Well, that was fast. Just as quickly as the
whole Wagner Opera got started, it suddenly came to an end.
It still feels like things could turn on a dime, but let’s take a moment while we can today
to understand what actually happened,
why the affair ended so suddenly,
problems with long-term commitments to any mutiny-ending deal,
the internal implications for the Russian regime,
the direct consequences for the war in Ukraine,
and the more subtle indirect effects that are still important for Kyiv.
But we begin by trying to understand what occurred—or at least the best
summary that I can offer at the time that I record this.
After having taken control of Rostov-on-Don,
a Wagner convoy appeared to be on a one-way express trip to Moscow.
It took them less than half of a day to get to Voronezh, about equidistant to the capital.
And they may have gone yet further.
By Belarus-to-Kyiv standards, the pace was blistering.
Even more stunning was the apparent lack of resistance that Wagner encountered along the way,
with some ignoring the situation and others appearing to join.
Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed to have shot down
an air force helicopter, with reports of takedowns of a handful more.
Similar to scenes out of Ukraine,
Russia was destroying its own roads and oil depots as preventive measures,
though for the most part, it seemed that the group was gaining momentum every kilometer.
But there was still an offramp.
Prigozhin was describing his convoy as a “march of justice”,
apparently wanting to remove Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov
from their positions as Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff due to incompetency.
That certainly would not have gone over well for Putin, especially the part with Shoigu.
Shoigu is a close comrade of Putin’s and frequent vacation companion.
Nevertheless, the offramp was there.
But then Putin went on national television and indirectly called Prigozhin a mutineer.
To be clear, Putin did not use Priogzhin’s name, which makes sense if you do not want
to give the guy a platform. More on that later. But it was as if Rostov-on-Don was the Rubicon,
and Putin had acknowledged Prigozhin’s crossing of it.
And in case that was not clear,
Wagner on Telegram declared that Putin had made a grave mistake,
but that it did not matter because Russia would soon have a new president.
The popcorn was popping.
Billionaires were getting out of Dodge while they could.
Ukraine began wondering if it had just discovered the easy button.
And then … the plot just died.
And not even with thunderous applause. It just whimpered.
And plot twist: the voice of reason was none other than Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko.
Remember him? Well, the reports of his imminent death two months
prior were apparently greatly exaggerated.
Hand wound, illness,
and then peacemaker.
I do not think anyone had that on their bingo card at the start of 2022.
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov announced the deal.
Prigozhin would effectively go into exile in Belarus to do … well, who knows what.
The other participants were effectively
pardoned and allowed to return to the battle in Ukraine—if they wanted to.
It is as if the artist formally known as Blackwater
took over Jacksonville,
which had become the US Centcom headquarters due to an ongoing war in Cuba,
Blackwater told Biden to replace Lloyd Austin and Mark Milley,
started driving toward Washington, DC, and reached the border of North and South Carolina,
maybe went further, hopped on a video call with
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and then decided to move to Ottawa.
Why? Meh. The two men on earth who know are not talking.
As the affair was unfolding,
I discussed how the key to winning a coup battle
is to convince everyone that it is already over and that you have won.
Then anyone who was not sure what to do comes to your side, allowing you to win for real.
Was Prigozhin not making much progress there?
To the contrary, the fact that new troops
were joining the convoy suggests things were actually working quite well for him.
Furthermore, when Prigozhin called it off,
reports indicate that many Wagner participants grew frustrated.
But I also explained how controlling the capital is standard coup procedure,
and Wagner was still hundreds of kilometers out.
It is possible that Wagner was working remotely to find assistance in Moscow—
or hoping that some enterprising Kremlin politicians would volunteer—
and perhaps that was not happening.
If so, Wagner had no theory of victory once the troops arrived in Moscow.
A source in British intelligence alleges that Kremlin threats to
Wagner family is what ended things, but this is an odd explanation:
Prigozhin knew that this would happen at the start and initiated the process anyway.
Something else was causing the march to stall.
So Prigozhin was looking for an out, and he took the first one given to him.
As I mentioned a moment ago,
the public deal is that charges against Prigozhin and Wagner are dropped.
If you are asking yourself why Prigozhin would need to go into exile if there truly
were no more charges against him … well, that is a good question.
And indeed, contrary to Peskov’s reports,
the charges were not really dropped until the following Tuesday.
