Australia's navy currently runs 6 Collins class submarines. They were built in Australia by
ASC Limited, formerly the Australian Submarine Corporation, back in the 1990s and early 2000s.
These were some of the most controversial and expensive machines
ever built in Australia's history. And now it is time to replace them.
In this video we are going to look at Australia’s troubled experiences
with boats that go underwater. A saga that continues to this day.
The United Kingdom has historically supplied Australia with their submarines since World War I.
Joseph Cook, sixth Prime Minister of Australia, had once asked
whether they can be made on Australian soil. An assistant minister of the Navy replied:
> "The submarine is the one class of vessel that is impossible to build in Australia."
Nobody disputed the notion at the time. Skilled labor was not present at high
enough quantities in Australia. Certain critical features in the submarine like the batteries
and electrical equipment would need to be imported.
So the whole thing would be a low-level assembly job. And an
expensive one to boot - financed by the taxpayer.
World War II would see the Australian shipbuilding industry build many
dozens of destroyers and frigates. But submarines again seemed out of the question,
despite their effectiveness in terrorizing Japanese shipping.
While the work quality was high,
productivity was low and bad labor relations frequently hampered output.
However after the war, the Royal Navy decided to base their fourth submarine flotilla in Sydney.
This forced the Cockatoo Island Dockyard to accommodate submarines,
and they gained some experience in it.
In 1963, the Australians announced that they would acquire four diesel-electric Oberon submarines
from the UK. Controversy immediately arose about why these were being built
in the UK. Why not build two of them in Australia?
The Australian Navy pushed back against even considering the notion of building
the Oberons in Australia. Largely again for the same reasons - feeling that such work
would be an expensive hand-out to a few hundred shipyard employees.
The Oberon-class submarines first launched in 1970. Remarkably quiet, the Australian Navy
had them fitted with American weapons systems, including a Harpoon anti-ship missile. Though
their original intention was to train the navy's anti-submarine forces,
the subs served well during the Cold War, operating for long periods away from base.
But in 1978, it came time to evaluate options for their eventual replacement
scheduled for the year 1990. This time, the United Kingdom was deemed to be less of a resource.
The UK Royal Navy had started to move away from using diesel-electric subs to only nuclear ones.
Australia wanted to avoid getting involved with the nuclear power issue. The Australian Labor
Party in particular strongly opposed the French nuclear testing program
in the Pacific. Keep this in mind for later.
This period of time finds the Australian economy in a funny place.
The global oil crisis and high inflation had brought upon an economic downturn
after a long post-war prosperity. Protectionist policies had eroded the country’s industrial
manufacturing capacities and forced it to reconsider new options to regain competitiveness.
The cancellation of an aircraft carrier opened up a vacuum in naval capacity. Backed by strong
political support at home, the Navy decided that it could fill that gap by purchasing an
existing diesel submarine design from abroad, and then build it domestically in Australia.
The troubled development and history of the Collins-class is well covered in books and
on Wikipedia so I am going to try to power through it and leave just the broad scope.
This was a difficult project from the very start. Domestic politics dictated
that at least 70% of the boat would have be built at home. Yet Australia had never built
a submarine before. Never maintained a class of submarines on its own before.
Painfully few of the contractors and sub-contractors were qualified or certified.
And it was a time of great change for the Australian defense forces both inside
and out. A few years earlier, Sir Arthur Tange had integrated the previously-separate
Australian defense forces into a single Department of Defense - and the different
departments were still learning how to play nicely with one another.
And the Cold War had recently ended, removing a long-present enemy and sparking
existential questions about what Defense would mean in this new era.
Most troublingly, the Collins would need to replace a very good predecessor
in the Oberons. And the Navy had great ambitions for the Collins.
They wanted it to be faster, deeper diving, stealthier, and run with fewer people.
This lack of coherency from the navy about what it actually wanted its submarine to be
and do was a key contributor to the Collins' future turmoil.
I am surprised they didn't ask it to cook and clean too.
The first boat out of six began construction in 1990
and was delivered in 1996. The last one arrived in 2003. The whole project had a final cost
of $5 billion AUD - one of Australia's most expensive defense projects ever.
