“So Stephen, I'm sorry to tell you that libertarianism and the kalam can continue
to live happily ever after, and so that epiphany of yours does not hold water… from which
I conclude that it didn't come from God. But hey, there's at least one thing we agree on, right?”
Just over a week ago, Lucas, of the channel Deflate, responded to my video
titled The Great Cost of the Kalam, in which I expressed that unless I’m mistaken, the
Kalam Cosmological Argument and Libertarian free will are incompatible. For context, here’s
how I expressed the crux of my case: “According to libertarianism, that is, according the
vast majority of theists, the will of a free agent is at least patially non-determined.
Thus, by freely stating ‘Whatever begins to exist has a cause’, you have demonstrated
the contrary. You have proven its falsehood. You are contradicting your statement through
the means in which you express it. Or put it this way: Your act of stating the first
premise of the Kalam was caused at least in part by your free will, but your free will
was not caused by anything. Your free will was, by definition, not caused – it’s
non-determined.” So, that’s the contradiction I’m playing with. It seems to me that one
can’t believe that their will is “free” from causation while simultaneously believing
that “everything that begins to exist has a cause.” Within my original video, I encourage
people to correct me should they believe I am mistaken or missing something important,
and Lucas has very kindly obliged. “Hi, I’m Lucas, and this is my new channel Deflate,
which answered the sceptic's questions to Christianity.” As is the standard, I recommend
that you view his response in full before continuing here, especially considering that
I’m going to respond to his objections in non-chronological order, for reasons I’ll
make clear shortly. So let’s get straight to Lucas’ core objection, by playing it
in full, and then responding one segment at a time. “Let's say my wife asks me in the
morning if I'd like a cup of coffee to which I respond with the free act of saying ‘Oh,
a cup of coffee would be great! Now is on libertarianism the coming into existence of
my freely chosen response ‘Oh a cup of coffee would be great’ uncaused? Popping out into
thin air from causal nothingness? Stephen claimed so! But there is no reason to say
that. The reason or cause why I freely respond by saying ‘Oh, a cup of coffee would be
great’ is because I love coffee, also because I feel tired and I'd love to wake up, and
because I love sitting down with my wife over a cup of coffee. So my love for coffee, my
desire to wake up, and my love for my wife are all causes behind the free act of responding
‘Oh a cup of coffee would be great.’ So free acts do not need to be thought of as
coming into existence without a cause, even in libertarianism, and thus there is no contradiction
between libertarianism and the first premise of the kalam. Stephen is simply mistaken when
he thinks that libertarianism implies that acts of free will don't have a cause.” Okay,
so the first thing to make clear is that libertarianism is not the view that acts determined by free
will (such as requesting a coffee) are uncaused’ (“The free act of saying […] The free
act of responding […] So free act”), but rather that the will itself is uncased. As
Theopedia’s entry on Libertarian free will puts it, “All "free will theists" hold that
libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined
or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called
a free choice.” Now I will further bolster this definition in a few minutes in reply
to some of Lucas’ criticisms of where and how I attain my definitions, but for now,
this is what we’ll work with, especially considering that despite Lucas’ objections,
he accepts Theopedia’s definition, and indeed the other two definitions that I gave in my
original video. “The definitions on libertarianism he’s given are pretty straight-forward and
non-controversial, I’d say.” So to put the locus front and centre, let’s map out
the example that Lucas gave. We have the act of Lucas accepting a coffee (“Oh, a cup
of coffee would be great!”), and we have various causes of this act, such Lucas enjoying
the taste of coffee (“I love coffee”), him wanting to wake up (“I feel tired and
I'd love to wake up”), and him wanting to sit with his wife (“I love sitting down
with my wife”). And Given these causes, Lucas concludes that there is therefore no
contradiction between libertarianism and the first premise of the Kalam. “And thus, there
is no contradiction between libertarianism and the first premise of the Kalam.” But
in actuality, Lucas has not given us an example of free will, but rather determinism. Remember,
"Free will theists" hold that [...] if our choice is determined or caused by anything,
including our own desires, […] it cannot properly be called a free choice.” Lucas’s
love for coffee, his desire to wake up, and his love for his wife, are causes of him accepting
her gracious offer of coffee, but here’s the question: Was any of these causes themselves
uncaused? Was any of these causes themselves free from determinism? Well, let’s go back
to the map. Is Lucas’s love of coffee determined by prior causes? Yes. His love for coffee
is determined by his taste buds, which in turn are determined by his genetics, and so
on either forever or until something in the chain is not determined – which proponents
of the Kalam insist is God. God is the only thing that’s not caused, for God is the
only thing that did not “begin to exist.” What about Lucas’ desire to wake up? Is
this determined by prior causes? Yes. Lucas wants to wake up because he’s tired, and
he’s tired because he’s just woke from a long slumber, and so on either forever or
until something in the chain is not determined – which, again, proponents of the Kalam
insist is God. And what of his love for his wife? Was this determined by prior causes?
