Hello everyone you are watching another episode of Military TV
There is a good deal of interest these days in the growth of the Chinese navy, known officially
as the People’s Liberation Army Navy or (PLAN). Most of the discussion tends to focus
on the steady and significant increase in the inventory of PLAN ships and submarines,
as well as the gradual expansion of the operational reach of these ships. However, the other dimensions
of seapower that constitute the real effectiveness of any navy are not always sufficiently considered.
In the case of China, an assessment of strategy, operational proficiency, regional and global
naval power, and leadership deserve additional emphasis.
Let's look at the history at glance. The naval history of China dates back thousands
of years, with archives existing since the late Spring and Autumn period (722 BC-481
BC) about the ancient navy of China and the various ship types used in war. China was
the leading maritime power in the years 1400-1433 when Chinese shipbuilders began to build massive
ocean-going junks. In modern times, the current People's Republic of China and Taiwanese governments
continue to maintain standing navies through the People's Liberation Army Navy and the
Republic of China Navy, respectively. The Han dynasty established the first independent
naval force in China, the Tower Ship Navy. Although naval battles took place before the
12th century, such as the large-scale Three Kingdoms Battle of Chibi in the year 208,
it was during the Song Dynasty (960-1279) that the Chinese established a permanent,
standing navy in 1132. At its height by the late 12th century, there were 20 squadrons
of some 52,000 marines, with the admiral's headquarters at Dinghai, while the main base
remained closer to modern Shanghai. China has since the mid-19th century four
times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured
by the Japanese in the war of 1894-1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or
lost to Japan, in the war of 1937-1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help,
which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the
present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from
the 1990s a navy which continues to grow and prosper.
Since the release of the Department of Defense’s “2020 China Military Power Report” this
past September, much has been made of China’s securing the title of the “world’s largest
navy.” Indeed, the United States Office of Naval Intelligence has confirmed that the
People’s Liberation Army Navy or (PLAN) has surpassed the United States Navy in total
battle force ships, approximately 360 to 297, with future projections expecting the gap
to grow. By 2025, the PLAN is predicted to field as many as 400 vessels whereas the United
States plans only to field 355. Quantitative discussions of this sort have fostered an
increasing level of hysteria in the U.S. media and even parts of its foreign policy and defense
establishments. What such discussions fundamentally misunderstand about the two fleets, however,
are the major differences in force structure as well as the incomparable regional ally
differential maintained by the United States. In fact, most discussions about the size of
the PLAN inflate its surface warship fleet by including either small coastal patrol ships
or its amphibious transports and landing ships. In order of descending size, the PLAN’s
surface force is comprised of two aircraft carriers, one cruiser, 32 destroyers, 49 frigates,
37 corvettes, and 86 missile-armed coastal patrol ships. In addition, China’s submarine
fleet includes 46 diesel-powered attack submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, and
four ballistic missile submarines. This is further supplemented by the China Coast Guard,
which fields roughly 255 coastal patrol ships. In sum, China has a surface warship fleet
of 121 vessels, a submarine fleet of 56 platforms, and another 341 coastal patrol ships. For
its part, the United States Navy boasts a surface fleet of 11 aircraft carriers, 92
cruisers and destroyers, and 59 small surface combatants and combat logistics ships. Its
submarine fleet is comprised of 50 attack submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines,
and four cruise missile submarines. As such, the United States maintains a surface fleet
of about 162 vessels, depending on the inclusion of its small combatants and combat logistics
ships, and a submarine fleet of 68 platforms. Here we clearly see that talk of China’s
massive navy is rather out of proportion. It should be noted that China’s fleet relies
disproportionately on smaller classes of ships, like the frigate and corvette, which are widely
considered not to be major surface combatants. Even still, the bulk of its numbers advantage
comes from its coastal patrol ships which, while not insignificant, have limited capacity
to project power beyond China’s near seas. Further, the United States maintains a massive
carrier advantage. Wherever one falls on the debate over the continued viability of aircraft
carriers, the fact remains that both states are interested in producing them. For reference,
China’s single formal ally North Korea maintains a handful of submarines and coastal patrol
vessels. In contrast, the United States has formal
military alliances with six Indo-Pacific states Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines,
South Korea, and Thailand. Moreover, many regional powers notably India, Indonesia,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam maintain ever-deepening security relationships with the United States
due precisely to concerns over potential threats from China.
All of these navies have to be factored into any probable correlation of maritime forces
for the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and for a confrontation of any magnitude,
it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would engage China without other maritime partners
in the fray. We should never take our maritime allies in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere
for granted, and China is fully aware of their standing and strategic impact.
About the projection of Chinese navy, the total number of ships, submarines, naval aircraft
and supporting infrastructure continue to make gains, which will likely continue in
future years. With this as a baseline, the strategic, operational and tactical proficiency
of the Chinese navy has also made progress in parallel, with varied results. At the strategic
level, the Chinese navy has attempted to strike a balance between regional focus on the western
Pacific and adjoining waters, and other, sustained operations in distant waters. While it is
accurate that the Chinese navy has expanded the scope of their operations over the past
decade, they do not have sustained global presence and reach. Concentrating maritime
power in areas such as the East China Sea and South China Sea has certain advantages,
although the cumulative impact of years of at-sea time and tough challenges in the world’s
oceans is an important barometer of capability. The PLAN will achieve the proficiency associated
with extended maritime employment in time, but a strategy which allows both a regional
and global deployment posture has yet to be fully realized.
We can conclude that, the growing number of ships and submarines in the PLAN is worthy
of our attention, and as they say, quantity has a quality all of its own. Underestimating
the steady progress of the Chinese navy would also reflect a serious miscalculation. Nonetheless,
the professionalism, consistent at-sea experience, combat readiness, and command and control
capabilities of any navy are paramount considerations. Thanks for watching and see you in another
episode.