And it was not clear that Prigozhin was actually headed to Belarus
until his plane was spotted flying there three days later,
apparently to take residence in a hotel without windows.
Nevertheless, that did little to resolve the uncertainty that compounded the day before,
when Putin went on national television a second time to reiterate the terms of the compromise,
still without using Prigozhin’s name.
Meanwhile, Gerasimov is missing in action.
As for Shoigu, Russian television released a video of him visiting a military installation,
but without any clear indication that it was filmed post-plot.
This got resolved the following day when he appeared at a public award ceremony.
But until both are solidified in their positions,
there will be great speculation that Prigozhin
backed down because he got what he really wanted all along—
Putin ordering changes at the top of the military leadership.
Of course, as I have hinted at, whatever was verbally agreed to is
meaningless. What matters is what can be enforced.
Both Putin and Prigozhin may mutually prefer a tranquil truce to conflict,
but that does not mean that they can credibly commit to it.
One of the reasons that the plot appeared to reach the point of
no return is that each side had made its true loyalties known.
If you gave either a button to delete the other,
you know that they would be mashing it like a Mario Party minigame.
Although real life is not that simple,
both have expansive military resources to keep the other one worried.
How Prigozhin would stay safe in particular—given that he had been
declared a traitor of the Motherland—is unclear.
That said, exile to Belarus provides a partial answer.
But despite the border standing in the way, Prigozhin still ought to be worried.
After all, Russia and Belarus form a “Union State” that goes back decades.
And for the handful of you Gen-Z viewers out there,
yes, this is a young Lukashenko.
The point is, Russia’s influence over Belarussian politics is well-known.
There are limits, of course.
Rumors abound that Putin has been lobbying Lukashenko to declare war on Ukraine,
but that Lukashenko has resisted because … well, he does not want a Belarussian
version of Wagner to come after him.
There is some irony there now that he has Wagner at home.
Still, if I were Prigozhin,
I would be very careful about the tea I drink or the windows I peer out from.
But Putin also needs to be worried. Have we seen the curtain call for Wagner,
or are we merely at an intermission?
One obstacle to removing Putin from power is who would have the popularity to replace him.
Prigozhin might not be the answer to that question.
But it also not obvious that he is the wrong answer.->
At the moment, Prigozhin’s status in Russia is unparalleled.
As long as he is alive—even if he is in Belarus—he can always
go back on his word and truly enter politics.
Just ask Lenin.
But Priogzhin and Wagner are not the only concerns now for Moscow.
Both of those proper names might as well be placeholders. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group
was the first challenger, but the door is now open for more.
One of the more interesting things I have encountered in the last year and a half is
the insistence from a vocal few that Putin is some sort of untouchable figure domestically.
Some of that belief was justified. Emphasis on was.
We have discussed before how Putin’s popularity—at least before war—appeared genuine.
The average Russian was not publicly parading around with Putin
while secretly hoping to be liberated from his rule.
But at the same time, Putin was playing with fire. With a few
missteps, even from his advantageous position, he was liable to get burned.
After the Wagner Opera, anyone who previously held
the position that Putin was untouchable now knows better.
That goes both for observers in the West but also
—and more importantly—political entrepreneurs in Russia.
Though Putin stayed in office, he also had to make the significant
concession of letting Priogzhin go free—or at least to Belarus.
When you negotiate a settlement, you only do so when you think that
the deal you are getting is better than the alternative.
Thus, the deal tells the world that Putin preferred letting go
free someone that he had described as a mutineer earlier in the same day.
Even though the coup-like substance failed to change leadership at the top, the damage is done.
Just ask Gorbachev how things went after the August Coup.
Putin will face more challenges as a result,
which is why suggestions that this was all a part of some scripted plan ring hollow.
Whether the next challenger is Wagner or someone else is unclear.
Whether the next challenge will be successful is also unclear.
At a minimum, governors in far-flung regions of the Russian Federation are going to start
to wonder just how much they need to listen to the Kremlin’s orders to keep themselves in business.
Putin has already been dealing with this for years in Chechnya, even with the smiles for the cameras.
He may have to put up with more—not exactly what you want to hear when
mobilized soldiers are coming from those regions disproportionately.
Even individuals who want to remain loyal must grow worried that Putin will become
suspicious and preemptively try to dismiss them.
But then those targets have incentive to initiate a preemptive coup against Putin,
which in turn encourages Putin to take the original preemptive action. It’s a mess.
