[Text: “If Gablenz remains at Trautenau, the Prussians will envelop him” - Aide-de-camp
Krismanic’s warning to Benedek on the evening of June 27.]
On June 27th, the Austrian 10th Corps under Gablenz achieved the only victory for the
Austrians during the entire war by successfully repelling the Prussian First Corps led by
Bonin.
However, Gablenz's position became untenable due to the Austrian defeat at Wysokow and
the advancing Prussian Guard Corps towards Eipel.
Despite the circumstances, the situation could have been worse.
To the west, Prince Friedrich Karl’s First Army deviated from orders, neglecting to swiftly
move eastward to support Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm's Second Army’s advance through
Nachod, Eipel, and Trautenau.
Instead, he turned south with the intention of encircling the Austro-Saxon Iser Army at
Münchengrätz.
In essence, the First Army was veering away from Benedek's position in pursuit of a relatively
insignificant tactical victory against Clam-Gallas.
Meanwhile, in Josephstadt, Benedek and his aide-de-camp General Gideon Krismanic spent
June 27 observing the intense battles unfolding on their northern flank from the fortress
ramparts.
While they were alarmed by the scale and intensity of the conflicts, they felt compelled to continue
their westward march towards the Iser.
Benedek, urged on by Krismanic, was eager to fully commit his forces against the five
corps of the Prussian Elbe and First Armies by joining Clam's Iser Army at Glitschin on
the twenty-ninth.
Benedek, concerned about the potential disruption to his overall war strategy, was hesitant
to turn northward and directly confront the Prussian Second Army.
Despite the ongoing assault by the Prussian Second Army on Benedek's flank at Vysokov
and Trautenau earlier in the day, the Feldzeugmeister chose to disregard the immediate threat.
Instead, he focused on devising plans for an Austrian concentration at Glitschin and
Königgrätz.
In an attempt to mitigate losses, he ordered Archduke Leopold's Eight Corps to join forces
with Ramming at Skalitz.
Towards the end of the 27th, a staff officer suggested reinforcing Skalice, but Krismanic,
deeming it too late to divert troops from their assigned marching routes, expressed
his resignation.
He reportedly muttered, "What can I do?
It's too late.
Everyone should just continue on to Josephstadt."
Krismanic and Benedek made the strategic decision to concentrate their main attack at Glitschin
on the thirtieth.
They acknowledged the peril of pursuing the Second Army into Silesia while facing the
threat of Prince Friedrich Karl's forces disrupting Benedek's lines of retreat.
Considering these factors, Krismanic and Benedek reached a consensus to leave Gablenz and two
corps stationed at Josephstadt on the twenty-eighth, with the purpose of impeding the advance of
the Second Army.
Meanwhile, the majority of the North Army would continue its westward flank march.
At Trautenau, the intention was for Gablenz to establish contact with the Second Army,
engage in battle, and subsequently disengage to return safely to Josephstadt.
This approach aimed to minimize risks and avoid the need for a time-consuming rescue
operation.
Following the clash at Podol on the Iser front, 1 Corps found itself in a precarious position,
facing overwhelming odds against the Prussian forces.
Colonel Eduard Litzelhofen, the staff chief of Clam-Gallas, was taken aback by Benedek's
order to hold the Iser line at any cost, as the strategic objective behind this deployment
was never clearly communicated.
Despite the setbacks, Benedek identified some favourable prospects as he assessed the situation
on the night of the twenty-seventh.
Archduke Leopold's Eight Corps was positioned in Skalice to provide support to Ramming and
obstruct the advance of Steinmetz.
The remaining forces of the North Army were in motion, converging with the Iser Army at
Glitschin via parallel roads.
Ammunition supplies were being transported from Brno to Pardubice, ensuring the necessary
firepower to counter the Prussian needle rifles.
Although hindered by slow communication from Clem-Gallas, a sense of optimism persisted,
with Krismanic believing that the First Corps and the Saxons had achieved victory on the
Iser front, potentially creating a diversion towards Reichenberg.
Benedek planned to visit Skalice the following morning to oversee Archduke Leopold's relief
of Ramming and secure his flank and rear before shifting focus to the main westward thrust.
On the Prussian side, the crown prince had been present with Steinmetz at Vysokov on
the twenty-seventh.
In the afternoon, he relocated his headquarters to Eipel Pass where, early on the twenty-eighth,
he anxiously awaited the sounds of battle from both sides.
Initially, he had planned to send one of his two Guard divisions to Skalice to assist Steinmetz
in crossing the Aupa river line.
However, due to Bonin's defeat at Trautenau, the crown prince was compelled to send the
entire Guard Corps, under the command of Prince August of Wurttemberg, northwestward.
Their objective was to dislodge Gablenz, open the only mountain pass that was still closed
to the Prussians, and begin securing the strategically crucial road to Glitschin.
This road would ultimately connect the western and eastern sections of Moltke's army.
Both flanks of the crown prince's forces were now under threat.
One flank faced the panicky retreat of Bonin from Trautenau, while the other flank was
at risk due to the presence of three Austrian corps known to be in the vicinity of Skalitz.
