Amna: As Russia's invasion of
Ukraine marks one year, and
president Putin announces Russia
will suspend its participation
in the new start treaty, where
does that leave u.s.-russia
relations?
Rose Gottemoeller was the chief
U.S. Negotiator for that treaty
during the Obama administration.
She's now a distinguished
lecturer at Stanford university.
And Angela stent worked in the
state department during the
Clinton administration and
served as a top intelligence
officer on Russia during under
-- during the administration of
George W. Bush.
She is a professor at Georgetown
university.
Welcome to you both.
Rose, I want to begin with you.
What is the practical
implication of this, of Putin
saying this treaty is being
suspended?
What changes immediately?
Rose: What has happened during
this war in Ukraine is that the
Russians have continued to
provide the notifications that
are violent -- vital to the
regime of the treaty.
Frequently during the week and
sometimes even multiple times a
day, they would send the U.S.
Notification of the movement of
their strategic nuclear forces.
If an icbm has to go to a
maintenance facility, they would
notify the U.S., and when it
returns to its deployment based,
they would have to notify the
U.S.
In that way, we had a great 24/7
view of what was going on with
the Russian strategic nuclear
focus -- forces, and they as
well.
They had reciprocal rights under
the treaty, but they have now
suspended those rights on their
own recon Dixons.
Amna: Does that mean the U.S.
Has less of an ability to know
when Russia is moving its
nuclear weapons and if they
could use one?
Rose: I think it is important to
know that our knowledge of
Russian readiness is very much
dependent on our so-called
national cycle -- so-called
national technical means, all of
the capabilities that we have of
our intelligence establishments.
It is not as if we are left
blind by the action.
The mutual predictability that
comes from the treaty helps us
to have that 24/7 understanding
backed up by what we know from
our own intelligence.
Amna: What about the timing and
the intent of all this?
Why would president Putin be
delivering this particular
message at this particular point
in time?
Angela: He skipped his address
to the federal assembly last
year, so it was time to address
the Russian nation and also
foreign listeners.
They knew that the Munich
security conference was
happening when it happened.
They did not know that president
Biden was going to visit Kyiv
until a couple hours before he
did, but, Putin wanted to first
of all restate all of the myths
about the origins of this war,
that it is the west's fault,
that we did not negotiate
seriously with Russia
beforehand, and the west
threatened Russia.
Then he wanted to tell his own
people that this war will
continue for a long time.
He set the Americans want a
strategic defeat of Russia but
we cannot be defeated in the
battlefield.
His message to his own people
and to the international
audiences that this war will go
on until Russia has achieved its
objectives.
But he has not spelled out what
those objectives are.
We think it is the annexation
and full control of these four
territories, and to get the
Ukrainians to recognize it, but
there may be other goals.
He just said, we will continue
until we achieve our goals.
That I think there was also a
slight element that would cause
concern to the Ukrainians and
outside world, which are the
failed hints that Russia could
develop new nuclear weapons.
There was not a direct threat of
the use of nuclear weapons, but
certainly that this war could
escalate because of what the
west were doing.
Unsettling the outside world and
trying to calm his own people,
but tell them, this war is going
to go on and you have to accept
it.
Amna: Two Angela's point, Putin
did say the strategic systems
have been put on what he called
combat duty.
What does that into you?
Rose: This is something that I
think we are all puzzling about,
and we have to wait and see if
there are actual changes in the
operational status of the
strategic new air force posture.
A year ago at the time of the
invasion of Ukraine, he also
said that the forces were being
put on higher alert.
We know for a fact that it meant
there were more soldiers in the
command posts, that they were
upping their level of oversight
of what was going on, and they
were not actually changing the
operational status of their
nuclear forces and putting them
on higher alert.
That is a very, to go to a
higher alert status, is
destabilizing.
It sends the warning of a
possible escalatory action,
which I don't think is either in
the Russian interests.
At the same time, it also is
very stressing for the nuclear
forces, and is something that on
a day-to-day basis, the
commanders do not want to do,
because it means that they
possibly will be less effective
and efficient, should they need
to be called upon, heaven
forbid.
But there are downside
operational risks to that kind
of approach as well.
I want to stress that I'm not
sure at this moment if there are
any changes in the operational
status of the Russian strategic
nuclear forces.
Amna: Why would he make this
announcement then if there are
no changes?
Rose: I think it is -- it echoes
what he said a year ago when he
was trying to rattle the nuclear
sabr, and make it clear that
this was going to be part of his
overall rhetoric throughout this
war.
And that for him, it underscores
the seriousness of the threats
that Angela outlined in her
comments.
Amna: On the rattling of the
nuclear sabers, the new start
treaty only relates to strategic
nuclear weapons, but there has
been concern about Putin using a
tactical nuclear weapon in
Ukraine.
Do you share that concern?
Angela: You can't dismiss it
entirely, but I think Putin has
used these threats to intimidate
the Ukrainians, the outside
world, and to break western
unity.
We saw at the Munich security
conference how great the western
is, given the fact that European
countries have suffered from the
economic aftereffects.
He wants people to believe he
could use a nuclear weapon, a
tactical nuclear weapon,
particularly where -- where the
Ukrainians going to try to take
back crimea.
We do see even in the Biden
administration for all of its
support of Ukraine a concern not
to take actions or allow the
Ukrainians to take actions that
could lead to a russian-nuclear
-- a Russian nuclear escalation.
You should not be intimidated by
it.
Amna: In terms of where we are
now, president Biden recommitted
support to Ukraine.
He said more sanctions are going
to come against Russia.
We heard vice president Harris
in Munich say Russia has
committed crimes against
humanity.
Marking one year in the war,
does all of this make it more
likely for president Putin to
negotiate or to be more deeply
dug in?
Angela: I did not hear anything
in his speech today to indicate
he is interested in
negotiations.
And I think again, that was the
mood in Munich too, the
understanding that this was not
the time for negotiations,
because Putin still thinks he
can outlast the west.
That western unity will crack.
And that he will force the
Ukrainians to make significant
territorial concessions.
I'm afraid I don't see any time
in the near future the
possibility for real genuine
negotiations.
Amna: Rose, I will give you the
last word.
What is your take?
Rose: My take is that we really
need to do -- as well as other
countries around the world, the
Chinese for example have an
interest in the Russians staying
in the new start treaty so there
is a good deal of credibility
and stability between the two
biggest nuclear powers, the U.S.
And Russia.
We are all worried about Chinese
modernization, but I think it is
in the general interest of the
nuclear weapon states, as well
as to nonnuclear weapon states
around the world, to get the
message out there that the
strategic nuclear arms treaties
we have had for 50 years have
served a good, strong, strategic
purpose.
Amna: That is rose Gottemoeller
and Angela stent joining us
tonight.
Thank you both for your time and
insights.