BEAmer report made no mention
of this. How is it that the crew escaped with their passports and important
marine certificates yet they couldn't manage to retrieve the logbooks from the
vessel? The Beamer report also never gave a verdict on how the vessel flooded in
the first place only giving a number of hypotheses on the water leak origins. The
most likely being the flooding of the beach club was due to a stern door water
tightness failure. Many people in the comments of the first video concluded
insurance fraud and there seems to be many reasons to think so however would
the crew deliberately fatally disable their vessel in rough weather not
knowing if their actions would allow them to escape with their lives? Many
aircrafts and marine accident investigations conclude that is not one
but the series of mistakes that lead to catastrophe.
The CEO of Proteksan Turquoise: Hayati Kamhi never got to read the BEAmer report. As
in June 2012 paramedics were called to his house by his family.
They found a fatally injured Kamhi who had a gunshot wound to his head.
The coroner reported it as suicide. And what of the crew? Did any of them lose
their licenses after this disaster? No. The crew's actions were exonerated by
BEAmer and within a year they were all back at sea on different vessels.
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