The project encountered substantial technical problems.
Three major issues arose. First, there were faults with the combat
system software - delivered by a coalition of vendors led by American company Rockwell.
That system had been too ambitious from the very start. Rockwell worked diligently
with other companies to deliver it, but communications were poor. Relations soured.
Each component worked fine in a vacuum, but collapsed when integrated together.
ASC tried to declare Rockwell in default, but the government forbade it.
They tried to fix it but eventually they had to replace it entirely with a system
developed in conjunction with the United States. In total, this kerfuffle cost over $1.2 billion.
Second, the welding in the hull had flaws. Submarine designer Kockums
did the welding in Sweden due to the work's complexity. But they were working with a new steel
from BHP and schedules were extremely tight since the sections had to go to Australia for finishing.
So despite their experience, Kockums still did flawed work.
A number of Australians - including an admiral - supervised the work and pointed out hundreds of
issues. Kockums denied that the flaws were serious and a back-and-forth ensued.
And third, the Collins had a noticeably high noise profile. This is in part due
the way the hull was designed. Silence had not been a key point in the contract definition,
so ASC did not really think of it during the planning stages.
They wanted to emphasize a better sonar system - which is justifiable.
In the end the Australian Navy changed its mind on the matter - probably motivated by
an 1997 incident in which a New Zealand aircraft detected the Collins during
exercises - and wanted silence at speed. The US Navy and American firm Electric Boat
thus worked together with the Australians to remedy these issues.
With Australian domestic politics the way they are, the pressure was excruciating.
In 1999, the Minister of Defense commissioned an independent report from the head of CSIRO,
a government organization.
The subsequent June 1999 McIntosh-Prescott report
detailed many of these shortcomings. By this time, the press had started calling
the Collins the "dud subs". Everybody was constantly being asked about progress. Woof.
In the end, the key point is that the Collins had some issues but that's to be expected with
anything so ambitious and from an industrial cold start. They worked their way through it.
And now, the boats are very capable - up to par with anything the US has to offer.
I really am quite positive on it!
The Collins was a triumph. But now it is scheduled to be retired in 2025.
What should the Australian government do to replace it?
Originally, Australia held an option for an additional two Collins-class subs
after the first six. But after the delivery of the sixth submarine, the government
declined getting any more due to cost/schedule overruns (though those were relatively minor)
and the bad politics around this epic saga.
Since then, the Australian Navy's needs have changed once more.
China and India have increased their presence in waters alongside traditional players like Japan
and the United States. Their submarines are very sophisticated - some the very best money can buy.
There is little question that Australia's Navy will need new submarines.
I think the big question is whether or not Australia should buy them from elsewhere or
try building them again domestically. The whole thing has been a real mess.
The plan as originally set in 2009 had been to design and build the 12 new conventional
submarines domestically. Such a prospect played a big role in Australian politics.
Around this time Australia lost its car manufacturing industry,
and people were anxious about the state of Australian manufacturing.
There is a good argument to have ASC design and build Australia's next submarines domestically.
After all, the Collins are today very good submarines.
But there’s also good reasons not to - beyond the obviously higher costs.
After the seventh and eighth submarines were cancelled,
ASC found itself without submarine work. The government-owned company - nationalized in
2000 - transitioned from building submarines to maintaining them.
They then got a new contract building three Hobart-class destroyers - the AWD project. But
costs went over-budget by some $1.2 billion and commissioning dates slipped by nearly three years.
By the time the ASC can ramp back up again, it would not have had any submarine-building
experiences over the last 15-20 years. ASC would have to regain that expertise. In the same time
period, the US has gone from the Los Angeles class to the Seawolf class to the Virginia class.
ASC can probably regain that expertise, but likely not without some issues.
And the new sub would definitely not be ready in time for when the Collins is decommissioned.
In 2013, the Abbott government came to power, promising to make a decision on
the submarines within 18 months. Leaks came out about possible collaborations with the Japanese.
It feels random but Abbott and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a pretty good dynamic,
and the two countries had recently been deepening their relationship.
Purchasing and using Japan's Soryu-class submarines would save some $10-15 billion
over the ASC domestic-build option. Abbott argued that doing so was more financially responsible.
