Putin’s bromance with Belarusian President and fellow autocrat Alexander Lukashenko
has yet to blossom into full-fledged military cooperation. But could it?
The year is 2022. Russia, once considered to have the world’s second most powerful
military on earth with defense expenditures hovering around $62 billion dollars per year,
embarks on an ill-conceived invasion of Ukraine,
a far-smaller nation who annually spends just one-tenth of that on defense.
Ukraine and its courageous armed forces exceed expectations in the first eight
months of fighting, blunting the advance of a military force with five times as many soldiers,
six times as many armored vehicles, sixteen times as many naval vessels, and thirty times
as many aircraft (show comparison graphs). As the campaign rages on in eastern Ukraine,
tensions at the Belarussian border simmer at an all-time high. Fighting along this border
has long since petered out. But ever since Russia kick-started its invasion with a failed thrust on
Kyiv from staging areas in Belarus, both Belarus and Ukraine have remained wary of one another.
And rightly so. Today, Belarusian police units patrol the 674-mile-long
Ukrainian border regularly. Occasionally, Belarusian guards complain that Ukrainian
servicemen cross the border illegally to take photos, search for weaknesses,
and even plant mysterious objects in the snow. On the other side, Ukraine is right to fear
Belarusian intervention; facing the ever-present threat that Russia’s allegedly “independent”
western neighbor might finally throw itself into the fray and storm across the border in force,
Ukrainian forces must prepare accordingly, blowing bridges, mining the approaches,
and sabotaging power and communication lines. But could Belarusian involvement push Ukraine
over the edge? And why hasn’t Lukashenko joined Putin’s de-nazifying crusade against Zelenskyy,
the Jewish President of Ukraine? On November 18, 2022, Lukashenko,
sporting an impressive comb-over mustache combination stood before an attentive
audience of six hundred workers and business leaders in the Belarusian agricultural sector.
There he announced that all Belarusian McDonalds franchises would be rebranded by a
Russian substitute following the global American fast food chain’s decision to leave the country
in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the man proclaimed, “Thank God it’s leaving!”
“We ourselves should do what McDonald’s did, if someone needs it,” he continued. “And even better!
Can’t we cut a bun in half? And shove a piece of meat and salad into these two halves and add
potatoes? Lord, who consumes it, I don’t know.” Lukashenko’s McDonalds slander may seem strange,
but it represents the extent to which Belarus’ ruling class have aligned themselves with
Russia’s recent wave of anti-western rhetoric and aggressive foreign policy. This isn’t suprising
as for decades Belarus has moved away from the west and closer into Russia’s sphere of
influence. The so called “independent” country had no choice but to support Putin in his war;
Lukashenko’s attack on the golden arches was just a way to show Putin his loyalty to the Kremlin.
Today, the post-Soviet bromance between Putin and Lukashenko appears stronger than ever. In
January 2022, Lukashenko’s regime warmly welcomed Russian military forces into its
territory. “Don’t worry,” they told the world, “Russian forces are just here to perform military
drills. They will leave once they’re done!” As we all know, Putin ended up using Belarusian
territory as a staging ground and springboard for its failed February assault on Kyiv.
Launching aircraft from Belarusian airfields, missiles from Belarusian military installations,
and ferrying vital supplies to beleaguered Russian troops using Belarusian railroads,
it seemed as though Putin had brought Lukashenko himself to the brink of war.
But despite his complicity facilitating the invasion, Belarus has never formally
committed its forces to the fight. Why? Lukashenko has not been averse to his
own saber-rattling since the start of the conflict. But Russia’s unprovoked
invasion has also served as an existential reckoning for Lukashenko’s fragile regime.
Once poised to establish its economic and political independence by levereging
its location between the“resource-abundant Russia and goods-abundant Europe,” Lukashenko
has witnessed his relationship with Putin grow more and more one sided. If Lukashenko
doesn’t accept all demands made by Russia, Putin’s political backing would immediatly disapear,
something the Belarusian dictator desperatly needs if he wishes to remain in power.
The question then becomes, what if Putin calls in some more of his favours and forces Belarus
to join the war. What kind of impact would the nation have on the war? “If Moscow succeeds in
enmeshing Belarusians in the fighting,” one commentator noted, “the swift decimation of
the under equipped Belarusian army will lead to major destabilization at home, prompting
Russian to swallow up Belarus once and for all.” But Belarus has already become a “semi-offshore
territory for Russia” and the war in Ukraine has had devastating
knock-on effects for the Belarusian economy. Prior to the conflict, most of Belarus’ revenue
came from transit fees and other intermediary activities. With its privileged access into
Russia, Belarus could charge lucrative transit fees on Russian oil and gas making its way
into Europe. These funds, complemented by state-controlled smuggling operations, tax
evasion, and the reselling of raw resources fueled the Belarusian regime —providing the basis for
state-subsidized Soviet-style building projects, social programs, and the bought loyalty of
Belarus’ bureaucrats and other powerful figures. By 2020, the output of two state-controlled oil
refineries in Novopolotsk and Mozyr accounted for 1/4 of all Belarusian exports and 20% of
budget revenues. The war changed everything. As prosperous western nations around the
world began sanctioning Russia (and Belarus by association), Belarusian refineries lost access
to all their European and Ukrainian markets. Five months into the war, Belarusian oil
exports to the EU shrunk by 99%; over the same period, oil deliveries to Ukraine fell
from $249 million to just $19 million. Now an international pariah, Belarus no
longer enjoys the benefit of being the economic gateway between Europe and Russia—a $4 billion
dollar industry. Today, with production and income stagnating, Minsk has only one major
market for its products left: Russia itself. With such a weak economy and an untrained army.
