U.S. and China tensions at the heart of this
meeting. While the U.S.
says that it is repeatedly seeking to speak to China, it is also doing things
which may anger China right now. For instance, speak on the Indo-Pacific.
Come on. Is making a transit in Taiwan?
How are you reading? What kind of message do you think the
U.S. is sending?
Well, I think obviously we want to see more dialogue and dialogue matters,
which is why the Shangri-La Dialogue, I think, is so important and being so
enduring over the course of its history. But I would say that, you know, the
common waters, international waters, international airspace are there for
everyone. And the United States is operating in
accordance with its rights within those waters.
And and it's important that those be maintained as open waters, because it's
important that the global rules based order be maintained in this region.
And certainly from an Australian perspective, when we think about where
our interest lies, our interest lies in the rules of the road.
And that means freedom of navigation. It means freedom of overflight.
And it means that in a place like the South China Sea, for example, where most
of our trade transits. So I don't think there's any other
message than the need for the rules to be applied to every country.
And we heard from Promise Albanese urging countries in the region to avoid
getting caught. But in the US and China, I mean, until
recently, one would be forgiven for thinking that Australia is firmly on the
side of the US strategically. Is Australia trying to get to the middle
in terms of US China relations? Well, we have an alliance with the
United States, which has been in place since really since the end of the Second
World War and formally since the 1950s. It's central to our national security
and it's central to our world view. And we're very committed to the alliance
and none of that changes. We are obviously a country of the region
and our largest trading partner is China.
We value a productive relationship with China and we seek to deal in our
relationship with China on its own terms.
And I think it's complex that that relationship, because there are security
anxieties that we have in respect of China.
We are seeing a very significant build up of its military.
And that's happening without a sense of strategic reassurance to us, but to the
region and the world about its purpose. And so, you know, we've got our issues
that said, you know, we do have a significant economic relationship with
China and we want to manage that as well.
And I think it is. But ultimately, this is actually the
reason why dialogue matters. How you navigate those two things is is
complex. It's not obvious.
It requires discussion. And that's why we want to.
But the question is whether or not Australia can be seen as a neutral
party. When defense ministers before you have
said that it is inconceivable that Australia will not defend Taiwan, should
China attack it. Well, first, I suppose in terms of
China, in terms of Taiwan, our position is that we don't want to see any change
to the status quo across the Taiwan Straits, but that that is our very firm
position. And that's in the context of having a
long standing one China policy, which has been the bipartisan policy in
Australian politics going right back to the mid 1970s.
So so that's where we stand in relation to Taiwan and that issue.
And we come back, we can be an ally of the
United States and we can build a productive relationship with China.
We firmly believe that that is possible. And and that's the line that we seek to
pursue. I want to touch on Ukraine.
Critics are saying that Australia is contributing only a small fraction to
military and humanitarian aid in the country, despite the fact that it is
among the biggest beneficiaries given the surge in oil prices as well as
commodities. Why that small role?
Well, I certainly wouldn't accept that. I mean, we're the second largest non
NATO contributor to the support of Ukraine, and that's behind Sweden.
And that's been consistent since the Russia invaded Ukraine.
We would be the largest military contributor to offer support to Ukraine
in the Indo-Pacific. Putting aside America, of course.
And so I think it's understood across Europe.
I think it's understood by Ukraine itself that Australia is very much
punching above its weight in its support for Ukraine.
And the reason we are doing that, notwithstanding Ukraine is a long way
from Australia, is that what we see at issue there is the very sanctity of the
global rules based order. I mean, Russia's invasion of Ukraine was
not an exercise of resolving a dispute by referee.
To international law, this was simply trying to impose the rule of power and
might buy a large country over a smaller neighbor that cannot be allowed to stand
in 2023. I mean, if that's the world that we live
in. That is a very bad portent for all of
us, which is why we see it as being so important that Ukraine is able to
resolve this conflict on its own terms and therefore why we will stand with
Ukraine for as long as it takes. What would it take for Australia to do
more in Ukraine, especially considering the fact that, you know, when MH 14 was
shot down by Russia. Australia lost dozens of lives, Sean.
And that is why we went with the second largest non NATO contributor to the
support of Ukraine. And it's behind Sweden, which is about
to join NATO. We're a long way from Ukraine, and yet
that's where we stand, largest supporter in this region of military support to
Ukraine. So we're very proud of being that.
So with that, support is significant and it's seen as significant by Ukraine and
I might say the countries of Europe. And the reason we are doing this is for
all. Everything I've just described, the
global rules based order matters. And whilst you know, those fighting in
the Ukraine armed forces, first and foremost fighting for their own country,
there is a sense in which they're on the frontline there for all of us who
believe in a rules based order.