Yes. He loves his wife because of the wonderful experiences he’s had with her in the past,
with in turn was determined by them both being compatible, and so on, again, either forever
or until something in the chain is not determined. And this brings us to the very heart of the
Kalam, which claims that everything other than God has a cause, since everything other
than God began to exist. The claim, therefore, is that there is no break in any of the deterministic
chains – they all descend back to God. Libertarian free will, on the other hand, is the assertion
that there are countless breaks in the deterministic chain. Namely, whenever a free agent exercises
their will. They reason that if their will is determined by anything, including their
own desires, then it’s not free. Thus, Lucas has not adequately dealt with my objection,
and so, for now at least, I’m still convinced that the Kalam is not compatible with libertarian
free will. To maintain a consistent worldview, theists must either exercise free will to
reject the Kalam, or be determined to reject free will. So, with Lucas’ primary objection
out the way, I’d now like to quickly respond to a few of his other objections, beginning
with one of which he dedicates the vast majority of his time to. “So what Stephens argument?
He starts by defining relevant terms, such as to begin or to exist, and the definitions
he offers are pretty straightforward and non-contentious. However, the problem starts when he gets to
the word cause, which he defines as follows:” “A cause is a person or thing that gives
rise to an action phenomena or condition.” That's the definition offered by Google, and
I have no issues with it, but immediately after defining cause,+ Stephen goes on to
say that: “It is a synonym of determinism” but that's simply not true the term cause
does not mean the same thing as determinism.” Lucas is of course correct here. I misspoke.
Cause is not a synonym of determinism. I always try to avoid mistakes such as this, but I
don’t always succeed, and Lucas emphasising my slip is fair play. I was wrong. My bad.
Fortunately, however, and most crucially, Lucas accepts the definition of ‘cause’
that I gave (“I have no issues with it”) and so one might hope that he’d quickly
move past my trivial mistake to get to the core my argument, but unfortunately, he doesn’t.
Here’s a few examples of him reiterating this objection. “No, it doesn't. The only
reason why Stephen would make this fallacious claim is that he wrongly holds cause and determinism
to mean the same thing […] In other words, cause and determinism are not the same thing.
Not at all […] This utterly arbitrary link is made only by Stephen to give the impression
that causation essentially equals determinism […] Because causality is not causal determinism.”
Again, Lucas is correct here, I misspoke. And the last objection from Lucas I’d like
to respond to refers to how I ascertain my definitions, and how transparent I am with
where I get them. “Stephen then turns to the term libertarian free will, or libertarianism.
If I've tracked his sources correctly, he quotes definitions given by Wikipedia, and
the website Information Philosopher.com, which says “Libertarianism holds on to the concept
of free will that requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course
of action under a given set of circumstances” And “Libertarianism is a school of thought
that says humans are free from physical determinism, and all the other diverse forms of determinism.”
He adds to that “It is, in a nutshell, the notion that one has the freedom to do otherwise.
Or to quote the propaganda machine that is via Theopedia, free will means that our choices
are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination
by God. Now on a side note, what is interesting is that when Stephen quotes Theopedia he does
what researcher normally does and lays fully open the source he's referring to.” So as
you’ve just had a taster of, throughout Lucas’ critique, he perpetually gives the
impression that I’m shady with my resources, and even makes out that he’s had to conduct
research of his own to find them (“He neither clarified where he's gotten from [...] If
I've tracked his sources correctly”), but as is the case with all of my videos, I gave
all of my references in the description. I have not, and will never, hide my references.
What’s more, when it comes to definitions, I personally couldn’t care less where one
ascertains them from, so long as they accurately represents the word or term – and so given
that Lucas accepts my definitions, this is, so far as I’m concerned, all that really
matters. “The definitions on libertarianism he’s given are pretty straight-forward and
non-contentious, I’d say […] And I have no issues with it […] And the definitions
he offers are pretty straight-forward and non-contentious.” To quote John Duns Scotus,
who is widely considered to be the father of libertarianism, “Nothing other than the
will is the total cause.” Okay, so let’s wrap up. “Greetings from Beirut to Portsmouth,
and let me know what you think. Greeting from Portsmouth to Beirut, and thank you Lucas,
for taking the time and energy to respond to me. I sincerely appreciate it.
Anyhow, as always, thank you kindly for the view, and an extra special
thank you to my wonderful patrons, and those of you who've supported the channel via other means.