On 23 June 2023, the world was captivated by the news coming from Russia. Yevgeny Prigozhin,
the owner of the Wagner Group private military company, has launched a march on Moscow with a
declared goal of removing Russia’s top military figures, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov,
from office. During the advance on Moscow, Wagner shot down several Russian helicopters,
with human casualties exceeding a dozen men. Confused by what was going on,
the media labelled the affair a mutiny, a rebellion, a coup d'état, or even a civil war.
Although the matter seems to have fizzled out for now, it raised the question of whether an
actual civil war in Russia is possible today. In this video, we will try to answer this
question by looking at Russia’s informal political system, its main influence groups, and challenges
that could potentially lead to a full-scale military confrontation within Russia itself.
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Fake Political Institutions Russia’s current political system can be best
described by an election campaign slogan of the United Russia party, “Strong president – strong
country.” Vladimir Putin is a true autocrat who stands above all branches of government and holds
a monopoly on key decision-making. Russia’s formal political system is largely decorative in nature.
United Russia, the country’s largest political party, holds over 72% of the seats in the State
Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament. United Russia’s leadership includes all major
national figures, thus securing the loyalty of the party, as well as the obedience of the Duma.
The upper house of the parliament, the Federation Council, is formed by the representatives of
Russia’s regions, yet the lower house can dissolve it. At last, there is the Security Council,
a consultative body, which is formed by Putin, and aimed to discuss key strategic national policies.
This entire formal government structure includes over 50,000 people, an absolute majority of which
are replaceable. Fake Federalism
A similar picture of centralized rule can be seen in Russia’s regions. Since 2001, the influence of
the local elites has declined drastically through the efforts of the Kremlin. Changes in the Russian
tax system resulted in most regions becoming dependent on the federal center financially,
thus leaving little room for disobedience. In addition, Kremlin has introduced a simple
scheme to assign governors to the regions. There, the head of the federal subject would resign
from his office about 7 months before the local elections and be replaced by an interim appointee
from Moscow, who would then “win” the elections. Those appointees were labelled “parachutists,”
who have little to no connection to the region they govern, have made their careers elsewhere,
and are loyal to Kremlin rather than their assigned federal subject.
As of summer 2023, an overwhelming majority of Russian governors are “parachutists.”
Because of this system of strict vertical subordination, it would be safe to say that
the so-called Russian Federation is a federation in name only. It would also mean that the hopes
of those opposed to the Kremlin that Russia would eventually get overwhelmed by a wave of separatism
are largely misplaced. As of July 2023, in only ten regions of Russia, the local elites are in
charge of their region and would potentially have the means to move against the federal government.
Politburo 2.0 The overall phoniness of Russia’s
formal political system, however, doesn’t mean that Russia has no politics. Putin might be an
autocrat, but running a country alone, especially one as large as Russia, is simply impossible.
Inevitably, the autocrat has to delegate tasks and responsibilities and allocate resources
to his subordinates, thus diluting some of his power in favor of maintaining overall control.
Those subordinates form their own patronage groups, which, in turn, compete against each
other for a more favorable place in the system. Putin accepts and encourages such competition,
as too much cooperation between the groups could pose a danger to the autocrat himself. The groups,
in turn, accept the role of Putin as an arbitrator in the intra-elite conflicts.
In a series of analytical reports and presentations, Minchenko Consulting
proposes a system describing the state of the top Russian elites called Politburo
2.0. This small group of men are Putin’s closest and most trusted subordinates.
They can get unscheduled personal audiences with the autocrat, set meeting agendas, and accumulate
a sizeable pool of resources, be it financial, political, media, or brute force. As of May 2023,
Politburo 2.0 is thought to include 11 men, with Mikhail Mishustin and Sergey Kiriyenko being the
most recent additions to the group. Elite Groups
The Ukrainian Institute for the Future proposed another scheme describing the Russian elites. In
a report from March 2023, the authors highlight six groups of influence in the Kremlin,
each of which has sufficient resources to exert political influence and contest for power.
Several of the groups are heterogeneous and have their own internal divisions, disputes,
and conflicts, yet on the strategic level, they tend to defend their common interests.
Perhaps the most infamous of the groups is that of the Siloviki, a Russian term which can be
roughly translated as strongmen, or enforcers. This group is also the most heterogeneous,
including various organizations related to the army, state security, and law enforcement.
