In 2015 a coalition led by the United States managed to secure a robust and binding agreement
that would prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
Known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, the deal saw a lifting of nuclear-program
related sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran's commitment to a set of very stringent
terms designed to remove Iran's current capability to build a nuclear bomb, and ensure that any
attempts to violate the deal and build a bomb would be delayed long enough for a military
response by the international community.
But what was the JCPOA exactly, what does it mean that President Trump has exited the
deal, and how close is Iran to a bomb really?
Iran's nuclear ambitions are rooted in its experiences during the 1980-1988 war with
Iraq, and its wish to protect itself from the influence of great world powers such as
the United States.
During the war against Iraq both sides used chemical weapons against the other, and the
conflict was catastrophic for both nations.
To make matters worse, Iraq had throughout the conflict garnered the support of various
nations to include the Soviet Union and the United States, who saw Iran as a regional
adversary and gladly supported any nation fighting against it.
Thus Iran's leadership decided that nuclear weapons were critical for their survival as
a state, a desperate need that only grew worse when Iran witnessed the US-led coalition crush
Iraq's forces in weeks during the first Gulf War.
It was clear that without nuclear weapons, Iran would never be able to withstand the
US militarily.
Despite bellicose language and threats against the US and Israel, Iranian nuclear ambitions
were always defensive in nature.
In truth, Iran would have little to gain by developing a large arsenal of nuclear weapons,
as regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan- both enjoying a close relationship
with the US and prosperous nations in their own right- would then immediately pursue their
own nuclear programs in response.
The balance of power in the region would largely remain unchanged, and Iran would be left facing
other nuclear-capable neighbors who have as many nukes as itself, and the benefit of the
aid and support of the United States.
Strategically speaking, this would be a disaster.
Instead Iran hoped to maintain the ability to achieve nuclear 'breakout'- or the capability
to build a nuclear weapon in a very short amount of time- without actually building
a functional weapon.
This would allow Iran to use the threat of nukes as a bargaining chip and a self-protective
measure both, and it would never have to actually build a functioning nuke and thus trigger
the regional nuclear arms race that it did not want.
Iran's activities supporting terror groups in the Middle East however left international
leaders with little faith that the nation would not secretly develop a nuclear weapon,
and some- specially in the US- believed that Iran might even build a nuclear weapon in
secret and then deliver it to a terror group to use in an act of nuclear terrorism.
Some believe that the NATO invasion of Iraq in 2002 was partly motivated by a desire to
show Iran exactly what would happen if a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in the US or in
Europe was traced back to itself.
Crippling sanctions aimed at Iran further isolated its economy from the world, further
weakening it and even threatening the integrity of the ruling government as dissatisfied people
demanded change.
Already under sanctions for its activities sponsoring terrorists and other regional destabilizing
actions, the nuclear sanctions eventually succeeded in doing what threats of force could
not do: bring Iran to the negotiating table over its nuclear program.
While no one seriously believed that Iran wanted to build working nuclear weapons in
large numbers, as it would face its own destruction at the hands of the US if it did so, Iran
had always hoped to use the threat of nukes to improve its position at the negotiation
table.
During talks in 2015 however, President Obama resolutely refused to lift any other sanctions
from the nation other than sanctions put in place specifically in response to its nuclear
weapons program.
Crippled financially and out of options, Iran's nuclear gamble had failed, and it was forced
to accept the terms of the JCPOA.
Under the terms of the JCPOA Iran agreed to several key items all designed to ensure that
it could no longer enrich uranium to weapons grade level, and that any attempts to do so
would be clearly evident and take a very long time to implement.
This in effect reduced Iran's nuclear 'breakout' time from a matter of weeks to having an operational
nuclear weapon, to just over a year- this was a key goal of President Obama's who wanted
to ensure that it would take Iran so long to achieve nuclear breakout that the attempt
could be easily detected, and military forces could be marshaled in time to prevent it.
The terms of the JCPOA would thus be:
1) The shutting down of several Uranium-enrichment facilities and the destruction of 14,000 of
its 20,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges.
These are critical pieces of hardware needed to enrich uranium to weapons grade levels,
and of the six thousand that Iran is allowed to retain, these would be permanently and
irreversibly modified to ensure that they cannot enrich uranium past what is required
for civilian nuclear power generation.
Iran was also forced to use only its first-generation and much less efficient IR-1 centrifuges,
and banned from developing more advanced models for several years.
This measure effectively neutered Iran's ability to quickly develop a nuclear bomb, and if
it desired to do so it would need to vastly expand its inventory of centrifuges prompting
massive construction and international purchases that would be easy to identify and stop.