Then-Minister for Defense David Johnston made big headlines when he said
that he "wouldn't trust ASC to build a canoe".
That along with his general mishandling of the sub issue got him canned.
Nevertheless, procuring submarines from Japan would break a campaign promise
that Abbott and his party had made - particularly to the people of South Australia. Abbott's own
party members led an internal coup against him - a leadership spill, as it seems to be called.
To maintain his party leadership, Abbott said that ASC would be allowed a chance to bid
on an "open tender" for the project. But then people got confused about
what he exactly meant when he said that. It was bizarre. But
the option of purchasing Japanese-built submarines made in Japan fell through.
What ended up happening in 2015 was a Competitive Evaluation Process
in which Japan, Germany and France contended for the $50 billion submarine contract.
All the parties agreed to a build inside Australia.
After a long process, prime minister Turnbull announced in 2016 that the French Naval Group
would be building the 12 submarines locally in the South Australian city of Adelaide.
The French project has somewhat soured in the days since 2016.
Back in 2015, the cost was publicly estimated at something like $50 billion. But over time,
the price has risen to $80 billion and beyond. So the optics on that front haven't been so good.
Furthermore, the new Attack-class submarines as they are called, have seen substantial delays.
By 2021, five years after the French won the contract
and five years before the Collins decommissioning, construction was still some two years away.
It became clear that the Collins would have to be refitted so to extend their operation lifespan.
The new submarines are not going to be ready in almost any case.
But more than that came a change in priorities. Remember what I said earlier. Since 2016,
the geopolitical situation has greatly changed. Tensions between China and the
West are at heightened levels. And ships carry billions of dollars of
goods through disputed trade routes in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
Over time, the Australians realized they needed a submarine with greater range and stealth.
This meant a nuclear submarine. These are fast enough to escort
fast-moving surface ships through chokepoints.
They offer greater freedom of action in multiple directions and can stay deployed for days on end.
The French-designed conventionally powered diesel submarine
can’t do that. And so the Australians decided on another direction - though
they probably should have asked first before squelching the deal.
Thus the nasty breakup in September 2021 with the Australians cancelling the Attack
class submarine and signing a trilateral security pact with the USA and the UK.
The French are naturally and understandably pissed at losing a $66 or $80 billion
project - such a thing has domestic repercussions for their defense industry
back home as well. They recalled their ambassadors to the US and Australia. Good times all around.
The Navy's move from a conventional submarine force to a nuclear one is ambitious,
to say the least. I read documents written in 2009 claiming that it is basically impossible.
The move requires a massive shift in personnel, operations, logistics, and manufacturing capacity.
Australia has never had a nuclear power plant and reactors are banned in several states.
The American nuclear propulsion technology the new sub will use means that it won't
ever need to be refueled, but nuclear technicians are still needed for operation.
Key would be in building up and maintaining a skill base in this nuclear technology. Experts
need to be imported from abroad. Though Australia is a pretty attractive place to immigrate to,
literal nuclear scientists don't exactly grow on trees.
Then there is the public. Australian public opinion towards nuclear power
can be best described as negative. The 1970s saw a massive anti-nuclear movement
that sought to prohibit nuclear weapons testing and the export of uranium.
Popular opinion has somewhat shifted in recent years due to concerns about carbon emissions,
but nuclear remains controversial and unpopular.
The Australian navy has had trouble staffing the 58-large Collins submarines.
This nuclear sub is likely to be even bigger.
Bad publicity and unwarranted fear over nuclear submarines won’t help with recruitment.
Australia has put a lot over the years into the notion of making things in Australia. The
Collins class shows that the country is still capable of making great things domestically.
But that they can does not always mean that they should.
Saying so publicly, however, seems to be political suicide.
The new security pact essentially reboots the submarine project.
Details on the new boat are scarce. So let us hold judgement until those details come about.
And what about ASC? The company still has work with the $6 billion
Collins refitting project so to bridge the gap to the forthcoming Australian nuclear sub. Which
they will probably be involved in in some way as well.
There remains questions about the company's ownership. But for now,
it seems like its future is assured. And the Collins will live on.