As for the direct consequences for the war in Ukraine,
the apparent ending to the affair could only be described as disappointing for Kyiv,
something that Putin was all too happy to acknowledge in his second speech.
As Wagner held Rostov-on-Don, resupply to Ukraine continued as usual.
Meanwhile, the casualties in Russia were minimal.
Not the potential bloodbath that Kyiv was hoping for.
Still, the potential removal of up to
25,000 Wagner soldiers from the fight is an important development,
and puts Ukraine in a much better position compared to a week earlier.
Wagner had two main roles in Ukraine, on the opposite ends of the spectrum.
The group had become most well-known for Zerg
rushing enemy lines in Bakhmut with poorly trained prisoner-soldiers under its command.
I guess given the earlier demographics I should state
that Zerg rushing means throwing bodies at the problem with reckless abandon.
One presumes that the Russian MoD can inherit that capacity without issue.
But its longer-running role was to keep experienced soldiers in the system,
something the MoD failed at miserably.
Even well-after Putin came into office,
the Russian military had basically no notable program for non-commissioned officers.
In contrast, Russia had a ton of inexperienced soldiers filtering
through the system from its conscription program.
It also had a top-heavy group of commissioned officers.
But the lack of a middle group of non-commissioned officers left a lot to be desired.
Why is that a problem? In a well-functioning military, NCOs play a critical leadership role.
They tend to be the ones who actually know how to
do things because they are the ones that work on the ground.
In recent years, Moscow has tried to implement such a system,
but the Russian military still has a long way to go.
Indeed, part of the reason that Russia appeared so aimless in its
drive toward Kyiv was because officers were responsible for any decision of consequence.
In an ideal world, NCOs ought to be handling much of that burden.
Wagner gave an outlet to experienced soldiers who would have otherwise cycled out of military life.
Given Russia’s poor track record with NCO programs,
though, it is not obvious that the MoD will effectively take over that role,
even assuming that some of the ex-Wagner soldiers want to participate.
And you know what that does to the lines on maps.
The indirect consequences for the war are much broader.
We have discussed before how the setup for
Ukraine’s counteroffensive is designed to cause a Russian manpower shortage.
Well, it is about to get worse.
One of the reasons that Wagner could move so far
so fast is a lack of domestic security forces to stop them.
At minimum, Russia will need to hold more troops back to deter any other would-be plotters,
never mind to stop a potential Wagner second act.
It’s a double whammy: fewer Wagner soldiers at all,
and fewer non-Wagner soldiers in Ukraine.
Basically, it is Ukraine’s plan in Belgorod on steroids.
Indeed, the former Kremlin caterer has fittingly put a lot more on Putin’s plate.
One of the overarching narratives of this war is the Kremlin’s inability
to develop and execute effective plans.
Now all of the top brass is responsible for two fronts—Ukraine and home.
There are only 24 hours in a day. Time spent
on stopping future rebellions is time away from winning in Ukraine.
Again, you know what that does to the lines on maps.
Meanwhile, within the context of the information war, there are two main consequences.
First, Prigozhin released a fiery video as the opening ode of the opera.
He went through Russia’s main talking points for the invasion:
Ukraine was about to attack Russia,
there was direct collaboration with NATO to that end,
Russia needed to exterminate the Nazis in Ukraine,
and that demilitarization of Ukraine was necessary for Russia’s security.
Prigozhin dismissed these as convenient “stories” that hide a deeper truth:
that Russia invaded Ukraine for the benefit of oligarchs.
As the rebellion demonstrated, Prigozhin has a large audience in Russia. Not as
large as Putin’s of course—he still controls the media. But the Kremlin
now has to deal with a competing narrative that many Russian citizens find credible.
Finally, as the plot was unfolding, we discussed how one explanation
for why the war still continues is a disagreement over its eventual outcome.
Namely, Russia expects that the Western appetite to support Ukraine will eventually dry up,
at which point Russia can take whatever it wants.
As abbreviated as the plot was, it is still causing a rally in the West.
Popular support for the countermeasures is
going to increase, which will mean we will see more of them,
and perhaps a change to Russian expectations on
whether things will really work out in the long term.
If your long-term goal is to do more reading, you will love my book that examines the causes
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Check below for more information on that.
And if you enjoyed this video, please like,
share, and subscribe, and I will see you next time. Take care.
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