When a 911 call alerts emergency services to a fire in Charleston,
it ends up as deadliest firefighting disaster since 9/11.
It’s Monday, June 18 2007, and an emergency call requests services to a fire in Charleston.
Fire crews respond immediately, with the first truck arriving just three minutes later.
The call leaves nine firefighters dead.
Charleston, South Carolina, has a long and proud tradition of firefighting. In 2007,
the department had 237 firefighters in 19 companies spread across the city. It's a
tight-knit profession, with personnel spending up to 24 hours together on call every three days.
That Monday, Charleston dispatchers receive the first 911 call at seven-minutes-past-seven pm.
The caller shouts there's a big fire behind a warehouse in the commercial
hub. They urge emergency services to hurry as smoke is pouring out of the building.
Moments after the first call, the alarms sounds at Engine Company 11, where the crew are sitting
down for dinner. The station is less than a mile from the blaze, and the men grab their
firefighting gear and head towards 1807 Savannah Highway, Charleston, home to the Sofa Super Store.
Engine 11 arrives at the 42 thousand-square-foot (nearly 4000 sqm) furniture store at about
ten-past-seven with sirens blaring. The building sits on nearly two acres of land,
and the crew can see thick smoke pouring from a loading dock area—a
space where store workers are known to take their cigarette breaks.
Firefighters get to work immediately, attacking the exterior fire.
Assistant Fire Chief Larry Garvin, the highest-ranking officer on
the scene assumes operational command. Donning his protective coat and helmet,
he enters the front of the building along with two other firefighters to assess the situation.
Garvin is no stranger to the store, having spent an hour just the week prior selecting furniture
for a new fire station down the road. According to media reports, Garvin also led a "walk-through"
of that very building in 2006 to plan how fire crews would respond to a potential fire there.
But Garvin's 2006 plans did not include the potentially hazardous steel truss
system which supports the roof over the vast showroom floor area. A construction design
that creates concealed spaces overhead where fires can grow without detection.
Ominously this type of design is called "widow-makers" by the firefighting fraternity.
Garvin initially sees no signs of fire inside the building and concludes that
the showroom is safe. But as he opens the double doors connecting to the warehouse,
the fire rips them from his hands as it swallows the fresh oxygen. The pull is
immense, and Garvin can't shut the door as flames push through to the showroom.
Four minutes later, the crew from Ladder 5 are among the first to go
inside the building with hoses to try and contain the fire. Engine
16 and 19's crew rush inside soon after with an additional hose line.
But the crews have difficulty dousing the rapidly spreading blaze with insufficient
water pressure. In publicly released radio transmission recordings, several firefighter
crews are heard calling for more water pressure on several occasions. The Department's hoses have a
smaller diameter than most others and on top of that, water supply lines are running across the
busy Savanah Highway, where cars are continuously hampering the pressure by driving over the hoses.
When Fire Chief Rusty Thomas arrives on the scene,
he puts on his white Chief helmet and takes command, redeploying trucks,
coordinating incoming support and monitoring water supplies. However, the city's command system
dictates that such tasks be delegated so that the Chief's main focus lies on combatting the fire.
A sofa store employee, Jonathon Tyrrell,
is working in a small workroom off the warehouse when he becomes aware of the fire.
Tyrrell can hear the sirens and knows the only way out is through the warehouse.
But when he opens the door, a blazing tower of furniture blocks his escape.
This would only be the start of the disaster.
Jonathan Tyrrell tried calling 911 just before seven-thirty. His first attempt failed, and he
tried to call his wife, but that call also failed. Miraculously the second 911 call went through even
though Tyrrell said he had never been able to get cellphone reception from that spot before.
The operator transfered him to a firefighter on the scene who told him to calm down,
hug the floor and wait. As the thick black smoke enveloped everything around him,
Tyrell wondered if he would ever see his wife and daughter again.
He banged on tables, cabinets and metal walls,
hoping the noise would signal his location to rescue crews.
Five minutes after his call, a firefighter's axe cut through the wall and pulled him out
of the building. Tyrell would be the last person rescued from the Sofa Super Store.
The situation inside the showroom continued to deteriorate,
with visibility extremely limited by the thick black smoke and stacked
furniture hampering the movement and bearings off firefighters inside.