Those include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB,
the Foreign Intelligence Service, and Rosgvardiya to name a few.
An undisputed leader of the group is Nikolai Patrushev, an extremely conservative, hawkish,
and anti-Western figure known to be a conspiracy theorist. A less-known yet still very important
figure in this group is the Kremlin Chief of Staff Anton Vaino, whose main role is presumed to be
that of communication with other political groups. The Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu undoubtedly
belongs to the Siloviki too, as well as the head of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov, however, their
influence on the decision-making process in Russia is presumed to be weaker. Of particular interest
is the head of Rosgvardiya Viktor Zolotov. As the man who runs Russia’s internal military force,
he might be the person able to play kingmaker in case Russia finds itself in a political crisis.
Although the Siloviki seem to be powerful, they don’t have that much to offer besides
brute force. Besides the military budget, they have some financial sources of their own,
but not their own bank. They control the Roscosmos corporation, yet their general influence on the
economy is exaggerated. The Siloviki have control over 19 regions (notably, most of North Caucasus),
however, they have little influence over Russia’s formal political system. The greatest weakness of
this group is a lack of media. It is unsurprising then, that in the long conflict between Shoigu
and Prigozhin, the former more often than the latter became an object of public ridicule.
An often overlooked influence group in Russia is the one of Sergey Chemezov, roughly corresponding
to the Military–industrial complex. In a state as belligerent as Russia, the person responsible for
the arms industry inevitably exerts a great deal of political influence. Most other groups need
Chemezov, yet the Military–industrial complex has a function too specific for this group to
be sizeable. Chemezov is the CEO of Rostec, which owns Novikombank, thus making it possible to keep
financial flows within the group. In Parliament, the MIC has control over the committees relevant
to its operations, as well as over the Federal Agency for Mineral Resources. Chemezov exerts
control over just 4 regions (although ones that are rich in natural resources). However, the MIC
has no muscle of its own, as the state already guards its enterprises. Just as in the case of
the Siloviki, the Military–industrial complex has little to offer when it comes to media.
Perhaps the group most important for the Russian economy is that of Gas industry interests. It is
comprised of Russia’s two largest natural gas producers, Gazprom and Novatec,
as well as several billionaires with businesses related to the gas industry.
The most important figures of the group include the CEO of Gazprom Alexey Miller,
a gas pipeline supplier Arkady Rotenberg, an energy market investor Gennady Timchenko,
and last but probably not least, Dmitry Medvedev, former chairman of Gazprom.
This group is much more than just a gas extraction business. Gazprom, Russia’s largest company,
is almost a state within a state. It has its own military force, Gazprom’s security service. There
are representatives of the group in the Russian government as well as Parliament. Combined,
Gazprom and Novatec exert control over 9 Russian regions, key for the gas industry.
Surprisingly for an outside viewer, Gazprom owns one of Russia’s most important media holdings.
This group controls several TV channels, production studios, radio stations, newspapers,
and web hosting services, with its content ranging from crime dramas to stand-up shows to football
match broadcasts to business analytics. Combined with the largest source of revenue available
in Russia, the Gas industry interests group is one of the most influential of them all,
with an array of resources wide enough to potentially threaten even Putin himself.
Gas, however, is not the only energy resource Russia exports. Similarly, there is a group formed
around Oil industry interests. Of particular importance here is the Rosneft company and its
CEO, Igor Sechin. Just like Gazprom, Rosneft has its own security service and a substantial source
of revenue. However, in other aspects, Rosneft has been on a steady decline. This group never
had a sizeable media empire to begin with, while its influence in the Russian parliament, as well
as Russian regions, has decreased significantly in the past 10 years. However, Rosneft has found
itself a different niche, that of communication with Western politicians and businessmen. It is
thus unsurprising that one of the Rosneft chairmen is the infamous Gerhard Schröder.
The most unusual of the groups of influence in the Kremlin is the Kovalchuk group.
Rather than forming a clan around an industry or a sphere of activity, the two Kovalchuk brothers,
Yury and Mikhail, have built their network of support on personal friendship with Vladimir
Putin. Shortly after coming to power, Putin elevated a mediocre regional Rossiya Bank,
owned by Yury Kovalchuk, to one of the key Russian financial institutions. Although lacking its own
military force, this group has sponsored the emergence of multiple Russian private military
companies (including Wagner) and has promoted its proteges into governmental positions, notably the
Natural resources committee, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is thought to be, at least to some extent, a Kovalchuk figure.
