Can a glutton be just? Can a coward be prudent? If so, how? If not, why not?
These questions inquire into the connection of the moral virtues. Just how are prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance related to each other? Can we acquire three of these virtues without
also acquiring the fourth? Or what about acquiring one without the other three?
Do all four virtues rise and fall together, or do they develop and work independently of each other?
In this edition of Aquinas 101,
we’ll examine how St. Thomas explains the connection of the moral virtues.
At first glance, it might appear that the moral virtues remain unconnected to each other. First
of all, when we exercise one of the moral virtues, it doesn’t appear that we’re also exercising the
other three. For instance, we don’t confuse an act of clemency with an act of chastity. In fact,
we can accomplish one act without the other. Also, life’s circumstances make exercising some virtues
difficult. For example, magnificence—an expression of justice—enables us to spend large sums on great
goods. But if we have limited means, such that great goods—and thus magnificence—lie outside
of our reach, does that require that we fail to exercise other kinds of virtue also? Unable to
exercise magnificence, is a simple man also unable to exercise fortitude or temperance? Furthermore,
it appears that a person may possess one of the intellectual virtues—like science—without
possessing another—say, wisdom. Likewise, it would appear that a person may possess one of
the moral virtues—like temperance—without possessing another—say, fortitude.
These three illustrations suggest that the moral virtues remain unconnected,
and that persons can acquire and exercise them independently of each other.
In his response to examples like these, Aquinas recalls the force of the Western
intellectual tradition. He reminds us of the teaching of St. Ambrose,
who taught that “the virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one,
is seen to have several.” Similar is the teaching of St. Augustine, who wrote: “the virtues that
reside in the human soul are quite inseparable from one another.” St. Gregory the Great held the
same opinion. He wrote that “one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever,
or is very imperfect.” Aquinas recalls even the teaching of Cicero, who argued that
“if you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must be that you have none at all.”
In order to defend this inherited teaching, which affirms the connection of the moral virtues,
Aquinas distinguishes the perfect from the imperfect exercise of the virtues.
For its part, the imperfect exercise of a moral virtue manifests simply an inclination
in us to do some kind of good work. We can possess an inclination to fortitude,
for example, by temperament or by habit. When they represent mere inclinations, Aquinas concludes,
the moral virtues are not connected. Although inclined to acts of fortitude,
we may remain disinclined to, or even repulsed by, acts of temperance.
But in terms of their perfect exercise, Aquinas goes on to explain, the moral virtues manifest not
just an inclination to good works but the good performance of good works. And this stands to
reason, Aquinas argues. The virtues equip us not only to perform good works but also to perform
good works well. Considered according to their perfect exercise, therefore, the moral virtues
remain intimately connected to each other. So much so, Aquinas concludes, to be perfect in
the exercise of one of the moral virtues, we must be perfect in the exercise of all four.
The reason for this, according to Aquinas, is that the moral virtues are connected to each
other internally by their own inner nature and logic, and in at least two ways. The first way,
Aquinas observes, highlights the proper functioning of prudence. As the queen of the
moral virtues, prudence cannot function properly without the support of the other three virtues.
That is to say, reason cannot discern, judge, and command action well unless it is supported by
rectitude in the will (which is the work of justice) and by strength and
moderation in the passions (which is the work of fortitude and temperance).
To justify his claim here, Aquinas draws on the authority of St. Gregory the Great, who states
plainly that “there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice, or fortitude.”
Gregory argued, too, that the same is true for the other three virtues: justice, and fortitude,
and temperance; these too cannot function well without the assistance of the other three virtues.
Accordingly, in the words of St. Gregory, there is “no perfect temperance, that is not brave,
just, and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate, and just;
no real justice, without prudence, fortitude, and temperance.”
The second inner connection that Aquinas perceives to link the moral virtues is the
dependence that justice, fortitude, and temperance have on prudence.
Here, Aquinas draws on Aristotle to make his point. Stated plainly, Aquinas’s argument is this:
no moral virtue functions apart from prudence. The reason is that the perfection of justice, of
fortitude, and of temperance results not from mere inclination but from choice. Because prudence is
the virtue that perfects deliberation and choice in all action, prudence remains operative in all
acts of justice, fortitude, and temperance. In other words, there is no truly just,
truly brave, or truly temperate act that is not also prudent. None of these acts can be
imprudent. Prudence counsels, judges, and commands all acts of justice, fortitude, and temperance.
For Aquinas, then, the moral virtues’ support of prudence, as well as their dependence on prudence,
highlights the inherent relations of the moral virtues one to another. As the moral
virtues progress toward their perfect expression, therefore, they rise and fall together. At the
same time, Aquinas’s teaching accounts for what we all experience in the moral life: our exercise
of the virtues can often remain uneven. We may excel at justice but struggle with fortitude.
Or we may excel at justice and fortitude but struggle with temperance. This experience does not
suggest that the moral virtues remain unrelated in us, but that we remain imperfect in exercising
them. Accordingly, the sign that we are making progress in virtue is when prudence, justice,
fortitude, and temperance consistently align, and increasingly cooperate, in our souls.
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