In the history of aviation, there are countless aircraft that were huge failures,
many of them more than justified, but there are also many brilliant projects that turned into
bad ideas. Among the most emblematic cases is the Beechcraft Starship, an executive turboprop
that Beechcraft launched in the mid-1980s. When one examines a failure of such monumental
scale as the Beech Starship programme, the inevitable question is, “Why did they do that?”
As in almost every instance where things go badly wrong,
it was a series of decisions made under shifting circumstances that led to the ultimate disaster.
In the early 80s, Beech had been acquired by Raytheon, a leader in high tech at the time.
A recession that hit general aviation particularly hard cast a pall over the future. Knowledgeable
people predicted the world would run out of oil, not just cheap oil. The oil crisis showed that
turboprops would have a huge advantage over jets because of their lower fuel consumption.
Beech had already started studies for an aircraft that could replace the King Air,
which was the most successful turboprop plane at the time. A great replacement
would be a plane that will offer superior performance and a lower operating cost.
To achieve this goal, an innovative proposal would be needed.
Thanks to the success of King Air, they had everything in their favour to launch
a successor. Beech approached Burt Rutan, then a young designer known for building some of the most
extraordinary homebuilt airplanes, his models are known for their canard configuration with
pusher propellers and fibreglass construction. It was, therefore, a partnership between a giant in
the general aviation market and a brilliant designer. What could go wrong? Everything.
Whenever an aviation giant goes looking for great leaps forward,
there is always somebody with an unproven idea ready to fulfil their dreams.
In the early 1980s, one of the most talked about bits of aviation magic looming on the horizon
was composite construction. Using carbon fibre reinforced plastic could cut airframe weight by
huge amounts, and we all know that a lightweight airplane is great. It’s faster, carries more,
and is more fuel efficient. By adopting carbon fiber in its construction, Beechcraft reduced
the Starship’s weight and thereby gained in performance. The “pusher” propellers would help a
lot since pusher props produce more thrust on the same power than tractor configuration, and because
the props are aft of the cabin, the passengers experience jet-like smoothness and quietness.
In August 1982, the Starship project started to become a reality. The new plane promised
to revolutionise business aviation by flying at 400 mph over 2000 miles, carrying 10 passengers,
and weighing less than 12,500 pounds, which would make it faster and more capable than King Air.
The Starship could have been designed with a conventional wing and tail,
much like its contemporary, the Piaggio Avanti was, but the futuristic look of Burt Rutan’s
canard creations was so exciting. But the problem is that in Rutan’s past designs like the Vari-Eze,
the CG is so far aft that the empty airplane can’t sit on its nose gear
without tipping over, and Beechcraft knew this. To get that futuristic look and make the airplane
practical in terms of CG location, the Starship’s wing needed a large amount of sweep. Wing sweep
looks fast, and does reduce drag above critical Mach, which is usually faster than Mach .70,
but at turboprop speeds, sweep adds headaches and penalties with no benefits. A swept wing is less
structurally efficient, which means it’s heavier than a straight wing, and they degrade stability.
The plus side is that a canard instead is more efficient than a conventional wing with horizontal
tail, because the forward wing always lifts while the main tail produces balancing downforce. But
because it’s always lifting, the forward wing must always stall before the main wing, so the nose
will pitch down, making recovery possible. But to have enough lift at low speeds for adequate pitch
control with wing flaps extended, the Starship's forward wing had to be too big to not stall at
higher airspeeds. The solution was a mechanism that would sweep and unsweep the forward wing.
Because the forward wing sweep was obviously critical to airplane performance and stall
behaviour, lots of monitors and backup equipment were required. The result
was more weight and complexity, which degraded the performance of the Starship.
To deliver the promised speed, Beech had to equip the turboprop
with a more powerful version of the Pratt and Whittney PT-6 engine,
with 1,200 shaft horsepower, this increased fuel consumption, and Beechcraft sacrificed
two seats to carry more fuel to meet the range requirements, leaving eight seats on the plane.
The difficulties, however, were more extensive. The futuristic cockpit for example, has become
an immense headache to keep countless screens reliable, requiring a cooling system verging on
perfection, because despite that electronic flight instrument systems were available at that time,
the displays were nothing more than TV tube pictures of conventional instruments.