With the National Media Group as well as the VGTRK broadcasting company,
the Kovalchuks have a significant media presence, mostly targeting an old, conservative audience
that prefers TV as the main source of information. Their control over regions, however, is modest
and is comprised of only 5 border regions. The youngest of the groups, and already one
of the most important ones, is the Technocrats. They tend to support economic liberalization,
raising the efficiency of the state apparatus, and are generally considered to have a more modern
outlook. It would be wrong, however, to consider them liberal paragons of freedom and democracy.
The most prominent of the Technocrats are Sergey Kiriyenko and Herman Gref. The key asset of this
group is an established system of raising and cultivating professional cadres for the Russian
elite. Multiple programs, such as “Russia, the Land of Opportunities”, “Leaders of Russia”,
and “School of Governors”, has already produced a huge number of rather competent administrators.
In the foreseeable future, it can be the main driver of the refreshment of Russian elites.
The Technocrats also have access to other resources. Herman Gref is the Chairman and
CEO of Sberbank, the largest bank in Russia. The graduates of the Technocrats have a significant
presence in Parliament, as well as strikingly large control over Russian regions (26 in total).
Most impressively, the Technocrats have a defacto monopoly on the Internet sphere.
Sberbank is the owner of Rambler while the son of Sergey Kiriyenko heads the VK Group,
which has control over all the Russian social networks, as well as the information services
of Yandex. Trustees
Alongside the elite groups, there are also trustees, people who have their
own assigned functions, and respond directly to Putin rather than to any of the groups.
Typical trustees include Yury Trutnev (responsible for the Far East), Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry
Kozak, and a designated liberal Alexey Nechayev, leader of the New People party.
Arguably the most influential of the trustees is the Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyanin.
He is included in Politburo 2.0, and his functions, besides being the head
of Russia’s capital city, also include patronage over local elites in general.
The infamous Ramzan Kadyrov, an undeclared Sultan of Chechnya, is a trustee as well. He controls a
region with a recent history of insurgency and is also an informal communicator with the elites of
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Interestingly enough, multiple military formations collectively known
as the Kadyrovites are technically a part of Rosgvardiya, and Kadyrov himself is a figure
somewhat aligned with Viktor Zolotov. Yevgeny Prigozhin is also a trustee (or,
at least, he used to be one). However, his role in the system, and his ambitions
to improve it, deserve a video of its own. Threats to the System and a Possible Civil War
Now, that we know more about the way Russia is governed, we can think about
how this informal political system can be put down. The elites face multiple challenges,
such as military defeats on the battlefields of Ukraine, an increasingly costly confrontation
with the West, or a decrease in revenue from gas and oil export.
Kremlin is threatened by two groups of citizens, who have the potential for protest sentiments. One
is that of the Western-aligned younger generation, residents of large cities,
and generally people who consider themselves liberals. The other is comprised of extremist,
revanchist, and chauvinist radicals, who consider Putin to be too soft, inefficient, and ultimately
undeserving to be the Russian autocrat. With the right amount of propaganda, repression,
concessions, and cosmetic changes to the formal political system, both groups can ultimately be
managed, but in the case of a major crisis, they can pose a significant danger to the status quo.
The system’s most significant weakness, however, is Vladimir Putin himself.
In this political configuration, he doesn’t and can’t safely have an undisputed heir.
Once Putin’s political career ends (one way or another), the system will lose its key element
and would have to react. None of the groups would have a decisive advantage, and it is
likely to see them organized into coalitions with one another, as well as with some of the trustees.
In a scenario optimistic for Kremlin, the political groups would find an agreement, and
appoint a new Russian autocrat, thus preserving the system as a whole. If a working solution isn’t
found, however, the groups would have to mobilize resources from the regions they control. By that
time, the level of escalation in the struggle between the groups might be quite high, and this
is not outside the realm of possibility to see a civil war being waged between the elite groups.
In such circumstances, the role of the local elites would rise, and the ideas of separatism
would get more relevant every day. This is a sort of scenario, that would lead to an outcome desired
by many of the Kremlin’s enemies, that of Russia’s dismemberment and cessation as a unified entity.
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