Can you tell us about the fundamental attribution error?
Well, actually, I'll tell you about the history of the fundamental attribution error.
Well, the term 'the fundamental attribution error' has a strange and interesting history,
and it has led to some confusion.
I was doing work a very long time ago.
It came when Dick Nisbett, whom I know you've interviewed, had done a very important series
of studies and written a paper with Ned Jones on actor-observer differences.
The hypothesis that I was pushing was that people are situationists for themselves to
much greater extent than they are of others, "I know what situations I'm responding to,
so I explain my own behavior in terms of situations. I explain other people's behavior in terms of their dispositions."
When he had shown it to me, I said, "Well, that's really interesting, Dick, but the fundamental
thing is that people overestimate the degree of cross-situational consistency, and they
make trait attributions in general when they shouldn't."
With absolutely no hesitation, Ross says, "Yes, Dick, that's right, but you're missing
the main point which is that everybody for everything is too much of a disposionist and
too little focused on situation."
Then in a later paper when I was discussing various kinds of errors and biases in distinguishing
my work from what I thought was the central message of social psychology, I had said,
"Well, the fundamental error is the tendency to underestimate the impact of the situation."
What I meant by that was not that it was fundamental in the sense that it was irreducible. No,
what I meant is it was an error in the most fundamental task that we attempt in life,
which is to say: what does that situation tell me about the actor; what does that situation
tell me about the observer? The term fundamental attribution error referred to the fact that
people characteristically make an error in that fundamental task.
Then, well, later he comes with a name for that: it's the fundamental attribution error.
That's now become a staple of psychology. Now you read an editorial, and someone would
say, "That guy made the fundamental attribution error."
There are two concepts that people understand about that. A columnist—you can count on
columnists to know of that in social psychology. One is fundamental attribution error
and the other is cognitive dissonance.
How can we reduce the effect of the fundamental attribution error?
Well, I think there's a limit to how much you can do. I know that, all day long, I'm
making the error. I mean, I know that in the abstract. I think there is a limit. On the
other hand, knowing that we're subject to it—I mean, if I hear myself say, "You know,
he's a very hostile guy," I say, "Well, wait a minute. What exactly is the evidence for
that?" "Well, he shouted at his kid at the picnic." I mean, how good is that evidence really?
If you have the concept clearly in mind, which you can do by giving people many, many examples—
I think it takes many examples, many illustrations from everyday life of the way that we can
make those mistakes—eventually, it does pack down to a principle that we can sometimes
recognize. We can sometimes see the error in ourselves. You can also point to the consistency
with which situations affect people.
One thing that strikes me often is that, I say, "You should see such and such a movie.
People are saying it's great." People's initial reaction to that is, "Oh well, I
may." Well, listen. If it's getting a 92 percent on Rotten Tomatoes, you're going to like it,
and that's an end to it. But every now and then, you're not, actually. But you probably
are. If it's getting a 34 in Rotten Tomatoes, unless you happen to have a real thing for
the actress in that thing, then you're not going to like it.
I think people find it hard to accept that generalization, actually. Since I say that
so often, I've come to believe it, and really I don't go to many movies that haven't been
strongly recommended. I get a lot better hit rate than when I say, "That's the kind of
movie I like." No, no, no. Specifically, how much do people like that?
There are some stimuli that are just very powerful, and we make a mistake in assuming
that we're not going to be one of those people. We way overestimate our own individuality and our own idiosyncrasy.
But that isn't the fundamental failing that human beings have. The fundamental failing
that really is much more basic is the tendency to assume that the way we see the world is
the way the world really is. That other reasonable people should see it the same way, and if
they don't see it the same way, it's because there's something wrong with them—some bias
that's affecting them. It can be the propaganda to which they've been exposed. It can be some
failing in their intelligence. It can be something about their education. We readily think that
when people disagree with us, it's because there's something wrong with them, not something
wrong with us, or at least not something that's affecting both of us that's making us simply disagree.