Prince August voiced his concerns regarding the lack of communication with First Corps.
However, a piece of news arrived, indicating that the Austrian 10th Corps was retreating
from Trautenau towards Josephstadt.
This retreat left their left flank vulnerable to the Prussian Guards.
Considering this development, Prince August made the decision to proceed with the march
towards Deutsch-Prausnitz, following the instructions given by Second Army headquarters.
Meanwhile, Gablenz, realizing that he had stretched his corps too thin the previous
day, attempted to escape from Trautenau.
Despite receiving orders at 2:00 AM, there were delays in transmitting these orders to
Gablenz, resulting in additional complications.
Upon learning about the advance of the Guard Corps, Gablenz, displaying defiance and a
strong desire for confrontation, dispatched a brigade to launch a flank attack against
them.
This decision was made despite the risky odds and the potential for encirclement.
[Battle map]
[“The Prussians are handling Bohemia like a conquered land.
A quick Austrian victory is needed.”
- Letter from a French observer]
After setting up camp at Trautenau on the twenty-seventh, Gablenz realized that he had
lost valuable time.
Although he did not receive specific orders for the following day, the successful advancement
of the Prussian Guard and other corps compelled him to retreat to the secure Elbe line at
Josephstadt.
However, initiating the escape proved to be time-consuming, as there were delays in getting
his trains on the road and his troops retrieving their backpacks.
It was not until 8:00 A.M.
when Gablenz himself finally left Trautenau, but by then, the Prussian Guard Corps was
already in close pursuit.
As his march column reached Burkersdorf, approximately five kilometers away, the 2nd Guard Brigade,
leading Prince August's 1st Guard Division, spotted them while closing in from Staudenz.
The physical condition of Gablenz's troops was severely strained, as the Guard Corps
had covered a distance of fifty kilometers within a span of two days.
The approach to Burkersdorf from Eipel was particularly arduous, involving a narrow dirt
track followed by traversing through standing corn, which further drained their energy.
Gablenz had anticipated the arrival of the Prussian Guard, although he did not expect
them to reach his location so swiftly.
Fortunately, he had already positioned three artillery batteries at Burkersdorf, having
trained them to face east.
In order to secure his last remaining escape routes to the Elbe, namely the roads from
Burkersdorf and Hohenbruck leading west to Pilnikau, Gablenz made a hasty maneuver to
the left.
He deployed the Knebel and Mondel Brigades, which had previously been moving southward,
in a protective half-circle formation facing east.
Specifically, Mondel took position on the left at Neu-Rognitz, while Knebel positioned
on the right at Burkersdorf.
Subsequently, Gablenz swiftly mobilized eight additional batteries from his corps reserve,
positioning them at Burkersdorf.
He then dispatched Grivic's brigade, despite being devoid of any cavalry and having suffered
significant damage from the preceding day's events, on a mission to flank the vanguard
of the Guard Corps by advancing from the rear through Radec.
Gablenz managed to position sixty-four guns, all aimed directly at the Prussian Guards,
before they could fully engage.
While the steady barrage from the 10th Corps' artillery held the Prussians in check for
an hour, the 2nd Guard Brigade successfully broke through and reached Burkersdorf by 9:30
A.M., launching a fierce assault on the elevated terrain leading to the village.
Simultaneously, Gablenz redirected the majority of his corps onto the westward road to Pilnikau,
while leaving behind a single regiment in Burkersdorf to impede the advancing Prussian
forces.
These soldiers, comprising Germans and Czechs from the Lower Silesian 1st Regiment, inflicted
substantial casualties upon the Prussian Guards, who were compelled to traverse 400 meters
of exposed ground in order to capture the village.
During the final approach, the Prussian Guards endured relentless shellfire and targeted
salvos, resulting in the loss of numerous guardsmen and every company captain leading
the charge.
While the Austrian 1st Regiment gradually conceded ground in Burkersdorf, Gablenz's
Knebel and Mondel Brigades dispersed across the fields toward Pilnikau, leaving behind
a substantial number of unharmed prisoners.
As the intensity of Austrian fire waned, an increasing number of disoriented Prussian
Guards stumbled into Burkersdorf.
Their impulsive rush to encircle Gablenz led them to engage in a frontal bayonet assault,
causing casualties reminiscent of Austrian-style warfare.
Eighteen officers and 478 men were left lying on the battlefield.
The time was approximately 10:00 A.M.
Subsequently, Knebel's 1st Regiment relinquished control of Burkersdorf and joined Gablenz's
forces as they moved towards Pilnikau.
Under the cautious leadership of Prince August of Württemberg, an energetic pursuit by the
Prussian forces was deemed impractical, as the majority of the Guard Corps was still
en route from Eipel.
Furthermore, to everyone's surprise, Bonin would not return to Trautenau until the following
day.
Satisfied with the belief that Gablenz had been defeated, the 1st Guard Division halted
in the fields between Burkersdorf and Soor, where they set up their cookfires.
As the afternoon progressed, in order to pass the time, curious guardsmen scavenged through
the abandoned spoils left by the panic-stricken Austrians on the Josephstadt road.
