Hello. This video is a summary of and commentary on the second half of Chapter 8 of Frederick
Wilhelmsen’s book Man’s Knowledge of Reality.
Chapter 8 Section 5 is titled “Knowledge and Representation.”
The driving question of this chapter is, “How can knowledge *represent* its object without
being a *copy* of its object?”
Preparing to answer this question, we have discussed the intentional mode of being, by
which a thing may be present in the mind of a knower.
With this background, we can begin our analysis of representation.
First comes a question of definition: what is representation?
If we trace this back to the root word “represent,” that is, re-present, we find that we must
first analyze the term “presence.”
Etymologically, “presence” comes from words meaning “to be before.”
There are two related ways a thing can be present.
First, it can “be before someone,” that is, be in view.
This type of presence necessarily involves being in a determinate place.
“Presence” in this sense is the antonym of “absence.”
But this first definition depends on the second, deeper definition of “presence.”
Only *what is* can “be before someone,” so the more fundamental, existential meaning
of “presence” is “existing,” or present in existence.
In the fullest sense, “presence” combines both of these meanings: it is a being-in-existence,
but also a being-before-another.
In other words, it is a relational mode of being, not closed in upon itself.
When a being stands in existence before another, it is re-presented to that other.
This being-present-to-another is a new mode of existence a being can exercise.
It marks the transition from a private to a public, shared existence, so to speak.
Next, let us consider the various possibilities of representation.
A being may be represented to itself or to another.
Purely material beings, like a stone, have no inner life and so can never re-present
themselves to themselves.
A stone is present to itself physically, but never intentionally.
It is not an object of knowledge for itself; it in incapable of self-knowledge.
A purely physical being can be represented to another being, however.
One way is physically: if the stone hits me, it is present to me physically.
A stone can also be present to me from a distance, when light travels from it to my eyes.
Finally, a physical being can be present to another being in a sign.
A sign is a thing or action that makes known something other than itself.
Signs signify, or re-present the signified being to a knower being.
For example, smoke is a sign of fire.
When I see the smoke, it not only conveys to me the reality “smoke is there,” but
also it signifies the fire that is the smoke’s origin.
This event is a re-presentation in the intentional order: I know there is fire because of what
I know about the smoke I see.
When I see the smoke and know that an unseen fire has caused it, the fire itself has three
different levels of being: first, it is physically present at its place and time as fire; second,
it is physically re-presented in the sky by the smoke it generates; third, it is intentionally
re-presented in the mind of an knowledge-capable observer, who sees the smoke and knows that
smoke means fire.
So far, we have two meanings of “representation.”
It means “present in relation to another being” physically, and “present in relation
to another being” intentionally, as knowledge.
There is a third meaning of “representation,” bound up with the nature of signs and signifying.
The third meaning of “representation” is “present in place of something else.”
In this sense, a sign represents the thing it signifies.
Let us call these the physical, the intentional, and the ambassadorial (or substitutive) meanings
of the term “represent.”
Like an ambassador, the sign acts on behalf of an absent party.
This sense of representation is the root of the idealist philosopher’s accusation against
the realist.
If the realist thinks knowledge is a stand-in for the object known, like an ambassador stands
in for his sovereign, then realism is copy theory, and thus false.
But this is not how the realist conceives of knowledge.
To explain this, we should distinguish between two kinds of signs.
An instrumental sign signifies another thing, while retaining its own particular being.
A roadsign pointing toward Chicago signifies that city, but it also a 10x8 foot piece of
green metal.
It could be used in a physical way, as shelter in a storm for example, quite independently
of its signifying function.
But in addition to instrumental signs, there are formal signs.
A formal sign has no being beyond its signifying act.
It points toward another reality, but other than that pointing-toward, it is nothing in itself.
There is no physical residue left over, nothing to use as shelter in a storm, so to speak.
Knowledge is a formal sign of its object.
“All signs, except knowledge, are two ‘realities’: (a) they are things existing in the natural
order; (b) they are signs.”
This is the solution to the problem of this chapter: knowledge represents its object,
not by being a mental copy of the object, but by being a formal sign of the object.
Our error on this point may come from our supposing knowledge to be a *thing* and then
asking what sort of thing it is.
Knowledge is not a thing, but an act.
My knowledge of a horse is nothing more than the being-known of the horse to me.
It is the real horse’s being, intentionally, in my mind.
Knowledge is this re-presentation of real beings in the intentional order of knowing minds.
When we realize this, we can begin to clear up many confusions about the nature of knowledge.
My knowledge of the planet Saturn is not a pattern of brain waves inside my head, nor
is it an immaterial idea-copy of Saturn present in my mind.
Instead, my knowledge of Saturn is a relationship between me, as a knowing being, and the real
planet millions of miles away.
It is a union of knower and known in the intentional order.
There is much more for us to explore about this, of course.
We have just scratched the surface so far.
This concludes my summary and commentary on Chapter 8 sections 5 and 6 of Wilhelmsen’s book.
I look forward to discussing it with you soon. Thanks for watching today; goodbye.