Could Belarus really change the tide of the war? We might not need to worry about this in the
first place. In a survey conducted by British policy institution Chatham House one month into
the invasion, 75% of Belarusian participants expressed unfavorable views toward the war.
A weak economy combined with an unpopular war could be what finally does it for the people of
Belarus. It’s likely that a revolt would occur. And with Putin’s forces focused on Ukraine it’s
unlikely the dictator will get help from the east. Several hundred Belarusian volunteers are even
fighting for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a unit known as the Kalinovsky regiment,
dozens of whom have been killed in combat. One of their members told a BBC reporter,
that his “sources in the Belarusian army say 90% won’t fight. They say training’s bad and
kit morale are even worse than the Russian army.” But if Putin does manage to bring Belarus into
the war without Lukashenko being overthrown. What impact could the nation have on the war?
Putin recently announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, a development that could
easily spark Belarusian involvement. Similar to NATO’s Article 5 principle of collective defense
that stipulates “an attack on one is an attack on all,” Lukashenko’s Belarusian regime is part of
a series of political-military agreements that form the backbone of an integrated Union State
between Russia and Belarus—agreements originally intended to recreate the closeness enjoyed by
Soviet nations at the height of the Cold War. After pressure from Putin an addendum was added
to this agreement in November 2021. This change stated that “any military action against one of
its members is an assault on the union state as a whole.” The decision placed Belarus on
“pre-war” footing, but did not implicate it in military operations since Russia,
well, invaded Ukraine, not the other way around. But if Putin decided to frame recent Ukrainian
counteroffensives into “Russian” annexed regions as an assault on Russian territory,
would Lukashenko have to respond? Belarus currently boasts an army of
65,000 soldiers, a third of which are classified as support staff and cadets. Of its
45,000 troops, many are considered ill-trained and under-equipped. There are an additional
289,500 reserves in the Belarusian ranks, almost 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 500 tanks, 800
artillery pieces, 71 aircraft, and 38 helicopters. Given how hard it’s been for Putin to mobilize his
own replacements, Belarus’ ready-made force might provide just enough time for Putin to
conscript and train enough soldiers to have a significant impact on the battlefield.
With those forces, could he once more threaten Kyiv while the bulk of Ukraine’s armed forces
remain focused on pushing Russia out of its eastern occupied territories? Or would
Belarusian soldiers just become more cannon fodder for Putin’s so called special operation?
Putin’s recent actions seem to indicate that the threat of teetering Belarusian neutrality
will continue to influence the course of the war regardless of whether or not their troops
are deployed. One month ago (October 2022), Russia increased its pressure on Lukashenko
by sending thousands of troops back into Belarus, prompting outcries that Putin
would try to form a joint-northern front and once again open a new front in the war against
Ukraine. Most western analysts and opposition leaders dismiss this as an unlikely outcome.
“They’re not skilled, not equipped and not motivated,” one opposition leader claimed,
“They won’t pose a threat...They would make things harder, make it slower to
reach victory—but Ukraine will win.” Another journalist agreed, arguing Belarusian deployment
“would likely be a big catastrophe for the Belarusian army and for Lukashenko himself.”
Some say it could even be “political suicide.” Belarus’ alleged mobilization and continued
posturing for war may indeed be a bluff, but ignoring the possibility of Belarus joining
the war would be dangerous. Mr Putin knows a few tricks, and many fear that he will stage a phony
terrorist attack on Belarusian infrastructure to drum up war support within the country. It
would’t be the first time he uses this tactic to make a nation ready for war.
In the meantime, Russia will continue to send troops into Belarus to train. Some
analysts believe doing so will “kill two birds with one stone:
threaten Ukraine with a potential new offensive from the north,” while also providing more
room to train Russia’s thousands of conscripts. One outcome is certain: The longer Putin chooses
to fight in Ukraine, the fewer resources he will have to bolster Lukashenko’s regime, meaning that
his ill advised special operation might put an end to not one, but two corrupt regimes in Europe.
Now go watch how Ukraine prevented a Russia day 1 win, or click this other video instead.