By 7:31 pm, more than a dozen men had been using their breathing apparatus
for at least 18 minutes, leaving them running severely low on oxygen.
Radio transmissions painted a bleak picture of the conditions inside, with fighters heard shouting
unintelligibly. One fighter was anxiously screaming that he had lost connection with
his hose - a life-threatening situation inside a building fire, as firefighters know to follow
their hoses back to the safety of the fire truck outside, especially in low visibility conditions.
Then at 7:32, the call comes in that no one wants to hear.
"Mayday" echoes across the radio. A second firefighter communicates
his dying wish to the Chief directly. "Car one. Please tell my wife that….I love you.”
Chief Thomas issues a radio silence so he can communicate with the crew inside. Then another
voice is heard from inside uttering the final words of a solemn prayer, "In Jesus' name, amen."
Twenty-four minutes into the fire, the Chief had no idea who sounded the
mayday call and didn’t know how many fighters were still trapped inside.
But he did know that the situation inside was dire and possibly fatal.
Shortly after, a message came in from dispatch that the engineer of Ladder 5's emergency button
had been activated. It was Mike French, but any attempt to reach him by radio proved unsuccessful.
Several alarm devices attached to firefighter's air packs were eerily
heard echoing in the darkness. These alarms are engineered to be activated when in distress
or automatically when a firefighter goes down for longer than 24 seconds.
Firefighters frantically started smashing the store's front windows
to create exit points for trapped firefighters inside and entry points
for firefighters who tried to gain entry into the building to assist.
But this action merely fueled the blaze by feeding
it more oxygen from outside to continue its vicious rampage.
Thick black smoke billowed out from the smashed windows,
which indicated that the fire was burning at an extremely high temperature and could
potentially lead to a hostile event such as a flashover. Flashovers typically occur when
fresh oxygen is introduced to a high-intensity fire within an enclosed space. This reaction
leads to the spontaneous combustion of all the combustible materials near the fire.
At 7:38 pm, the Chief ordered everyone to evacuate immediately. The crew outside
watched helplessly as the flames burned white hot.
Less than seven minutes later, the showroom's roof collapsed in
a thunderous crash. Onlookers said a wave of heat and ash flew over everyone's heads
before fire shot up 30 feet (9.1m) into the sky as the rest of the building collapsed.
At that point, the death toll was unknown. The true extent of the tragedy was still unfolding,
and the exact number of fatalities would only be discovered much
later when rescue teams combed the area.
The fire was finally under control by ten pm, three hours after the first 911
call. The grief-stricken firefighters respectfully saluted as the bodies of
their fallen brothers were brought out one by one while the search continued.
By 04 am, the “broken” fire department brought out the bodies of the last two firefighters.
Nine bodies were found in the smoking embers of the showroom floor.
Louis Mulkey, Mike Benke, Melvin Champaign, William Hutchinson, Bradford Baity,
James Drayton, Mark Kelsey, Michael French and Brandon Thompson all died in the line of duty.
The men ranging in age from 27 to 56 were all career firefighters and had
more than 130 years of experience among them. At least nine other firefighters were injured,
barely making it out of the building before the collapse.
The firefighters' deaths left the people of Charleston shocked and saddened. It
elicited messages of support the world over - including from President George
W Bush - who called the men heroes. He said they demonstrated great skill and
courage and that their legacy would continue to inspire all Americans.
Four days later, the brave men received a hero's farewell when thousands gathered
to pay their final respects. Fire crews from around the world showed up in their
numbers. A motorcade of more than 300 fire engines, ladder trucks,
ambulances and command vehicles drove past the three fire stations where the nine men were based.
But the nation had so many questions. For starters - how did the firefighters lose their
lives responding to what was initially believed to be a fire in a dumpster outside a building?
The answers would eventually come out in 2008, in the form of reports released by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the National Institute of Service Technology
and an independent investigation report, commissioned by the city of Charleston.
Investigators used modelling methods and examined debris and constructions as well
as the contents of the store. They also used photographs, interviews,
videos and over 900 radio transmissions to piece together how the deadly blaze spread.
The reports made several findings and highlighted two main factors leading to the devastating fire,
factors relating to the actual building and the property where the blaze occurred
and the operations conducted by the Charleston Fire Department.
