Imagine using a nuclear weapon to scare your opponent into submission and end a war.
Sounds a bit crazy, right? Well, that is what many
intelligence analysts think is a part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
Other states have more restrictive philosophies. India and China,
for example, have a “no first use” policy.
This puts them on record that they will
not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
But if, say,
Pakistan were to hit India or
the U.S. were to hit China with some nuclear weapons,
then the nuclear floodgates come wide open.
During the Obama administration, the United States adopted a limited no first use policy,
but reserves the right to call in the first use nuclear weapons against other nuclear states
or states that the U.S believes are not in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
So China and Iran, yes.
Afghanistan and Bangladesh, no.
Russia’s government is opaque, and no one knows for sure,
but Moscow appears to have a completely different perspective.
And that has many worried about what might happen next in Ukraine.
In particular, if Ukraine continues to see success with its counterattack despite
Russia’s mobilization, Putin’s back will be against the wall.
With parts of Ukraine freshly annexed according to Russian law and therefore,
in theory, falling under Russia’s nuclear umbrella,
Moscow will order some type of nuclear strike against a
Ukrainian target. Or at least that’s the fear.
According to this concern, Kyiv, frightened by what might happen next, will cave.
That might not mean
welcoming Russian troops into the capital to take over the country.
But it might mean a freeze on the battlefield.
What Russia definitely would not want is for Ukraine to fight back
harder. After all, this is escalate to de-escalate, not escalate to escalate.
Is that even possible? Historical examples suggest that the answer is maybe.
Whether that is the case with Ukraine is another story.
Unfortunately for our analysis here—but fortunately for the
rest of the world—we do not have many historical cases to compare this to.
In fact, the only offensive use of nuclear weapons in history
seems to confirm the plausibility of escalate to de-escalate as a strategy.
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the Little Boy bomb over Hiroshima.
Three days later, it dropped the Fat Man bomb over Nagasaki.
Six days after that, Japan surrendered. The timing of everything matches with
what an escalate to de-escalate strategy would hope to accomplish.
However, in fulfilment of its promise at the Yalta Conference,
the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8.
This ended the government’s hope that Stalin would broker a more attractive
settlement for Japan vis-a-vis the United States.
Thus, what exactly caused the end of the war is unclear.
To underscore that point, we know the U.S.’s
previous attempt to escalate to de-escalate with Japan failed.
Overnight between March 9 and 10, 1945, the United States executed Operation Meetinghouse,
commonly known as the Firebombing of Tokyo.
This was a massive undertaking of 334 B-29 bombers dropping napalm over the city for hours on end.
100,000 people died, and more square kilometers of
territory were destroyed in Tokyo than what the nuclear bombs did elsewhere.
Operation Rolling Thunder provides another example of a failed attempt
to escalate to de-escalate with conventional weapons.
This was the long-running campaign where the United States bombed North Vietnam
to convince the Hanoi government to terminate support of communist insurgents in South Vietnam.
That failed, of course, ultimately leading to South Vietnam’s capture.
However, if we are going to think more generally about whether and when nuclear
escalate to de-escalate will work, we need to think more about the theoretical problem.
We can’t just have some bizarre claim that nuclear weapons are
magically ending the war without explaining the intermediary step—
and we are going to see that intermediary step is often nebulous.
If a limited nuclear strike would end any war,
the strike itself must resolve whatever problem was causing the war in the first place.
This, incidentally, is a good way to think about anything that allegedly will end any war.
And as our friendly lines on maps will tell us, any explanation for war must
address why the parties do not settle around what they expect war to produce.
That’s because both would benefit from not suffering the costs associated with fighting.
Recently, we discussed what I see as the three plausible barriers to peace currently:
(1) Putin’s inability to survive in office given the expected war outcome
(2) Ukraine not wanting to give Russia time to regroup
and coerce Kyiv again from a better position
and (3) uncertainty and disagreement over the outcome of the war.
A Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine would not eliminate Putin’s personal bias.
At best for that theory, it would convince Ukraine that the cost of war is too high to continue.
But if that were clear to everyone,
Ukraine would just quit the counterattack now or right before the nuclear attack would
become credible. By doing so, Ukraine would avoid the unnecessary damage.
Obviously, Kyiv does not see an immediate threat,
so escalate to de-escalate is not going to resolve the war through those means.
Maybe that will change as the counterattack continues,
but it would be pure speculation at this point.
It’s a similar story with Ukraine wishing to keep its momentum.
Suppose that Ukraine knows that continuing the
counterattack will eventually trigger a nuclear escalation,
which would in turn cause Ukraine to de-escalate.
If so, like before, Kyiv would stop the advance
just short of that point and spare itself the destruction.
Thus, the only plausible way escalate to de-escalate would work in this
conflict is if there is disagreement between the two about the fight.
This is essentially how the narrative for Japan’s surrender works, with the
government learning of the U.S.’s new ability and giving up afterward.
Obviously, things are different today. Everyone is well-aware of Russia’s nuclear capacity.
And to be clear, it is not obvious that there is actually much other uncertainty
regarding nuclear use now. Still, there are some plausible options.
For example, Ukraine might doubt Russia is prepared to incur the
wrath that the international community would respond with.
Alternatively, Russia might doubt Ukraine’s own
willingness to escalate by launching more attacks on Russian soil and into Crimea.
Actually launching the nuclear weapon would initiate that learning process.
It could conceivably convince Ukraine of Russia’s seriousness,
which would lead to Ukraine slowing the counteroffensive.
Of course, escalate to de-escalate could ironically end up with Russian de-escalation.
Suppose that the uncertainty is that Ukraine privately believes that the
backlash against Russia would be vicious. And further, suppose that Ukraine is right.
For example, maybe nuclear use would cause abandonment from India, China, and Turkey,
further economic sanctions, an influx of U.S. military support, and an uprising at home.
Then Ukraine may
prefer to resolutely persist through the nuclear detonation and continue its counterattack.
Afterward, disaster befalls Russia, Moscow realizes it cannot politically win,
and Ukraine watches Russian soldiers retreat from its soil.
But how exactly would international actors like the United States respond to Russian nuclear use?
Well, that’s a big question that deserves enough video space to be answered in its own right.
Perhaps next week?
Fortunately, I do not think we are going to have to worry about any of that in the short term.
Ukraine’s counterattack was very successful in the north in September to the east of Kharkiv.
And over the course of October, Ukraine made slow but steady gains in the south near Kherson.
With the way Russia has been cycling experienced troops out
of Kherson City for freshly mobilized soldiers,
there is a good chance that Moscow views it as a lost cause and is willing
to slowly recede past the Dnipro River and give it up to Ukraine.
To be even more explicit, while Ukraine is still regaining territory,
the rate at which is doing so is slowing down,
partly because the easier targets are gone and partly because rainy
weather is making it more difficult to maneuver.
It recaptured 1.76% of its territory in September, but only 0.42% of its territory in October.
That’s right—those second derivatives from your calculus classes do, in fact, matter.
What that means is that Russia is not entirely out of the war. Not yet anyway.
And as long as Moscow sees a conventional way to win the war,
there is no need to engage in a risky nuclear gambit.
That, instead, might come after Ukraine severely
devastates Russia on the battlefield. And even then, that’s not certain.
Things are not looking good for Moscow, of course,
but Ukraine is still missing a large chunk of its territory.
And until there is further progress for Ukraine, there is little risk of Russian nuclear use.
Do you think Russia can successfully escalate to de-escalate in Ukraine?
Let me know in the comments.
If you want to know more about the war, you will love my book on specifically on the causes of it.
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Take care.
Imagine your job was to film the very first nuclear detonation ever,
and you didn’t actually get the shot in the frame. Forever a failure.