These included caissons, food wagons, and Gablenz's entire cash reserve of 10,000 silver
florins.
Gablenz was compelled to forgo his planned retreat on a well-established hardened road
and instead navigate through the soft fields behind him.
Remarkably, he only lost two cannons during this hurried maneuver.
He successfully led the three brigades under his command—Knebel, Mondel, and Wimpffen—to
safety.
Unfortunately, Colonel Grivicic's brigade was doomed due to Gablenz's swift retreat.
Just as the 10th Corps was relinquishing its final positions west of Burkersdorf, Grivicic,
coming from the south along the Aupa, unintentionally marched his regiments into the rear of the
Guard division at Burkersdorf and Soor.
Messengers failed to locate Grivicic's brigade, and at noon, he found himself alone in the
wilderness southeast of Trautenau, completely unaware of the developments in Burkersdorf.
Following his original orders, Grivicic continued his march three kilometers south to Radec,
intending to face northeast and confront any Prussian forces approaching from the Eipel
road.
Erroneously assuming that the artillery barrage pounding Burkersdorf
was due to the arrival of Austrian Fourth Corps' batteries reinforcing Gablenz, Grivicic
fell into a trap.
With his 5,000 hungry men, he found himself caught in a fog of ignorance and unfavorable
circumstances.
By chance, Grivicic's brigade stumbled upon four Prussian rifle companies dispatched as
a vanguard for reconnaissance.
Initially, the Prussians mistook Grivicic's brigade for an advanced party of Bonin's First
Corps.
However, the lieutenant colonel leading the Guard soon recognized the white tunics worn
by the Austrians and exclaimed to his adjutant, "I see white tunics; it's the enemy.
Report that Rudersdorf is occupied by the enemy, and we will capture it."
Thus began an hour-long engagement where four Prussian rifle companies faced off against
an entire Austrian brigade, managing to hold them at bay.
Due to the absence of intelligence from cavalry scouts, Grivicic remained uncertain about
the size of the Prussian force he had encountered.
Instead of simply pushing aside the Prussian battalion and continuing his march, Grivicic
made the decision to defend Rudersdorf.
His aim was to divert the main attack of the Guard Corps toward himself, buying time for
Gablenz and the rest of the Tenth Corps to move southward towards Josephstadt.
However, Grivicic was unaware that Gablenz had deviated from the Josephstadt road, and
Gablenz himself was unaware of Grivicic's presence in Rudersdorf.
Through the use of horn and drum signals, Grivicic managed to communicate the change
in the battlefront to his scattered regiments, repel the Prussian battalion, and seek refuge
in the fortified farm buildings of the village along with seven infantry battalions.
It was only when the Prussian Guards opposite him refused to launch an attack that Grivicic
realized he had been facing a smaller reconnaissance party rather than an entire division.
At 1:00 PM, the Grivicic Brigade resumed its cautious advance.
At this point, the Prussian battalion facing them had received reinforcement from another
battalion, prompted by the sounds of fighting at Rudersdorf.
While Grivicic's skirmishers meticulously searched the dense meadows to the south of
Rudersdorf, they were suddenly ambushed and overwhelmed by a formidable force of 2,000
Prussians.
As the Austrian Jäger hastily retreated to Rudersdorf, elements of the 4th Guard Brigade
swiftly pursued them, subjecting Grivicic's line infantry to heavy fire.
Despite still holding a numerical advantage of two-to-one over the Prussians in his vicinity,
Grivicic found himself unable to make any progress against their advanced needle rifles.
Consequently, he issued orders for his men to withdraw to the safety of Rudersdorf, where
the battle persisted in a fierce house-to-house struggle.
Reflecting on the situation later, Grivicic expressed his desperate need to establish
communication with Gablenz, but the absence of cavalry and the incapacitation of his adjutants,
along with the loss of most of his staff officers at Trautenau the previous day, left him in
a dire predicament.
Matters soon deteriorated further for Grivicic as three additional Guard battalions arrived
and executed a successful flanking manoeuvre, causing panic among his Polish 23rd Regiment.
His efforts to organise the retreat were cut short when he too was shot and fell from his
horse.
Left without a leader and encircled by the Prussian Guard Corps, Grivicic's demoralized
brigade surrendered.
In the ensuing events, hundreds of men were killed, hundreds surrendered, and hundreds
more sought refuge among the rows of crops or escaped into the nearby woods.
Only a group of approximately 1,600 Austrian stragglers managed to navigate through the
night, driven by their fear of being detained in Prussia's Baltic prison camps.
These traumatized survivors eventually rejoined the North Army.
However, out of this group, only 600 individuals were deemed fit to participate in the upcoming
battle of Königgrätz, taking place one week later.
[Aftermath] Burkersdorf marked the continuation of the
conflict that unfolded at Trautenau, making it essentially a second battle in the series.
Interestingly, the occurrence of this battle was almost prevented due to Prince August
of Württemberg's reluctance.
Still, as Württemberg's cavalry pursued the retreating troops from Grivicic's brigade,
some 30 kilometres to the east, an even more significant and pivotal battle unfolded at
the small market town of Skalitz.