It found that the Sofa Superstore had several high fire risks,
which added to the volatility of the situation.
According to the reports, the fire could have been prevented if the property had been built
and maintained in accordance with state and local codes. It included additions to the structure,
mainly constructed out of wood and enclosed by sheet metal.
The additions were reportedly constructed without building permits and violated several code
requirements. A few examples of this were the open floor plan and the hidden build-up of combustible
smoke and gases due to the spaces between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom.
The reports say that the fire could have been contained quickly and with minor damage had the
store been fitted with a sprinkler system as required by city and state ordinances.
Additionally, it may have been less severe if highly combustible materials were not
stored close to a smoking area. And firefighters may have been able to
find their way out of the inferno if the required exits were maintained correctly.
But the City of Charleston and the fire department also had a role to play.
The building code violations would have been discovered if the City of Charleston
had conducted regular fire inspections and if firefighters had been trained
to look out for code violations during pre-fire planning visits.
The investigation panel concluded that the Department was understaffed
and unprepared and used outdated equipment in responding the fire.
It found that the undersized hoses left the crew without the volume of water needed to
contain a fire burning in the ceiling overhead. The "aggressive" firefighting techniques of the
Charleston Fire Department also came under scrutiny. The report concluded that the
offensive tactics used by the Department exposed fire crews to excessive and avoidable risks.
The reports, which included a timeline of the events of the evening, found that officials did
not assess the situation accurately by not evacuating the crew from the fire sooner.
It also noted that Chief Thomas ordered the smashing of the store's front windows when
he realized firefighters were trapped in the smoke-covered showroom. An action which resulted
in oxygen entering the building, accelerating a flashover which ignited the showroom.
But the panels agreed that very few options were available at the time. It said the best
way to remove smoke would have been to make a hole in the roof. However,
there were not enough firefighters or equipment at the scene to follow protocol.
It was initially thought that the men had died due to the collapse of the
structure's roof. But the Coroner's report found no crushing injuries
concluding that the men died from smoke inhalation and thermal burns.
Chief Rusty Thomas told the panel that he accepted responsibility for the loss
of life and was sorry that he could not have done something different that night
to bring back the nine firefighters. Thomas retired after the release of the reports.
In February 2011, the State of South Carolina ruled that no criminal charges
would be filed for prosecution in the Sofa Super Store fire.
An independent inquiry found that the issues raised did not warrant a criminal investigation.
Four months later, the Sofa Super Store settled civil claims from the families of
the nine firefighters to the tune of $1.9 million. It also settled with nine other
firefighters who claimed emotional and physical ailments due to the fire. It's believed more
than $18 million was paid in settlements involving more than two dozen defendants.
The Sofa Super Store was never rebuilt. The city bought the
three acres of land in 2008 and created a park with unique memorial markers for
the nine men at the locations where their bodies were found.
The newly built fire station 11 (August 2022) now stands adjacent to the memorial park with
nine floor-to-ceiling windows in honour of the men, overlooking the urban memorial.
Several recommendations made by the reports have since been
implemented to prevent future tragedies. The Department acquired larger oxygen tanks
and new uniforms after it found that firefighters' uniforms had melted due to the intensity of the
flames. And fire stations now have more trained personnel to size up fires effectively and assess
what resources are needed for each situation. New state-of-the-art equipment,
such as thermal imaging cameras and wider circumference hoses, has also aligned the
Department with industry standards. Incident commanders now operate from
within a command vehicle which improved the ability of the fire chief to monitor
communications and keep track of resources. Building Code enforcement now falls under the
umbrella of the fire department, with the establishment of a fire marshal
division to oversee code enforcement, fire prevention, and bar and nightclub inspections.
The legacy of the men is memorialized through an emblem bearing two axes,
a large number 9 and the numbers 6.18.07, worn as a pin by local firefighters. The
design also features on firefighting apparatus along with the names of the fallen heroes.
A bell, hanging outside the station, tolls nine times at 9 am, every morning,
reminding Charleston of the tragedy that unfolded on June 18 2007.
Watch this episode next if you found this video interesting.
Please add a like and leave a comment if you want to support the channel 🙂