2) Iran's current stockpile of enriched uranium was reduced from 10,000 kilograms to only
300 kilograms.
While a modern nuclear weapon can require as little as 15 kilograms to be operational,
the 300 kilograms Iran was allowed to retain would not easily cover the research, development,
and testing phases needed to get to even a 1st generation nuclear weapon.
3) Uranium enrichment activities are capped at 3.67 percent, leaving uranium suitable
for use in civilian nuclear power reactors and experimental reactors, but falling way
short of the 90% enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon.
4) Iran's was forced to shutter several of its nuclear facilities, leaving it with its
facility at Natanz for enriching uranium and research labs at Fordow for experimental research-
though no fissile material is allowed inside the labs at Fordow.
This measure simplified monitoring of Iran's nuclear weapons program and simplified military
options if any were ever needed by limiting the number of targets to strike.
5) The plutonium plant at Arak was redesigned, and filled in its heavy water reactor with
concrete so that it could no longer create weapons-grade plutonium.
This measure also limited the type of fuel Iran could use to build a bomb with to just
Uranium, and increased the time it would take to do so.
6) Iran agreed to unlimited and free-access inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency on all of its nuclear sites, to include uranium mines and mills, centrifuge factories,
and its supply chain.
This also included any suspicious site discovered via intelligence assets or any other means.
Any development or purchase of dual-use technologies, or pieces of hardware that could be used for
either peaceful nuclear energy production and research or nuclear weapons, would also
be closely monitored.
The only caveat to this term is that some military sites would have 'managed access',
but Iran must ultimately grant access to even these sites.
With such stringent measures in place, and an unprecedented level of cooperation from
Iran, the nation's nuclear weapons program was in effect completely neutralized.
Yet many people, especially here in the US have for the last few years complained that
the deal was flawed.
These concerns sadly enough are largely the result of ignorance of the details of the
JCPOA, the process of building a working nuclear weapon, and even Iran's own strategic goals.
The most common fear is that Iran could simply develop a nuclear weapon in secret, and 'cheat'
the terms of the JCPOA.
This would be so incredibly difficult for Iran to achieve, that it borders on absurdity.
The centrifuge facility at Natanz was one of Iran's best-kept secrets, and not only
was its existence quickly discovered by Israeli and American intelligence, but it was penetrated
on several occasions by the infamous StuxNet computer virus which destroyed thousands of
centrifuges in operation.
And this of course was without inspectors being granted access to every corner of the
country.
Simply put, developing the hardware to create nuclear weapons is a massive endeavor, and
not one that is easily hidden- let alone when you have international inspectors scouring
every inch of your country and carefully checking your finances.
If Iran wanted to secretly build a nuclear weapon it would have to rebuild huge portions
of its nuclear infrastructure, and while it once attempted to hide a single enrichment
facility, doing so for an entire nuclear development chain would be impossible.
Then of course there's the simple matter that Iran is not well served by having a nuclear
arsenal in the first place.
It knows all too well that the US would spare no amount of military force to neutralize
it if it ever developed a working nuclear weapon, and even if it didn't, Iran would
then have to contend with other nations not friendly to itself such as Jordan and Saudi
Arabia developing their own weapons- something that both nations have in fact expressed a
great desire to do.
Unfortunately, President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA has greatly destabilized the
entire agreement, and threatened a return to the pre-deal years of constant threats
of military action, and retaliation by Iran through its support of international terror
networks.
In a move that is meant to force the European members of the agreement and China to relax
sanctions re-imposed by the US, Iran has once again begun to enrich uranium and has breached
the stockpile limit set by the JCPOA.
Yet even if Iran were to continue enriching uranium, it would take at least a year for
it to have enough material for a working nuclear weapon, making the violation a calculated
bluff.
Then of course there is the matter of transferring a working nuclear weapon onto a missile platform,
and the development of a delivery system capable of reaching international targets in Europe
and America- yet another difficult feat.
In short, Iran is currently anywhere from several months to at least a year from having
enough material to build a working bomb- and that is exactly what they would have, one
single bomb.
Fitting that weapon to a delivery platform that is accurate and reliable would be another
challenge in and of itself.
Yet even if Iran were to build a bomb, doing so would in fact be suicidal, as it would
immediately trigger an international military response.
In the end, President Trump's withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA was largely as symbolic
as Iran's own threat to develop a nuclear weapon, and sadly today we're quickly returning
to the pre-deal days where what happens next is anyone's guess.
Do you think Iran would ever be suicidal enough to actually build a bomb?
Why or why not?
Let us know in the comments!
And as always if you enjoyed this video don't forget to Like, Share, and Subscribe for more
great content!