It was not possible to combine all six primary flight instruments into a single display. To
continue with the airplane of the future theme, the Starship designers opted for an
EFIS display of every individual cockpit instrument. There were 16 individual TV
tubes in the instrument panel burning amps and pumping out gobs of heat. The avionics
cooling fans were an absolutely critical item. As complexities grew, the aviation world divided
on the Starship, one camp believed that the Starship would deliver its promise of
400 mph cruise speed, jet level vibration and quietness, and a range pushing out close to
2,000 miles. The other camp believed a plastic airplane couldn’t be built and certified,
and the strange configuration would not work, and the whole program would flop. But there was
a third possible outcome; what if the Starship is built and certified, but just doesn’t do
anything well, and certainly not better than other airplanes? That’s exactly what happened.
It didn’t take long to learn that composite construction could not deliver the promised
weight savings. As the starship's empty weight soared, the whole program would have collapsed
except for a new FAA certification program called commuter category. The “small” airplane category
the Starship was launched under maxes out at 12,500 pounds takeoff weight. In exchange for more
stringent structure and performance requirements, the commuter category allows takeoff weight to
go higher. Those commuter category requirements undoubtedly added even more weight but did allow
the program to continue. The eventual maximum ramp weight of the Starship topped 15,000 pounds.
More than the usual number of tweaks were required to bring the Starship's flying qualities in line
with the rules, but Beech persevered. In the end, the Starship was the most stable
airplane in Beech’s history, it plodded through bumps like it was on rails, stability is great,
but stability is the antithesis of low drag. Because of that, the big miss on weight,
and the lack of realised efficiencies from the forward wing configuration, the Starship
missed all of its performance goals by a lot. The Starship was too far ahead of its time,
while the aircraft seemed ready for the future, the market was not: potential buyers
were hesitant to be the first to try out these aviation “firsts.” Furthermore, the aircraft
launched at the height of an economic recession at a costly $3.9 million for the original 2000
model and $4.7 million for the 2000A. This price tag was on par with a jet aircraft.
In a bid to improve sales and prove the Starship’s worth, Raytheon decided to offer free maintenance
to Starship owners. Unfortunately, this further exacerbated the aircraft’s image:
current owners made full use of the offer by often getting extensive and sometimes unnecessary
maintenance work done. Meanwhile, prospective buyers incorrectly assumed that the Starship was
unreliable, hence needing frequent maintenance. As a result, not only did the Starship fail
to bring in any money, but it was also costing Raytheon more money than expected.
After investing an unreal sum in the project (estimated at $1 billion), Raytheon still insisted
on offering the Starship in the business aviation market, but only managed to close 11 purchase
orders until 1991. In that period, smaller and more efficient executive jets arrived with a
cost practically the same as the turboprop. Not even the promised unbeatable performance
remained – rival Piper Cheyenne was as fast as the Starship without needing such an exotic design.
The first aircraft was delivered in 1989 during the Paris Air Show, in France,
but it had so many problems that it was called the “hangar queen”. With low demand, reinforced by
good sales from King Air, Beech started offering Starship to customers through leasing in 1991.
Even so, the unusual turboprop was unable to expand its sales, and just seven years after its
certification, the manufacturer completed its 53rd and final model in 1995. It seemed like the end of
a sad story, but the “ghost” of the Starship continued to pursue Beechcraft until 2003,
when the company decided to dismantle the small aircraft fleet due to its high support costs.
The Starship disaster is unusual on the long list of new airplane failures.
Most importantly, it did get built. Most paper airplanes never fly, and certainly almost none are
certified and produced. The other big difference is that no order holder lost their deposits on
the Starship. Raytheon stockholders didn’t do so well, but Beech didn’t screw the aviation public.
But the Starship was a disaster for all of aviation in terms of lost opportunities.
The billion bucks — closer to two billion in today’s dollars — that Raytheon spent going
down the wrong technological paths could have been, and should have been, spent on an improved
conventional turboprop. Today’s King Air 350 is a terrific airplane, and a best seller, but if
those billion dollars had gone into building on the King Air instead of chasing a dream, we would
have an airplane now that is several inches larger in cabin section, more fuel efficient because of
a newer wing design, and less costly to maintain because of modern system design and materials use.
Even to this day, it’s awkward when the Starship is described by so many as high-tech,
and futuristic. It was a failure in every respect. Raytheon shot for the
moon and ended up with an exotic looking airplane that didn’t do anything as well
as airplanes already there, and costing much less. And all of aviation was robbed
of the really terrific airplane that a billion dollars could have created.